Latest 4 Cases: Bates v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Civil Rights), Rendon v. U.S. Attorney General (Criminal Law), United States v. ...

What Happened in Kahler v. Kansas?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb describes how the U.S. Supreme Court purported to allow the state of Kansas to substitute one insanity defense for another, but in fact approved its abolishment of the insanity defense altogether. Colb explains the difference between the insanity defense—an affirmative defense to the commission of a crime—and facts that negate mens rea—the mental element of a crime. Colb also notes how in dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer made a case for veganism, albeit probably inadvertently.

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Bates v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Docket: 17-14960

Opinion Date: July 14, 2020

Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 as untimely. The court held that its decisions in Hall v. Secy, Dep't of Corr., 921 F.3d 983, 988–90 (11th Cir. 2019); Green v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 877 F.3d 1244, 1247–49 (11th Cir. 2017), issued after the district court dismissed the petition, foreclosed the government's arguments. Hall and Green held that the one-year limitations period tolled the day a petitioner filed a procedurally noncompliant Rule 3.850 motion if he was permitted to and did later file a compliant motion. Therefore, a compliant Rule 3.850 motion relates back to the date of filing of a noncompliant motion, such that the compliant motion was "properly filed" and "pending" as of that date for purposes of tolling the limitations period in section 2244 of Title 28. In this case, because the limitations period tolled on the date of petitioner's initial motion, the court held that he timely filed his petition in federal court. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.

Rendon v. U.S. Attorney General

Docket: 19-10197

Opinion Date: July 14, 2020

Judge: Martin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Approximately 25 years after his guilty plea to resisting a police officer with violence, an IJ found petitioner removable and ruled he was no longer eligible for cancellation of removal on account of the stop-time rule. The Eleventh Circuit held that it was error to retroactively apply the stop-time rule to petitioner's pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) conviction. The court found no clear congressional statement that the stop-time rule should be applied retroactively to pre-IIRIRA plea agreements like petitioner's and held that in the circumstances presented here—specifically, where petitioner's pre-IIRIRA plea agreement did not render him immediately deportable—applying the stop-time rule to his 1995 conviction would have an impermissibly retroactive effect. Therefore, the court reversed the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings.

United States v. Martinez

Docket: 18-12950

Opinion Date: July 14, 2020

Judge: Luck

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence and held that USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knew, intended, or had reason to believe (rather than hoped, wished, or dreamed) the gun was going to be used to buy drugs, and the sale would have (rather than may or might have) happened but for the defendant's arrest or something else getting in the way. In this case, the district court found that defendant intended that his stolen shotgun would be bartered for a pound of dope. Therefore, the court held that the district court's finding was supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous.

Tesoriero v. Carnival Corp.

Docket: 18-11638

Opinion Date: July 14, 2020

Judge: Grant

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

After plaintiff sat on a vanity chair in her Carnival Cruise ship and it collapsed, she filed suit against Carnival, alleging that it had failed to inspect and maintain the cabin furniture (or else warn her of the danger the chair posed). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Carnival, holding that plaintiff failed to establish that Carnival had actual or constructive notice that the chair was dangerous. Unlike the district court, the court declined to consider whether res ipsa loquitor applies in this case. The court explained that, even if it does, the doctrine cannot cure a defect in notice. Furthermore, because plaintiff has not shown that Carnival committed sanctionable spoliation of evidence, her case is not saved through an adverse inference sanction.