The “When” of Chevron: The Missed Opportunity of County of Maui

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, DANIEL FOLSOM

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and rising 3L Daniel Folsom comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, in which the Court interpreted a provision of the Clean Water. Estreicher and Folsom argue that the case presented an opportunity to clarify the murky question of when the Chevron doctrine applies, yet the Court avoided answering that question.

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The Unnecessary Protection of Qualified Immunity

JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, SETH STOUGHTON

UCLA law professor Joanna C. Schwartz and South Carolina law professor Seth W. Stoughton address some of the arguments commonly asserted to support qualified immunity, the doctrine that shields police officers from civil liability for constitutional violations. Schwartz and Stoughton argue that eliminating qualified immunity should not affect police decision-making and that existing Supreme Court doctrine gives police officers plenty of leeway to make mistakes without violating the Constitution. Because qualified immunity applies only to unreasonable actions by police officers, eliminating or substantially restricting it should not a chilling effect on police officers’ ability or willingness to respond to critical incidents.

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Audio Technica U.S., Inc. v. United States

Docket: 19-3469

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Eric L. Clay

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Tax Law

Technica makes high-end audio equipment and claimed tax credits for increasing research activities under 26 U.S.C. 41 for several tax years. The R&D tax credit is available when taxpayers increase certain research expenses over time, with the increase measured in part against research costs from the five-year period from 1984-1988, taken as a percentage of the company’s gross receipts during those years (the fixed-base percentage). For the 2002–2005 and 2011 tax years, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency. Rather than litigate, Technica and the government reached settlement agreements, which were approved by the Tax Court. The settlements did not address the details but simply listed the dollar amounts of the agreed-upon deficiencies. According to Technica, these amounts were determined by a “specific agreement” as to the fixed-base percentage. With respect to the 2006–2010 tax years, Technica paid the amount requested by the IRS then sued for a refund, arguing that the government was judicially estopped from claiming that the .92% fixed-base percentage did not apply. The district court agreed, finding that because the government had entered into settlements for the other tax years using that same fixed-base percentage, it was judicially estopped from now arguing that the percentage was incorrect. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A court order memorializing a settlement agreement generally does not constitute judicial acceptance of the facts underpinning that agreement, and the orders approved by the Tax Court did not actually include the .92% rate.

Small v. Officer Brock

Docket: 19-1841

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Gibbons

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Small, a Michigan prisoner, pro se, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, alleging that, without provocation, Officer Brock several times brandished a knife, threatened to kill Small, and motioned in a manner suggesting how Brock would use the knife to kill Small. On initial screening, the district court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. 1997e(c). The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal. Small plausibly alleged an Eighth Amendment violation. While verbal abuse and nonphysical harassment of prisoners do not alone give rise to a constitutional claim, the combination of multiple, unprovoked verbal threats to immediately end a prisoner’s life and the aggressive brandishing of a deadly weapon can violate the Eighth Amendment. Based on the allegations in Small’s complaint, Brock had no legitimate penological reason for repeatedly placing Small in fear of his life; it is reasonable to infer that Brock knew that his conduct would cause Small psychological harm. Unprovoked and repeated threats to a prisoner’s life, combined with a demonstrated means to immediately carry out such threats, constitutes conduct so objectively serious as to be “antithetical to human dignity.” Neither the force threatened by Brock (death) nor the resulting injury to Small (fearing for his life to the point of paranoia and psychological distress necessitating mental health treatment) was de minimis.

Valadez-Lara v. Barr

Docket: 19-4013

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Immigration Law

In 2003, 15-year-old Valadez Bonilla entered the U.S. illegally to be with his father. Months later, police charged him with drunk and disorderly conduct. Immigration authorities took custody of Valadez, then released Valadez into the care of his aunt at her home in Lorain, Ohio. Valadez identified that address as the place at which he would be staying. The same day, immigration authorities personally served Valadez with a notice to appear “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” After Valadez’s release, immigration authorities mailed multiple notices about his upcoming removal hearing to his aunt’s address. When Valadez did not appear at his removal hearing, an IJ ordered him removed in his absence. In 2008, Valadez was removed to Mexico after he was stopped for speeding while driving without a license. Valadez illegally reentered this country many times. In 2019, after the government charged him with illegal reentry, Valadez sought to rescind his earlier removal order, claiming that he had not received notice of his hearing. The BIA found that Valadez failed to prove the lack of notice, relying on his long delay in seeking to rescind the removal order after he learned of it. The Sixth Circuit denied Valadez’s petition for review. The BIA could reasonably conclude that Valadez did receive notice in conformity with all requirements in 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1) and (2).

Byers v. Internal Revenue Service

Docket: 19-1893

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Tax Law

Byers received notice from Chase Bank that IRS Agent Conroy had requested information in connection with the IRS’s investigation into her then-husband. The notice stated that “[t]he requested information includes information that relates to you.” Conroy sent Byers a letter, informing her that she was under investigation for violating 26 U.S.C. 6700 and/or 6701, issued a document request, and requested an interview. Byers refused. Byers received copies of IRS summonses that Conroy had issued, directing her banks to provide, for 2007-2018, “any and all documents … related to . . . Andrea Byers and any other corporation or name Andrea Byers used . . . including but not limited to multiple entities. Bank of America responded to the summons but Conroy has not opened the envelope containing the response due to Byers’s pending petition to quash. The government successfully moved for dismissal of Byers’s petitions and for enforcement of the summonses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the IRS’s broad authority to collect information related to taxpayers’ potential liabilities. The IRS was not required to establish a “reasonable basis” for its investigation before its summonses could be enforced. The IRS made a prima-facie showing in support of enforcing its summonses. She did not establish that the IRS abused the district court’s process in seeking enforcement of the summonses.