Reflections on the Pending Supreme Court Challenge to the Affordable Care Act in California v. Texas: Part One in a Series

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, EVAN CAMINKER, JASON MAZZONE

In this first of a series of columns on the latest prominent challenge to the Affordable Care Act (ACA), Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar, Michigan Law dean emeritus Evan Caminker, and Illinois law professor Jason Mazzone examine the stare decisis effects of the Supreme Court’s initial blockbuster decision involving the ACA. The authors demonstrate several, perhaps surprising, ways that the earlier decision should shape how the Court views the present challenge.

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Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc.

Dockets: B292609A(Second Appellate District) , B299014(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Frances Rothschild

Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation

In this antitrust dispute involving licensing of motion pictures to movie theaters for public exhibition, Flagship obtained a jury verdict against Century. Flagship owned the Palme d'Or theater and Century owned The River theater. The jury found true Flagship's allegations that Century had engaged in "circuit dealing" by entering into licensing agreements with film distributors that covered licenses to play films not just at The River, but at multiple other Century-owned theaters as well, and using these agreements to pressure distributors into refusing to license films to Palme d'Or. The Court of Appeal agreed with Century that Flagship did not present substantial evidence of anticompetitive effects in the relevant market. The court also agreed with Century that this failure of proof warrants reversal, as circuit dealing based on multi-theater licensing agreements is not per se illegal under the Cartwright Act. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and need not reach Century's remaining arguments on appeal. The court also did not need to address Flagship's case from the court's postjudgment order awarding Flagship attorney fees in an amount lower than Flagship had requested.

California v. Martinez

Docket: C083898(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Harry E. Hull, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Alfredo Martinez and two codefendants were charged in connection with a “drug rip.” A jury found defendant guilty of robbery in the second degree, active participation in a criminal street gang, criminal conspiracy, being an active participant in a criminal street gang having a concealed firearm, and recruiting a minor into a criminal street gang. The jury found true several firearm enhancements and an on-bail enhancement, and the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 16 years eight months in prison. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) the Penal Code section 12022.53(e) firearm enhancement on count two must be stricken because it is impermissibly inconsistent with the jury’s failure to reach a finding on the section 186.22(b)(1), gang enhancement allegation attached to count two; (2) the sentence imposed and stayed on the section 12022(a), enhancement attached to count two had to be stricken because the jury did not make a true finding as to that enhancement allegation; (3) the verdict on count eight, recruiting a minor for participation in a criminal street gang, was not supported by substantial evidence; and (4) following the passage of Senate Bill No. 620, the matter should have been remanded to afford the trial court the opportunity to exercise its discretion to strike the section 12022.53(e) firearm enhancement. The Attorney General conceded the trial court improperly imposed and stayed sentence on the section 12022(a) enhancement attached to count two. The Attorney General also agreed that the matter should have been remanded to afford the trial court the opportunity to exercise its discretion to strike the section 12022.53(e) firearm enhancement attached to count two. The Court of Appeal agreed with these concessions, but otherwise affirmed the judgment.

In re S.S.

Docket: E074852(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Slough

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (department) filed a petition seeking to remove an 18-month old girl based on mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues and noncustodial father’s failure to provide for her. However, after the child was detained, father came forward and said he had been trying to reunify with her since mother took the child when she was about four months old. He also said he had established his paternity through a genetic test and had been paying child support to mother throughout their separation. Father said he couldn’t yet take custody of the child because his housing, transportation, and employment weren’t stable, but he indicated he had obtained work and was attempting to find suitable housing. He also indicated he would return to Chicago, his home city, and live with relatives who were willing to help him raise her once he obtained custody. The department amended the petition to remove the allegations against father before the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, nonetheless maintained the child should be removed from both parents, and asked the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that placing the child with her parents would pose a substantial danger to her health, safety or well-being. Rights to the child were ultimately terminated, but the father appealed, averring his situation had changed: he obtained full-time employment with benefits and a permanent place to live. The court denied his motion, concluding he had shown his circumstances were changing, but had not changed. Before the Court of Appeal, father argued the entire procedure violated his due process rights and there wasn’t adequate support for the trial court’s finding that giving him custody would be detrimental to the child. The Court held a juvenile court could not terminate parental rights based on problems arising from the parent’s poverty, "a problem made worse, from a due process standpoint, when the department didn’t formally allege those problems as a basis for removal." Absent those impermissible grounds for removal the Court found there wasn’t clear and convincing evidence that returning the child to father would be detrimental to her. Termination of father’s rights was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

People v. Allison

Docket: B300575(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Frances Rothschild

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeal, just as in its recent decision in People v. Galvan (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1134, held that a defendant convicted of murder with a felony-murder special circumstance (Pen. Code,1 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's petition for resentencing. The court published in order to respond to colleagues in Division 5, who in People v. York (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 250, disagreed with the court's analysis in Galvin. The court explained that there is no reason to believe that defendant's admission of the special circumstance after his original trial was any different in meaning or effect than it would have been if he had made it today. If defendants like defendant were able to petition for relief under section 1170.95, it would create a disparity by giving defendants with pre-Banks and Clark special-circumstance findings an opportunity to retry their cases, even as more recently convicted defendants are denied this opportunity. Furthermore, the Legislature's silence regarding defendants with pre-Banks and Clark special circumstances does not imply that such defendants are eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95. Finally, the purpose of section 1170.95 is to give defendants the benefit of amended sections 188 and 189 with respect to issues not previously determined, not to provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been resolved.