The Supreme Court Limbers Up to Aid and Abet Trump’s Coup

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan describes how the U.S. Supreme Court is readying itself to declare Trump the winner of the election. Professor Buchanan points out that no court acting in good faith would apply the text of the Constitution or existing Supreme Court precedents in a way that would allow any of this scheme to see the light of day, but based on what Justice Kavanaugh has written and what Justice Gorsuch strongly suggests, the Court might not even have that minimum amount of good faith.

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If the Challengers Prevail on the Merits of the ACA California v. Texas Case, What is the Appropriate Remedy and What Effect Should the Ruling Have on the Entirety of the ACA? Part Four in a Series

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, EVAN CAMINKER, JASON MAZZONE

In this fourth of a series of columns examining the California v. Texas case challenging the Affordable Care Act (ACA), Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar, Michigan Law dean emeritus Evan Caminker, and Illinois law professor Jason Mazzone consider what the appropriate remedy should be if the challengers prevail on the merits of the case. The authors explain why enjoining the 2017 amendment, which zeroed out the potential tax penalty for failure to maintain the specified health insurance coverage, is a more appropriate remedy than striking down the entire ACA.

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The U.S. Supreme Court Cannot Determine the Election Result

AUSTIN SARAT, DANIEL B. EDELMAN

Amherst College Associate Provost Austin Sarat and attorney Daniel B. Edelman argue that there is nothing the Supreme Court can do to prevent governors from certifying slates of electors that actually reflect the vote of the people in their states. Sarat and Edelman explain why Bush v Gore is both inapplicable, and by its own terms, never supposed to be used as precedent.

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Borror Property Management, LLC v. Oro Karric North, LLC

Docket: 20-3146

Opinion Date: October 29, 2020

Judge: Readler

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Civil Procedure

Oro contracted for Borror to manage Oro’s residential apartments. Each management contract stated: “If either party shall notify the other that any matter is to be determined by arbitration,” the parties would proceed to arbitration unless they first resolved the dispute. A dispute arose and resulted in Borror’s ceasing to manage Oro’s properties. Oro responded by letter asserting that Borror was in breach of the contracts and that Oro planned “to proceed directly to litigation in either state or federal court,” as the contracts “do not limit litigation exclusively to arbitration.” Nonetheless, Oro asked Borror to notify it within six days if Borror preferred arbitration. A week after receiving Oro’s letter, Borror filed a federal court complaint asserting its own breach of contract claims. Rather than filing an answer or another responsive pleading, Oro moved to compel arbitration. The district court held that Oro had waived its contractual right to arbitration through its pre-litigation conduct. Invoking its appeal rights under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, Oro timely appealed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Correspondence is not equivalent to formal litigation; parties often posture their claims with “loose rhetorical flair.” Oro’s pre-trial “posturing” correspondence was neither inconsistent with its arbitration right nor prejudicial to Borror.

Gatewood v. United States

Docket: 19-6297

Opinion Date: October 29, 2020

Judge: Larsen

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1997, Gatewood was convicted of two counts of kidnapping and one count of robbery affecting interstate commerce. The court determined that Gatewood’s four prior Arkansas robbery convictions qualified as serious violent felonies and imposed a life sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c), the federal three-strikes statute. In 2016, Gatewood moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his robbery convictions had been deemed serious violent felonies only under the residual clause. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) residual clause had been found unconstitutionally vague in the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” decision. Gatewood filed his motion within a year of Johnson. The government argued that Johnson could not render the motion timely because it applied only to ACCA. The government also argued procedural default. The Supreme Court decided “Davis” in 2019, finding the 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause, which is nearly identical to the three-strikes residual clause, unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied Gatewood’s motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the government concedes that Gatewood’s motion was timely in light of Davis, Gatewood procedurally defaulted the vagueness claim by failing to raise it on direct review. Gatewood cannot establish cause by showing that his claim cut against circuit precedent at the time of his appeal. From Gatewood’s sentencing to the 2002 conclusion of his appeal, the tools to construct his present vagueness claim existed; no Supreme Court precedent foreclosed it.

Troutman v. Louisville Metropolitan Department of Corrections

Docket: 20-5290

Opinion Date: October 29, 2020

Judge: Donald

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Troutman, a daily user of heroin and methamphetamine, committed suicide in pretrial detention after LMDC jail officials placed him in solitary confinement despite a recent suicide attempt while in LMDC custody. A medical screening had indicated signs of depression; he had attempted suicide three to four times in the past and was “currently thinking about suicide.” Troutman had experienced a traumatic brain injury the prior year which left him in a coma for nine days, He told medical staff “I’m not good at all, I’m dying!” In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Cox, the LMDC classification officer, but affirmed summary judgment in favor of LMDC director Bolton and Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government. Troutman objectively “exhibited suicidal tendencies” and other risk factors. A reasonable jury could find that Cox was subjectively aware of the substantial risk if Troutman was placed in solitary confinement. Cox’s argument that he reasonably relied on the medical judgment that Charles no longer presented a suicide risk does not make summary judgment appropriate. Claims that Bolton inadequately performed his duties are insufficient for section 1983 supervisory liability. It is plausible that the municipality was negligent in enforcing its policies, but deliberate indifference remains distinct from mere negligence.

Waskul v. Washtenaw County Community Mental Health

Docket: 19-1400

Opinion Date: October 29, 2020

Judge: Eric L. Clay

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Public Benefits

Community Mental Health modified the methodology through which it allocated funding to individuals with disabilities receiving community living support services under a Medicaid waiver received by Michigan. Individuals receiving those services, together Advocacy, challenged that methodology as violating the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(8), (a)(10)(A), (a)(10)(B), 1396n(c)(2)(A) and (C); Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794; the Michigan Mental Health Code; and the terms of Michigan’s Medicaid Habilitation Supports Waiver and the contracts implementing it. The district court dismissed the claims in full. The Sixth Circuit reversed, first holding that the plaintiffs have standing, that the defendants are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies provided by the state under the Medicaid Act, and that the plaintiffs have a private right of action under sections 1396a(a)(8) and (a)(10). The plaintiffs’ allegations suffice to state plausible claims that they are being denied sufficient necessary medical services; that feasible alternatives that provide them a meaningful choice between institutionalized and at-home or community-based care exist and are not being ensured; and that they face a serious risk of institutionalization.