Latest 4 Cases: Center Healthcare Ed. & Res. v. Internat. Cong. Joint Reconst. (Business Law), People v. Avila (Criminal Law), People v. Griffin ...

What’s Not the Matter with Kansas: State Supreme Court Broadly Recognizes the Rights of Lesbian Co-Parents

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on a recent decision by the Kansas Supreme Court holding that a woman who conceives through artificial insemination and her same-sex partner can both be deemed the legal parents of any resulting child born during their relationship under the Kansas Parentage Act, even if the couple has not entered into a co-parenting agreement. Grossman explains the facts of the case and the court’s reasoning, and she explains why the court effectively balanced the rights and interests of the two women.

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Center Healthcare Ed. & Res. v. Internat. Cong. Joint Reconst.

Docket: D076513(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Judith McConnell

Areas of Law: Business Law, Contracts, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In 2009, the president of the International Congress for Joint Reconstruction, Inc. (ICJR) retained Mark Sacaris, part owner of the Center for Healthcare Education and Research, Inc. (CHE), to assist ICJR in producing medical education conferences on the subject of joint-reconstruction surgery. Their agreement was unwritten, and there was no discussion of the rates ICJR would be charged. Sacaris was given full control over ICJR’s money accounts as part of the arrangement. Sacaris used ICJR’s money accounts to pay CHE’s invoices without notifying ICJR’s board members of the amounts ICJR was being charged. Over time, and also without informing the board of ICJR, he increased the scope of CHE’s services, thereby creating additional sources of profit for CHE, and indirectly for himself, but he did not disclose his interest in these arrangements to ICJR. Eventually the ICJR board was informed by Sacaris that ICJR had amassed a $2 million to CHE. ICJR terminated its relationship with Sacaris and CHE. CHE filed suit to recover amounts it claimed it was owed by ICJR under the agreement. ICJR cross-sued Sacaris and CHE, asserting Sacaris secretly profited from his relationship with ICJR. After a bench trial, the court found ICJR liable to CHE for breach of contract. Although the court also found that CHE and Sacaris breached their fiduciary duties to ICJR in earning all four categories of the profits ICJR sought to disgorge, the court awarded ICJR recovery only as to categories two and four. On appeal, ICJR contended the trial court erred in determining that ICJR could not recover disgorgement of CHE and Sacaris’s profits from their undisclosed charges for management services without proof their breach of fiduciary duties caused ICJR to suffer monetary damages. The Court of Appeal agreed ICJR was not required to show it suffered monetary harm to establish a right to disgorgement of CHE and Sacaris' profits from undisclosed charges for event management services. The Court of Appeal reversed that portion of the judgment affected by the error and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of the award of disgorgement. However, the Court rejected ICJR’s claim that the court erred in determining that running symposia for pharmaceutical companies was not a corporate opportunity of ICJR.

People v. Avila

Docket: B294632(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Dhanidina

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted robbery and attempted extortion, and his sentence of 25 years to life plus 14 years. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's Romero motion to strike a prior conviction. In this case, defendant's prior strikes were remote and committed when he was of diminished culpability based on his age, a factor the trial court erroneously concluded was inapplicable to the formulation of his sentence. Furthermore, despite the trial court's characterization of the facts, defendant's current offenses were not violent and, on the spectrum of criminal behavior, fall closer to the end of less reprehensible conduct. The court also held that the sentence imposed on defendant is cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution. The court considered the Lynch technique and concluded that defendant's sentence lacks proportionality to his crimes. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing with the direction to the trial court to strike two of defendant's prior strike convictions and to reconsider his sentence.

People v. Griffin

Docket: A159104(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Simons

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A 2018 complaint charged Griffin with possession of methamphetamine for sale, possession of materials with the intent to make an explosive, and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person. A 2019 complaint charged entry with intent to commit larceny, malicious destruction of personal property, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and assault with a firearm, with allegations that Griffin personally discharged a firearm and that two prior prison term enhancements applied, based on convictions for weapons offenses. Another 2019 complaint charged Griffin with felony transportation of methamphetamine with intent to sell, other drug crimes, and extortion, alleging two prior prison terms. In two cases Griffin pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance for sale. In the third case, Griffin pled no contest to burglary and admitted a prior prison term. The stipulated term comprised six years for burglary and a one-year Penal Code 667.5 prison term enhancement. The court imposed the sentences in October 2019. Senate Bill 136, effective January 2020, eliminated section 667.5(b)'s enhancement for prior prison terms except those based on sexually violent offenses. The court of appeal reversed the sentence. The enactment is retroactive. The prosecution may withdraw from the plea agreement but it would be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to impose a longer sentence than the original agreement if a new plea agreement is entered.

Sabetian v. Exxon Mobile Corp.

Docket: B297107(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Feuer

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chevron and Exxon in an action brought by plaintiff on behalf of her deceased husband, in an action alleging claims for negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium. Plaintiff claimed that her husband contracted mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos while he was an Iranian citizen working for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) in facilities controlled by defendants. The court held that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the negligence and premises liability claims. In this case, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the Chevron and Exxon defendants' ownership, possession, or control of the Iranian facilities, which would impose a duty on defendants under Civil Code section 1714 to protect refinery workers like plaintiff's husband from exposure to asbestos. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the 1954 contractual agreement between the Iranian government and a consortium of international oil companies, including defendants' predecessors in interest, created a special relationship between defendants' predecessors and plaintiff's husband. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding monetary and evidence sanctions to the Exxon defendants.