Why People Dislike the Insanity Defense

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on the insanity defense, considering when and why juries (and others) might perceive a criminal defendant to be not guilty by reason of insanity. Colb proposes that if a criminal defendant’s mental illness looks like an outside force that made him behave in an out-of-character fashion, then the jury is more likely to find him not guilty by reason of insanity.

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O'Brien v. Village of Lincolnshire

Docket: 19-1349

Opinion Date: April 7, 2020

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

An Illinois municipality may join the Municipal League, an unincorporated, nonprofit, nonpolitical association, and may pay annual membership dues and fees; member municipalities may act through the League to provide and disseminate information and research services and do other acts for improving local government, 65 ILCS 5/1-8-1. Lincolnshire is one of more than a thousand dues-paying League members and uses tax revenue to pay the dues from the Village’s General Fund. From 2013-2018, Lincolnshire paid at least $5,051 in voluntary dues and fees to the League. Individual residents and the Unions sued, claiming First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause violations. They claimed that Lincolnshire compelled them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern because the League sent emails promoting a particular political agenda, including the adoption of “right to work” zones. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Lincolnshire itself has the right to speak for itself and a right to associate; it voluntarily joined the League as it is authorized to do. Local governments must be allowed to discuss, either directly or through a surrogate, ideas related to municipal government, regardless of where those ideas originated.

United States v. Young

Docket: 18-3679

Opinion Date: April 7, 2020

Judge: Barrett

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Young promoted the prostitution of high-school-aged minors, taking some of the money that they were paid for sex. Young showed the minors the website Backpage.com and taught them how to post advertisements for “escort services,” sometimes taking revealing photos and posting them himself. Young set the hourly rates, reserved the hotels, and provided the victims with condoms and cell phones. He provided housing for one victim and drove the victims to and from their calls. Sometimes he personally demanded sex from them. He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 1591. Weeks before Young’s trial was set to begin, Young elected to represent himself. The government presented substantial evidence of Young’s guilt. Young testified in his own defense, admitting that he had been trying to start an adult escort business, that he knew some of the victims, and that he gave them rides. He denied facilitating their prostitution and posting their ads, stating that he did not know that they were minors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Young's convictions and 21-year sentence. Rejecting arguments the district court erred in instructing the jury on “interstate commerce” and that the evidence was insufficient on that element, the court noted the evidence of interstate advertising. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s third motion for a continuance. Young was warned of the consequences of representing himself. The court upheld the decision to exclude evidence of the minor victims’ past sexual conduct.

Flexible Steel Lacing Co. v. Conveyor Accessories, Inc.

Docket: 19-2035

Opinion Date: April 7, 2020

Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple

Areas of Law: Intellectual Property, Trademark

Flexco sued for trade dress infringement and unfair competition, alleging that CAI infringed its registered and common law trade dress by promoting and selling conveyor belt fasteners with a product design that is confusingly similar to the product design of Flexco’s fasteners. Flexco cited the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114 and 1125(a), and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS 510/2. CAI sought cancellation of Flexco’s registered trademarks and a declaratory judgment of invalidity, unenforceability, and noninfringement. The district court granted CAI summary judgment, holding that Flexco’s trade dress was functional. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Flexco’s utility patent discloses the utilitarian benefits of the beveled center scallop and is strong evidence of the functionality of Flexco’s trade dress; that evidence is bolstered by Flexco’s own advertisements, internal communications, and statements to the Patent Office. Where functionality is established, there is no need to consider alternative design possibilities.

Vega v. Chicago Park District

Dockets: 19-1926, 19-1939

Opinion Date: April 7, 2020

Judge: Barrett

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

Vega, a Hispanic woman, began her employment with the Chicago Park District in 1987 and was promoted to the position of park supervisor in 2004. In 2012, an anonymous caller accused Vega of clocking in hours that she had not worked. The District had investigators watch Vega for 56 days. The investigators interrupted Vega at work; Vega’s union representative found them to be “pretty dead set” on finding that Vega had violated the Code of Conduct. Suffering from “significant anxiety,” Vega took medical leave on the advice of her physician. Ultimately, Vega was fired for timesheet falsifications and for being untruthful during her Corrective Action Meetings. The District did not offer Vega’s union a pre-disciplinary agreement. A Personnel Board officer upheld Vega’s termination. Vega sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin. A jury awarded her $750,000 in compensatory damages but rejected Vega’s retaliation claims. The district court overturned the verdict on the section 1983 claim and remitted the compensatory award to $300,000, Title VII’s maximum; awarded Vega back pay and benefits, plus a tax-component award of $55,924.90; and ordered the District to reinstate Vega. The Seventh Circuit affirmed except for the grant of the tax-component award, which it vacated and remanded for the district court to explain its calculation.