Latest 4 Cases: Arnold v. Dignity Health (Civil Procedure), Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC (Civil Procedure), Robinson v. Southern Counties Oil Co. ...

#MeToo and What Men and Women Are Willing to Say and Do

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb explores why people have such strong feelings about the #MeToo movement (whether they are advocates or opponents) and suggests that both sides rest their positions on contested empirical assumptions about the behavior of men and women. Colb argues that what we believe to be true of men and women generally contributes to our conclusions about the #MeToo movement and our perceptions about how best to handle the accusations of those who come forward.

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Arnold v. Dignity Health

Docket: C087465(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 13, 2020

Judge: Elena J. Duarte

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff-appellant Virginia Arnold appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer, defendant-respondent Dignity Health (Dignity) and other individually named defendants. Arnold was employed as a medical assistant. She alleged defendants engaged in discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on her age and her association with her African-American coworkers, including by terminating her employment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). On summary judgment, the trial court concluded defendants provided evidence of legitimate reasons for plaintiff’s termination and, in rebuttal, plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that defendants’ actions were discriminatory, harassing, or retaliatory. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court's findings and affirmed summary judgment.

Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC

Docket: D075738(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 13, 2020

Judge: Guerrero

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Products Liability

Plaintiff Angela Bolger bought a replacement laptop computer battery on the online shopping website operated by defendant Amazon.com, LLC. The listing for the battery identified the seller as “E-Life,” a fictitious name used on Amazon by Lenoge Technology (HK) Ltd. (Lenoge). Amazon charged Bolger for the purchase, retrieved the laptop battery from its location in an Amazon warehouse, prepared the battery for shipment in Amazon-branded packaging, and sent it to Bolger. Bolger alleged the battery exploded several months later, and she suffered severe burns as a result. Bolger sued Amazon and several other defendants, including Lenoge, alleging causes of action for strict products liability, negligent products liability, breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty, and “negligence/negligent undertaking.” Lenoge was served but did not appear, so the trial court entered its default. Amazon then moved for summary judgment, arguing primarily that the doctrine of strict products liability, as well as any similar tort theory, did not apply to it because it did not distribute, manufacture, or sell the product in question. It claimed its website was an “online marketplace” and E-Life (Lenoge) was the product seller, not Amazon. The trial court agreed, granted Amazon’s motion, and entered judgment accordingly. Bolger appealed, arguing that Amazon was strictly liable for defective products offered on its website by third-party sellers like Lenoge. In the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed: "Amazon placed itself between Lenoge and Bolger in the chain of distribution of the product at issue here. ... Under established principles of strict liability, Amazon should be held liable if a product sold through its website turns out to be defective. Strict liability here “affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course of their continuing business relationship."

Robinson v. Southern Counties Oil Co.

Docket: A158791(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 13, 2020

Judge: Stuart R. Pollak

Areas of Law: Class Action, Labor & Employment Law

Robinson worked as a truck driver for Southern in 2015-2017. In 2018, after filing a notice with the California Labor Workforce Development Agency, he filed suit under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code 2698), alleging that Southern denied Robinson and other employees meal and rest breaks, and, as a result, failed to pay timely wages, furnish complete and accurate wage statements, and pay all wages due upon termination. The San Diego County Superior Court subsequently approved a settlement in a class action that sought individual damages and civil penalties under PAGA for the same alleged Labor Code violations (Gutierrez), which covered all persons employed by Southern in certain jobs, 2013-2018. Robinson and three other employees opted out of the class settlement. Robinson amended the allegations of his complaint to represent Southern employees who opted out of the Gutierrez settlement and persons who were employed by Southern from January 27, 2018, to the present. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the case. Robinson is barred from bringing a PAGA action asserting the same claims that were settled in Gutierrez and lacks standing to bring a representative action on behalf of employees employed during the time period when he was no longer employed by Southern.

People v. Santos

Docket: B299844(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 13, 2020

Judge: Moor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 and Senate Bill No. 1437. Defendant alleged that the judge erred by ruling on the petition although he was not the judge who sentenced defendant in the underlying matter, and by summarily denying defendant's petition. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred in denying defendant's petition based on the constitutional challenges to Senate Bill 1437 and section 1170.95 and on the the merits of his petition. The court explained that the record provides no basis for the trial court's determination as a matter of law that "the overall record" precluded defendant from showing that he was not a major participant in the robbery and did not act with reckless indifference to human life. The court interpreted the statute to require the judge who originally sentenced the petitioner to rule on the petition, unless that judge is unavailable. In this case, the record contains no evidence that the original sentencing judge was unavailable. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.