Latest 38 Cases This Week: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York (U.S.), Imamura v. General Electric Co. (1st Cir.), ...

A Constitutional Commitment to Access to Literacy: Bridging the Chasm Between Negative and Positive Rights

EVAN CAMINKER

Michigan Law dean emeritus Evan Caminker discusses a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in which that court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause secures schoolchildren a fundamental right to a “basic minimum education” that “can plausibly impart literacy.” Caminker—one of the co-counsel for the plaintiffs in that case—explains why the decision is so remarkable and why the supposed dichotomy between positive and negative rights is not as stark as canonically claimed.

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New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 18-280

Opinion Date: April 27, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The petitioners challenged a New York City rule regarding the transport of firearms, citing the Second Amendment, and seeking declaratory relief against enforcement of the rule insofar as it prevented their transport of firearms to a second home or shooting range outside of the city. The Second Circuit rejected their claim. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the State of New York amended its firearm licensing statute and the City amended the rule so that the petitioners may now transport firearms to a second home or shooting range outside of the city. The Supreme Court vacated. The petitioners’ claim for declaratory relief with respect to the old rule is moot but they claimed that the new rule may still infringe their rights; they may not be allowed to stop for coffee, gas, food, or restroom breaks on the way to their second homes or shooting ranges outside of the city. The Court declined to address the argument, citing its practice of vacating and remanding where the mootness is attributable to a change in the legal framework governing the case, and where the plaintiff may have some residual claim under the new framework that was understandably not asserted previously. On remand, the Second Circuit and the district court may consider the new arguments and whether the petitioners still add a claim for damages with respect to the old rule.

Imamura v. General Electric Co.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1457

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Torruella

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

In this class action lawsuit stemming from the 2011 nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP) in Japan, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissing Plaintiffs' suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an adequate alternative forum was available in Japan. Plaintiffs were individuals and business entities who suffered property damage and/or economic harm as a result of the FNPP disaster. Plaintiffs filed suit against General Electric Company (GE) alleging that GE negligently designed the FNPP's nuclear reactors and safety mechanisms, both of which were implicated in the explosions. Plaintiffs alleged that venue was proper in the District of Massachusetts because GE maintained its corporate headquarters and principal place of business in Boston, Massachusetts. The district court dismissed the suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, determining that an adequate alternative forum was available to Plaintiffs in Japan and that dismissal was in the private and public interest. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Japan satisfied the forum availability requirement despite the jurisdictional idiosyncrasies presented in this case.

New Jersey Coalition of Automotive Retailers, Inc. v. Mazda Motor of America Inc

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-2961

Opinion Date: April 28, 2020

Judge: Morton Ira Greenberg

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Commercial Law

The Coalition, an association of franchised New Jersey new car dealerships, filed suit under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act on behalf of 16 Mazda dealer-members. Mazda had an incentive program for its franchised dealers (MBEP), which provides incentives, per-vehicle discounts or rebates on the dealers’ purchases of vehicles from Mazda, to dealers who make certain investments in their physical facilities that highlight their sale of Mazda vehicles or dedicate their dealerships exclusively to the sale of Mazda vehicles. The incentives come in different tiers, with the highest tier available to dealers who have exclusive Mazda facilities and a dedicated, exclusive Mazda general manager. Mazda dealers also earn incentives if they meet customer experience metrics. Mazda dealers who sell other brands of vehicles as well as Mazdas, do not receive incentives for brand commitment. Only three of the 16 Mazda dealers in the Coalition qualified for the highest tier; eight others qualified for some tier of incentives. The complaint alleged that the MBEP creates unfair competitive advantages for dealers who qualify for incentives under the MBEP at the expense of those dealers who do not, and even among incentivized dealers through different tiers. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the case, rejecting as too narrow the district court’s rationale--that the Coalition lacked standing because only five of the 16 Mazda dealers would benefit from the lawsuit, so the Coalition cannot possibly be protecting the interests of its members.

Amawi v. Paxton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-50384

Opinion Date: April 27, 2020

Judge: E. Grady Jolly

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

In 2017, Texas enacted a law that forbids its governmental entities from contracting with companies who engage in economic boycotts of Israel. Plaintiffs, who support the Palestinian side of the conflict, filed two actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court, alleging that requiring "No Boycott of Israel" clauses in Texas government contracts violates the First Amendment. The district court then preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the clauses in all contracts with Texas governmental entities. The Fifth Circuit held that the appeal is moot because, twelve days after the district court's ruling, Texas enacted final legislation that exempts sole proprietors from the "No Boycott of Israel" certification requirement. Because plaintiffs are no longer affected by the legislation, the court held that they lacked a personal stake in the outcome of this litigation. Accordingly, the court vacated the preliminary injunction order and remanded the case to the district court to enter an appropriate judgment dismissing the complaints.

Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm. P.L.L.C. v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-50506

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics, Tax Law

The IRS served a John Doe summons on the Texas Law Firm, which provides tax-planning advice, seeking documents for “U.S. taxpayers," who, during specified years, used the Firm's services "to acquire, establish, maintain, operate, or control" a foreign financial account, asset, or entity or any foreign or domestic financial account or assets in the name of such foreign entity. A John Doe summons, described in 26 U.S.C. 7609(c)(1), does not identify the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued. The government made the required showings that the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertainable group or class, there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or class may fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of internal revenue law, and the information sought and the identity of the person or persons is not readily available from other sources. The Firm moved to quash, claiming that, despite the general rule a lawyer’s clients’ identities are not covered by the attorney-client privilege, an exception exists where disclosure would result in the disclosure of confidential communication. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in favor of the government. Blanket assertions of privilege are disfavored. The Firm's clients’ identities are not connected inextricably with privileged communication. If the Firm wishes to assert privilege as to any responsive documents, it may do so, using a privilege log to detail the foundation for each claim.

Turubchuk v. Southern Illinois Asphalt Co., Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 18-3507

Opinion Date: April 29, 2020

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

In 2005, a van containing six family members van slipped off the edge of an Illinois roadway. In the ensuing rollover crash, everyone was hurt; one passenger died. The crash occurred in a construction zone; a guardrail had been removed and not replaced. All lines had not been repainted on the repaved road, and pieces of asphalt lay on the shoulder. In a suit against the construction companies, the defense attorney told the plaintiffs that the two companies were operating as a joint venture with a $1 million liability insurance policy. The parties settled for $1 million. Plaintiffs signed a release of all claims that stated the plaintiffs agreed they were not relying on any statements by any parties’ attorneys. Four years later, the plaintiffs discovered that the companies carried separate liability policies. The district court ruled as a matter of law that the failure to identify the individual policies violated FRCP 26; that the undisclosed policies would have covered plaintiffs’ claims; and no joint venture agreement existed under Illinois law, so joint venture exclusions in the individual policies were inapplicable. A jury awarded damages of $8,169,512.84 for negligent misrepresentation. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court erred in allowing plaintiffs to rely on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for a duty of care; in deciding, before trial, that plaintiffs reasonably relied on the insurance disclosures; and in excluding the defense’s expert testimony on liability and settlement value.

Carter v. Pulaski CO Special School Dist

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-1426

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: William Duane Benton

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Marion Carter sued the Pulaski County Special School District for race discrimination under Arkansas state and federal laws. Carter taught at the Joe T. Robinson High School in the School District. She also coached the cheer and dance teams. In 2017, the school's principal recommended to the District Superintendent that Carter's cheer and dance duties not be renewed for the 2017-2018 school year, and that she be offered a teaching contract only. The principal cited: (1) lack of student participation in cheer and dance in the previous two years; (2) inappropriate cheer routines at sporting events; and (2) inappropriate behavior of cheerleaders during out-of-town travel. After a hearing, the District's School Board accepted the recommendation not to renew Carter's cheer and dance contract. The District filled the cheer position with an African-American woman, and eliminated all dance teams district-wide. The Eighth Circuit concurred with the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District on all claims. The Court found Carter's allegations were insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Franklin v. Franklin County, Arkansas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-1854

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Arnold

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

After Cody Franklin died in police custody, his father, as administrator of his estate, sued the police officers who struggled with Franklin the night he died, and against the municipalities who employed them. The elder Franklin asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for excessive force, and claims under state law for battery and wrongful death. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the municipalities and all but two of the officers. Those officers filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims. After review, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the officers with respect to the federal claims, and remanded. With respect to the state claims, the Court remanded for further proceedings, including a determination whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.

Granite Re, Inc. v. Nat'l Credit Union Adm. Board

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 18-2674

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Grasz

Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Contracts

The National Credit Union Administration Board ("NCUAB"), the self-appointed conservator of Citizens Community Credit Union ("Citizens"), repudiated a letter of credit Citizens issued to Granite Re, Inc. Granite filed a complaint for damages against the NCUAB, claiming wrongful repudiation and wrongful dishonor of a letter of credit. The NCUAB moved to dismiss with prejudice, arguing 12 U.S.C. 1787(c) authorized it to repudiate the letter of credit with no liability for damages, and section 1787(c) preempted conflicting North Dakota Law. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Eighth Circuit determined that were it to adopt the NCUAB's construction of section 1787(c), the NCUAB could "quietly appoint itself conservator and repudiate letters of credit with no liability to the injured beneficiary. Absent the ability to predict an impending conservatorship, a clean letter-of-credit beneficiary like Granite is subject to repudiation with no recourse." The Court determined NCUAB's construction was inconsistent with the language of the statue, which provided a limited remedy for damages determinable at the point of conservatorship, but did not negate recovery entirely. The Court also determined it was premature to declare section 1787(c) preempted North Dakota law. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

LN Management, LLC Series 5664 Divot V. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-15402

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Trusts & Estates

In 2003, Dansker obtained an $83,000 home loan to purchase Las Vegas real estate. In 2009, Dansker died. No probate proceedings were instituted. In 2011, the neighborhood HOA began foreclosure proceedings and sold the property to LN. The priority lien-holder was Fannie Mae and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The district court held that LN had not identified any legal representative of Dansker’s estate, and since no such person was identified and joined, complete diversity existed. The district court dismissed and denied a motion to substitute Dansker’s daughter. The Ninth Circuit vacated. Diversity did exist at the time of removal. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying a motion to substitute, so diversity jurisdiction continued to exist. The lawsuit was against Chase and Dansker. Dansker, being dead, had no legal existence, and, therefore, was not a citizen of any state. Jurisdiction exists where the federal entity is not the record beneficiary on the deed of trust but can prove its property interest through admissible evidence. The Federal Foreclosure Bar, which provides that FHFA's property shall not be subject to foreclosure without FHFA's consent, applies and is fatal to LN’s case on the merits.

Mitchell v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-17031

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Sandra S. Ikuta

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for relief from the district court's denial of his 2009 motion for authorization to interview jurors at his 2003 criminal trial in order to investigate potential juror misconduct. Petitioner argued that the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), changed the law governing requests to interview jurors for evidence of racial bias, and that this change constituted an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The panel first held that petitioner's motion is not a disguised second or successive section 2255 habeas motion, and the district court had jurisdiction to decide his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The panel held that a mere development in jurisprudence, as opposed to an unexpected change, does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of Rule 60(b)(6). In this case, the panel wrote that, although Peña-Rodriguez established a new exception to Rule 60(b), this change in law left untouched the law governing investigating and interviewing jurors. Furthermore, because Peña-Rodriguez does not override local court rules or compel access to jurors, it is not "clearly irreconcilable" with precedent, Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (2003) (en banc), and therefore did not make any change in the law regarding lawyer access to jurors, let alone one so significant that it would constitute "extraordinary circumstances" for purposes of Rule 60(b).

CSMN Investments v. Cordillera Metropolitan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-1094

Opinion Date: April 28, 2020

Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The residential community of Cordillera in Eagle County, Colorado, featured a private lodge and spa (the “Lodge”) and a village center (the “Village”). For many years, the Lodge offered its dues-paying members certain amenities, including a golf course and spa. The Village offered “open space: tennis courts and hiking paths, which all residents and their guests could use. In 2013, after years of monetary losses, the owner of both parcels listed them for sale. In 2016, CSMN Investments, LLC (CSMN) emerged to purchase both properties. CSMN's plan for the properties would have closed the properties to other uses. Before closing on the sale, CSMN sought confirmation from Eagle County’s Planning Director that its planned use, operating an inpatient addiction-treatment center, was an allowed use under the “Cordillera Subdivision Eleventh Amended and Restated Planned Unit Development Control Document” (PUD). The Director issued a written interpretation of the PUD, concluding CSMN could operate a clinic including inpatient, non-critical care, for treatment of a variety of conditions. In response to the Director’s interpretation, community members unhappy with the change to the Lodge and Village, formed the Cordillera Property Owners Association (CPOA) and Cordillera Metropolitan District (CMD), to jointly appeal the Director's PUD interpretation to the Board of county Commissioners. The Board affirmed the Director on all but one point, concluding the PUD permitted outpatient-only clinical uses. Still aggrieved, the CMD and CPOA took their case to Colorado state court; the district court affirmed the Board's decision. CPOA appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which likewise affirmed the Board's decision. With the state-court appeals pending, CSMN filed a civil-rights action in Colorado federal district court against CPOA, CMD, and various associated people (the CMD board members, the CMD district manager, and the Legal Committee members). In response, Appellees moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss all claims, arguing that the right to petition immunized their conduct. CSMN countered that Appellees’ claim of immunity was unfounded because the petitioning had sought an unlawful outcome, and that even if the immunity somehow did apply, the petitioning fell within an exception to that immunity, that is, the petitioning was a “sham.” The district court sided with Appellees, dismissing all but one of the claims on the ground that their conduct was protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity. CSMN appealed. But the Tenth Circuit concurred with the finding that Appellees engaged in objectively reasonable litigation, thus immunity applied to their conduct.

Evans v. Diamond

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-4083

Opinion Date: April 28, 2020

Judge: Michael R. Murphy

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates

Plaintiffs-Appellants (collectively, the “Estate”), brought this action against Defendant-Appellee, Betty Diamond (“Diamond”), the former wife of Gregory Diamond (the “Decedent”). The complaint alleged the Decedent was a federal employee who had a Thrift Savings Plan account (the “TSP Account”) administered by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (“FRTIB”). During Diamond’s marriage to the Decedent, she was the named beneficiary of Decedent’s TSP Account. When Diamond and the Decedent divorced in 2013, they entered into a divorce decree containing the following provision relevant to the Decedent’s TSP Account: “The parties have acquired an interest in retirement accounts during the course of the marriage. [Diamond] waive[s] her interest in [Decedent’s] retirement accounts. Therefore, [Decedent] is awarded any and all interest in his retirement accounts, free and clear of any claim of [Diamond].” When the Decedent died in 2017, however, Diamond was still designated as the beneficiary of the TSP Account. The Estate requested that Diamond waive all her interest in any distribution she received from the TSP Account. After Diamond refused and indicated her intent to retain any monies distributed to her, the Estate filed a declaratory judgment action against her in Utah’s Third Judicial District Court. Diamond removed the case to federal district court and filed a motion to dismiss the Estate’s complaint. The district court granted the motion, concluding the Estate’s breach of contract claims against Diamond are preempted by federal law governing the administration of TSP accounts. Finding that the district court correctly concluded the relevant provisions of the Federal Employee Retirement Systems Act (“FERSA”) preempted any conflicting Utah state property rights, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Progressive Northwestern Ins v. Gant

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 18-3226

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Harris L. Hartz

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

Progressive Northwestern Insurance filed suit to obtain a declaratory judgment that it had not violated any duty to its insureds in the defense of a wrongful-death suit. The underlying suit had been brought in 2013 by Gabriel Gant against Justin Birk; his parents, Edward and Linda; and the Birks’ family company, Birk Oil. The suit alleged that Justin had negligently killed Kathyrn Gant (Gabriel’s wife) in a car accident; that his parents were liable because they had negligently entrusted the vehicle to him; and that Birk Oil was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because Justin was driving the vehicle incidental to his employment by the company. Gant’s attorneys estimated damages of many million dollars, which far exceeded defendants’ insurance coverage. Defendants had assets from which Gant could have collected additional money on a judgment against them, but his attorneys apparently thought that a better way to collect a large judgment would be if defendants had a claim against Progressive for not representing them properly and exposing them to a judgment far exceeding their insurance coverage. Accordingly, shortly before trial Gant entered into an agreement with the Birks in which Gant promised not to execute any judgment against the Birks, and in exchange the Birks assigned to Gant their rights to the policy limits under the Progressive and corporate insurance policies, and any claims the Birks had against Progressive for breach of contract, negligence, or bad faith. After a bench trial, Gant was awarded $6.7 million in damages. Progressive then brought this declaratory-judgment action and Gant counterclaimed, arguing that Progressive: (1) breached its duty to discover and disclose the corporate insurance policy; (2) was negligent in hiring attorney Kevin McMaster to defend the suit; and (3) was vicariously liable for McMaster’s conduct. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Progressive on its claim and the counterclaims. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.

Young v. SEC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 16-1149

Opinion Date: April 28, 2020

Judge: Wilkins

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Securities Law

Petitioner, found liable for multiple securities fraud violations, petitioned for review in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which is the wrong court. By the time petitioner realized his mistake and filed the petition in the DC Circuit, the 60 day deadline for filing had passed. The DC Circuit did not pass upon whether the statutory time limit to file a petition for review is jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling. Instead, the court held that, even assuming it is a non-mandatory claims processing rule, petitioner has failed to demonstrate entitlement to equitable tolling. The court stated that filing a petition for review in a state court that clearly lacks jurisdiction over the petition does not toll the deadline for filing in the DC Circuit court. Furthermore, no extraordinary circumstance beyond petitioner's control prevented him from timely filing in this court and thus he is not entitled to equitable tolling. The court dismissed the petition.

Everheart et al. v. Rucker Place, LLC et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Dockets: 1190092, 1190116, 1190110, 1190102

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Sellers

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

Tamikia Everheart; Cardell Coachman, by and through his mother and next friend Johnitia Coachman; Michael Coleman, as administrator of the estate of Diane McGlown; Mary Weatherspoon; and Elizabeth McElroy, as administratrix of the estate of Jakobie Johnson (collectively, "plaintiffs"), filed four separate of summary judgments entered in their separate cases by the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of Rucker Place, LLC, and Savoie Catering, LLC. While attending a Christmas party in December 2015 at the residence of Bruce McKee and Dale McKee, Jason Bewley consumed alcohol. Later, he was driving while allegedly intoxicated and was involved in an accident with a vehicle occupied by five individuals. As a result of the accident, two of those individuals were injured and the other three were killed. The plaintiffs filed four separate actions against Bewley, alleging negligence and wantonness in the operation of his vehicle. The plaintiffs also asserted dram-shop claims against Dale McKee; the estate of Bruce McKee, who died shortly after the Christmas party; Savoie Catering, LLC, which had catered the McKees' party and had served guests alcohol that had been provided by the McKees; and Rucker Place, LLC, which operates a catering business with connections to Savoie, but which claims it had no involvement with the McKees' party. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgments based on the conclusion that plaintiffs did not demonstrate that Reg. 20-X-6- .02(4) applied to the circumstances involved in their cases. The Court expressed no opinion as to whether plaintiffs presented evidence sufficient to establish a joint venture between Savoie and Rucker Place.

Ex parte State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1180451

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Mitchell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Products Liability

In 2015, Elizabeth Byars was visiting a residence in Huntsville, Alabama owned by Hannelore Sims ("Hannelore") when she was attacked by a pit bull kept by Hannelore's adult grandson Cody Sims ("Cody"), who also resided at the property. The pit bull was allegedly owned by Belinda Jones (whose relationship to Cody and Hannelore was not made clear from the trial court record). Byars sued Hannelore, Cody, and Jones seeking to recover damages for her injuries. Cody was served with notice of Byars's lawsuit, but he failed to answer the complaint. The trial court entered a default judgment against Cody, awarding Byars $200,000. Byars thereafter amended her complaint to assert a claim against State Farm. Specifically, Byars alleged that State Farm had issued a homeowner's insurance policy insuring Hannelore's property and that, because a judgment had been entered against Cody, Byars could assert a claim against State Farm under the direct-action statute. State Farm moved to dismiss, arguing that the direct- action statute did not allow Byars to simply amend her complaint to add State Farm as a defendant. Rather, State Farm argued, Byars was required to initiate a separate action to pursue any claim she might have against State Farm. State Farm petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief when the trial court denied its motion. In denying State Farm's petition, the Supreme Court determined State Farm failed to meet its burden or establishing that it had no adequate remedy aside from a writ of mandamus.

Johnson v. Ellis

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1180786

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Greg Shaw

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Acting pro se, Costillo Johnson, who, for purposes of this litigation, identified himself as "Asume Bjambe Ausir Imhotep El" ("Johnson"), appealed a circuit court's order dismissing his civil claims of assault and battery and "retaliation" against: "Ms. Ellis," purportedly a nurse's aid at Bibb Correctional Facility where Johnson was incarcerated; Wexford Medical, Ellis's purported employer; and the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC"). Because it concluded the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the Alabama Supreme Court vacated its judgment and dismissed the appeal.

Jostens, Inc. v. Herff Jones, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1180808

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Mendheim

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

Jostens, Inc. ("Jostens"), John Wiggins, and Chris Urnis (collectively, "defendants") appealed a circuit court's denial of their renewed motions for a judgment as a matter of law following the entry of a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Herff Jones, LLC ("Herff Jones"), and Brent Gilbert (collectively, "plaintiffs"). Herff Jones and Jostens were nationwide competitors that manufactured scholastic-recognition products (e.g., class rings, diplomas, caps, gowns, tassels, and graduation announcements) for high school students. The companies sold their products through independent-contractor small businesses located in the schools' territories. Gilbert's business was GradPro Recognition Products, Inc. ("GradPro"), and he worked with Herff Jones for over 30 years, both as a sales representative for his father and as the current owner of GradPro. Wiggins worked for an independent distributor of Jostens from 2000 to late 2003; Urnis worked for an independent distributor of Jostens from 2001 to 2005. In 2004 and 2006, respectively, Gilbert hired Wiggins and Urnis away from Jostens to be sales representatives for GradPro and, ostensibly, for Herff Jones. Before joining Gilbert in working on behalf of Herff Jones, Wiggins and Urnis each spent one year away from the industry to honor their noncompetition agreements. After working with GradPro for a time, Wiggins and Urnis went to another independent distributor for Jostens. Herff Jones suffered a substantial loss in business, allegedly stemming from the move. An issue at trial arose over whether plaintiffs were required to present direct, customer-by-customer evidence of the reasons each of the 47 blue-list schools that switched from Herff Jones to Jostens in order for the issue of causation to be submitted to the jury. The Alabama Supreme Court determined plaintiffs presented ample circumstantial evidence that would allow the jury to infer that defendants' wrongful conduct led to plaintiffs' loss of the school accounts at issue. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order denying the defendants' renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law.

Basey v. Alaska Dept. of Pub.Safety

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17099

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Daniel E. Winfree

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics

Kaleb Basey, who was convicted of federal crimes, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit in January 2016 against several Alaska state troopers based on their actions during his investigation and arrest. In September, Basey submitted two public records requests to the Alaska State Troopers seeking various documents relating to the investigation of his case, including two troopers' disciplinary records. Basey's requests were promptly denied on the ground that the information pertained to pending litigation. Asking for reconsideration, Basey's request was again denied, again citing the pending litigation. Acting pro se, Basey appealed, and his appeal reached the Alaska Supreme Court. In 2017, the Supreme Court reversed a superior court's dismissal order, holding that neither disclosure exception the State used as grounds for resisting Basey's request had applied. Basey moved to compel production of the requested records in January 2018. The State responded by agreeing to produce certain records, denying the existence of others, and asserting that the requested disciplinary records were private personnel records exempt from disclosure. In a seonc trip to the Alaska Supreme Court, the issue before the Court was whether state employee disciplinary records were confidential “personnel records” under the State Personnel Act and therefore not subject to disclosure under the Alaska Public Records Act. To this, the Court concluded that, with one express statutory exception not relevant to this case, the answer was “yes.”

C.G. v. Alaska, Dept. Health & Social Serv.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17254

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Daniel E. Winfree

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law

An Alaskan superior court terminated a mother’s and father’s parental rights based on a finding that they caused mental injury to their child. Relevant to this finding, the child in need of aid (CINA) statutes provided that a court may find a child in need of aid due to parental conduct or conditions causing the child “mental injury”; they also provideed that a “mental injury” exists when there was “a serious injury to the child as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment in the child’s ability to function in a developmentally appropriate manner and the existence of that impairment is supported by the opinion of a qualified expert witness.” The primary issue before the Alaska Supreme Court in this case was one of evidence rule and statutory interpretation in the context of a judge-tried CINA matter: did the statutorily required expert witness have to be offered and affirmatively accepted as a qualified expert witness by the superior court? The Supreme Court concluded the answer was “yes”; that it would review a claim of error in this regard despite a lack of objection in the superior court; and that it would conclude any such error is harmless only if - considering the parent was not necessarily on notice to make an on-record challenge to the expert’s qualifications - the Supreme Court could conclude the putative expert clearly was qualified to render the specific testimony required by statute.

In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of M.B.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17018

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Joel H. Bolger

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The respondent in an involuntary commitment proceeding, "Meredith B.," appealed the ex parte order authorizing her hospitalization for evaluation and the subsequent 30-day commitment order. Respondent argued that the screening investigation was inadequate because she was not interviewed. She asserted that, as a result, both the order hospitalizing her for evaluation and the 30-day commitment order should have been reversed and vacated. Further, she challenged the 30-day commitment order finding she was (1) "gravely disabled" and there (2) was a reasonable expectation she could improve with treatment. After review of the order at issue, the Alaska Supreme Court found the superior court's decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence. "If there was an error during the screening investigation, the error was harmless, because the respondent had the opportunity to testify at the 30-day commitment hearing."

M.M. v. Alaska Dept. of Admin.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-16970

Opinion Date: April 24, 2020

Judge: Craig F. Stowers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

The plaintiff in this case, M.M, was incapacitated, and in July 2014, a superior court appointed the Alaska Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) as guardian. Plaintiff raised several issues in a complaint filed on his behalf by a next friend - issues regarding the caseloads of OPA workers, the lack of standards of practice for OPA workers, and OPA not visiting its wards quarterly as required by statute. Plaintiff requested class certification, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. The superior court granted summary judgment against plaintiff on all issues except one, and the parties proceeded with discovery and briefing on the issue whether OPA had met its statutory requirement to visit plaintiff on a quarterly basis. After the parties stipulated to a set of facts, the superior court granted OPA’s motion for summary judgment on the remaining issue. OPA moved for attorney’s fees, which the court granted but reduced, and the court entered final judgment in favor of OPA. Plaintiff appealed, arguing the superior court improperly interpreted the statutes addressing to whom OPA may delegate duties, erred by awarding attorney’s fees, and erred by holding the plaintiff’s next friend personally liable for fees. Because the superior court properly interpreted the statutes at issue, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed its ruling that OPA could contract with service providers to help satisfy its statutory visitation duty. As to the attorney’s fees award, the Supreme Court concluded it was error to hold plaintiff’s next friend personally liable for fees. The matter was remanded for the superior court to reconsider whether to impose fees on plaintiff, given that the next friend was no longer personally liable.

Caldera v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G057343(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Augustine Caldera was a prison correctional officer who sometimes stuttered when he spoke. In 2010, Caldera filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and his supervisor alleging disability discrimination. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding a stutter constituted a disability under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). A jury found in Caldera’s favor and awarded $500,000. The court granted a motion for new trial because it found the damage award excessive. The Court of Appeal reversed on procedural grounds. After nearly a decade of litigation, Caldera sought about $2.4 million in statutory attorney fees (a $1.2 million “lodestar” and a 2.0 “multiplier”). The court awarded a little over $800,000. Caldera appealed. The Court of Appeal determined Caldera could not find a local attorney to take his discrimination lawsuit, so he hired an out-of-town firm. But when calculating attorney fees, the court set the attorneys’ hourly rate based on a lower local rate, rather than a higher out-of-town rate. The court then applied the extrinsic "Ketchum" factors to the hourly rate, rather than applying a multiplier to the lodestar. "In sum, Caldera’s attorneys were not adequately compensated consistent with the purposes of the FEHA." Thus, the Court reversed the trial court’s order for attorney fees.

Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D075932(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 29, 2020

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law

T-Mobile USA, Inc. (T-Mobile) appeals a judgment entered on a $5 million jury verdict in favor of former employee Stephen Colucci in a workplace retaliation case. T-Mobile primarily challenged the punitive damages award, arguing insufficient evidence was presented at trial that a T-Mobile agent engaged in retaliatory conduct, or that the agent's actions were malicious or oppressive. Alternatively, T-Mobile argued the $4 million punitive damages award was constitutionally excessive. Stephen Colucci worked for T-Mobile from 2007 until 2014 as the manager of a store in Ontario, California. A series of incidents ranging from a medical accommodation request, defamatory comments made by co-workers, and an allegation that Colucci was running a side business while on duty for his T-Mobile store. On day, complaining of back pain, Colucci was permitted to leave work for the day; while away, Robson recommended to HR that T-Mobile terminate Colucci for "cause" (conflict of interest), notwithstanding no loss prevention investigator interviewed Colucci or any co-workers about Colucci's alleged side-dealings while on T-Mobile time. In making this decision, Robson admittedly bypassed T-Mobile's progressive discipline policy, which might have included a warning or less severe consequence before resorting to termination. Information about the alleged conflict of interest had come almost entirely from the associate; at no point did anyone speak to Colucci about a purported conflict. Unaware of any pending termination, Colucci submitted a formal request to HR for a medical leave of absence. Colucci also lodged a second complaint to T-Mobile's integrity line, reporting that Robson was discriminating against him and neglecting to resolve the defamation incident. Undeterred, Robson proceeded with processing Colucci's termination. Ultimately, a jury returned a unanimous verdict in Colucci's favor on his claim of retaliation, awarding $1,020,042 in total compensatory damages for past and future economic losses, and past and future noneconomic damages and/or emotional distress. After review, the Court of Appeal reduced the punitive damages award to an amount one and one-half times the amount of compensatory damages, but otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Huang v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A152074(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 29, 2020

Judge: Peter J. Siggins

Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

In 2000, the Fasslers obtained a Wells Fargo (WF) home equity line of credit (HELOC), secured by a deed of trust (DOT). In 2003, they secured a $530,000 World Savings home loan, then obtained another WF HELOC. In 2004, they refinanced, using a $682,500 Countrywide Loan (secured by a DOT) to pay off World Savings and eliminate the HELOC balances. WF never issued any reconveyance of its DOTs. In 2005-2008, the Fasslers drew upon both HELOCs; as of 2016, the outstanding balances totaled over $224,000. In 2007, they refinanced the Countrywide Loan with a $1 million WaMu loan They defaulted. WaMu foreclosed. In 2008, LaSalle obtained title at a nonjudicial foreclosure auction. The following month, WF recorded a notice of default and election to sell under its DOT. The Huangs purchased the property from LaSalle in February 2009. In August 2009, WF recorded its notice of trustee’s sale. The Huangs received the notice when it was posted on their door. The Huangs' suit to quiet title was rejected as time-barred because, more than three years before they filed suit, they were aware of a recorded notice of trustee’s sale. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the notice of sale did not disturb or otherwise interfere with the Huangs’ possession sufficiently to start the running of the limitations period. After receiving the notice of sale, the Huangs provided it to their title insurer. The trustee’s sale did not take place as scheduled; the Huangs heard nothing substantive about the matter for years, while they continuously lived in the home.

Amica Life Insurance Company v. Wertz

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 CO 29

Opinion Date: April 27, 2020

Judge: Gabriel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The certified question arose from a dispute in which plaintiff Amica Life Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment that it was not required to pay defendant Michael Wertz benefits under a life insurance policy naming Wertz as the beneficiary. The policy, which was issued in compliance with a standard enacted by the Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Commission (the “Commission”), contained a two-year suicide exclusion, and the insured committed suicide more than one year but less than two years after Amica had issued the life insurance policy to him. Wertz contended that the policy’s two-year suicide exclusion was unenforceable because it conflicted with Colorado statute, section 10-7-109, C.R.S. (2019). Wertz asserted that the Colorado General Assembly could not properly delegate to the Commission the authority to enact a standard that would effectively override this statute. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with Wertz, and accordingly, answered the certified question narrowly: the General Assembly did not have the authority to delegate to the Commission the power to issue a standard authorizing the sale of life insurance policies in Colorado containing a two-year suicide exclusion when a Colorado statute prohibited insurers doing business in Colorado from asserting suicide as a defense against payment on a life insurance policy after the first year of that policy.

Langer v. Board of County Commissioners

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 CO 31

Opinion Date: April 27, 2020

Judge: Gabriel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

This case and its companion, Yakutat Land Corp. v. Langer, 2020 CO 30, __ P.3d __, arose out of a contentious zoning dispute involving the propriety of constructing a gravity-based mountain roller coaster in a part of the Estes Valley, Colorado in which “significant view sheds, woodlands, rock outcroppings, ridgelines, other sensitive environmental areas and low-density residential development comprise the predominant land use pattern.” The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Larimer County Board of County Commissioners (the “BOCC”) misconstrued applicable law and abused its discretion in finding that defendant Yakutat Land Corporation’s mountain coaster project was properly classified as a Park and Recreation Facility, rather than as an Outdoor Commercial Recreation or Entertainment Establishment. The Supreme Court concluded the BOCC correctly construed the applicable code provisions, and, applying the deferential standard of review mandated here, it further concluded that the BOCC did not abuse its discretion in classifying the mountain coaster project as a Park and Recreation Facility. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Yakutat Land Corp. v. Langer

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 CO 30

Opinion Date: April 27, 2020

Judge: Hart

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

This case and its companion, Langer v. Board of Larimer County Commissioners, 2020 CO 31, __ P.3d __, arose out of a contentious zoning dispute involving the propriety of constructing a gravity-based mountain roller coaster in a part of the Estes Valley, Colorado in which “significant view sheds, woodlands, rock outcroppings, ridgelines, other sensitive environmental areas and low-density residential development comprise the predominant land use pattern.” The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the local authorities tasked with making and reviewing zoning determinations abused their discretion in interpreting and applying the Estes Valley Development Code (the “Code”) when they determined that the proposed mountain coaster could be constructed. Applying a deferential standard of review for an action brought pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), the Court concluded that they did not. Furthermore, the Court determined the constitutionality of the Code could not be appropriately raised or considered in a suit brought exclusively as a Rule 106 claim: "Rule 106 proceedings are reserved for challenges to the judicial and quasi-judicial actions of government actors. In other words, these claims challenge the application of a law in a particular instance, not the law itself."

Nelson v. IDOL and Franklin Group

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47061

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

After Christine Nelson quit her job at Franklin Building Supply in Pocatello, Idaho, due to what she described as a hostile and demeaning work environment, she filed for unemployment benefits with the Department of Labor. The Department denied Nelson’s request for benefits, concluding that she quit her job without good cause because “reasonable alternatives were not exhausted prior to quitting.” Nelson mailed her protest via the U.S. Postal Service (“USPS”) from Pocatello, Idaho. Her letter arrived at the Department’s offices in Boise on March 7, one day past the deadline. Because the postmark did not indicate the date of mailing, Nelson’s protest was dismissed by the Department for being untimely. After a hearing, an appeals examiner concluded that although there was a USPS postmark stamped on the envelope, the red ink “blend[ed] with the red stamps,” obscuring the date. Thus, while the distribution center could be discerned from the postmark, “the remainder of the postmark [was] illegible.” Because the envelope lacked a date on the postmark, the appeals examiner concluded that the envelope should be treated as if it had no postmark at all, thereby making the date of filing the date received, which was March 7, 2019 - one day too late. Nelson timely appealed the decision of the appeals examiner to the Industrial Commission, arguing that the letter was mailed by March 1 and that she had no control over its late arrival or the absence of a legible postmark. The Commission concurred with the appeal's examiner. The Department of Labor nor the Industrial Commission considered Nelson's reason for appealing in the first place: that she lacked good cause to leave her employment. Focusing instead on the timeliness of her appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the Department and Commission were mistaken in holding Nelson's filing was too late: "since once a letter is deposited for mailing it is entirely within the control of the USPS, the obscured date on the postmark stamp could only have been a result of USPS error. Thus, by the application of reason and common sense, the delivery of this letter on March 7—even with an illegible date on the postmark—conclusively proves that Nelson must have deposited her appeals letter into USPS custody on or before the March 6 filing deadline." The decision in this matter was reversed and remanded for consideration of the merits of Nelson's case.

Smith v. Glenns Ferry Hwy Dist

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46180

Opinion Date: April 28, 2020

Judge: Stegner

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law

Joanie Smith was employed by the Glenns Ferry Highway District (the District) when she witnessed the District’s office manager overpaying herself on several occasions. Smith reported the overpayments to the District’s superintendent. Sometime after Smith reported these overpayments, the District terminated Smith’s employment. Smith filed suit, alleging adverse employment action in the form of discharge. At trial, the trial court ruled it would use the jury in an advisory capacity concerning any front pay damages. The jury returned a special verdict for Smith, awarding her both back pay and front pay. Following the jury’s verdict, the trial court rejected the jury’s verdict awarding front pay, and entered a reduced award. The trial court reasoned that: (1) the jury’s verdict with respect to front pay was advisory because front pay was an equitable remedy when awarded in lieu of reinstatement; (2) Smith had not properly pleaded “failure to promote” as an adverse action in addition to discharge; and (3) the jury had incorrectly used an erroneous full-time employment status in calculating front pay. The trial court also reduced Smith’s requested attorney fees to an amount less than she had contracted to pay. Smith unsuccessfully moved for post-judgment relief. Smith appealed, and the District cross-appealed, arguing that the issue of back pay also sounded in equity, and that the trial court should have reduced the jury award of back pay. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the trial court erred: (1) when it ruled that there was no right to a jury trial on the issue of front pay; (2) by refusing to include the adverse action of “failure to hire” in the jury instructions and special verdict form; (3) by failing to instruct the jury on the “risk of uncertainty” to be borne by the District in its determination of damages; and (4) by denying Smith post-judgment interest. The Court determined the "failure to hire" instruction and "risk of uncertainty" errors were not prejudicial, and the jury award of front pay should have been reinstated. Smith’s request for entry of judgment nunc pro tunc was declined; however, on remand the trial court was asked to determine whether judgment nunc pro tunc should be entered as of the date of the jury’s verdict. Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion in reducing the award of attorney fees from the amount Smith requested. The matter was remanded for further proceeedings.

Donelon v. Shilling

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-C-00514

Opinion Date: April 27, 2020

Judge: Crain

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Civil Procedure, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this case to determine whether the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance was bound by an arbitration clause in an agreement between a health insurance cooperative and a third-party contractor. The Louisiana Health Cooperative, Inc. (“LAHC”), a health insurance cooperative created in 2011 pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, entered an agreement with Milliman, Inc. for actuarial and other services. By July 2015, the LAHC was out of business and allegedly insolvent. The Insurance Commissioner sought a permanent order of rehabilitation relative to LAHC. The district court entered an order confirming the Commissioner as rehabilitator and vesting him with authority to enforce contract performance by any party who had contracted with the LAHC. The Commissioner then sued multiple defendants in district court, asserting claims against Milliman for professional negligence, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation. According to that suit, the acts or omissions of Milliman caused or contributed to the LAHC’s insolvency. Milliman responded by filing a declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the Commissioner must arbitrate his claims pursuant to an arbitration clause in the agreement between the LAHC and Milliman. The Supreme Court concluded, however, the Commissioner was not bound by the arbitration agreement and accordingly could not be compelled to arbitrate its claims against Millman. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment holding to the contrary, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

DeRuiter v. Township of Byron

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 158311

Opinion Date: April 27, 2020

Judge: Bernstein

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Christie DeRuiter, a registered qualifying medical marijuana patient and a registered primary caregiver to qualifying patients, brought an action in the Kent Circuit Court against Byron Township, alleging that the township’s zoning ordinance—which required that a primary caregiver obtain a permit before cultivating medical marijuana and that the caregiver cultivate the marijuana within a dwelling or garage in a residentially zoned area within the township as part of a regulated home occupation at a full-time residence—directly conflicted with and was therefore preempted by the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (the MMMA). DeRuiter cultivated marijuana in an enclosed, locked facility at a commercially zoned property she rented in the township; she did not obtain a permit from the township before cultivating the medical marijuana as a primary caregiver. At the township’s direction, DeRuiter’s landlord ordered her to stop cultivating medical marijuana at the property or face legal action. The Michigan Supreme Court found that under the conflict-preemption doctrine, the MMMA did not nullify a municipality’s inherent authority to regulate land use under the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA) as long as: (1) the municipality does not prohibit or penalize the cultivation of medical marijuana; and (2) the municipality does not impose regulations that are unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state law. The township’s ordinance requiring primary caregivers to obtain a permit and pay a fee before using a building or structure within the township to cultivate medical marijuana also did not directly conflict with the MMMA because the ordinance did not effectively prohibit the medical use of marijuana. The Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of DeRuiter. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Foster v. Foster

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 157705

Opinion Date: April 29, 2020

Judge: Brian K. Zahra

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law

Deborah Foster sought to enforce a consent judgment of divorce (the consent judgment) between herself and ex-husband Ray Foster. The consent judgment provided that Ray would pay Deborah 50% of his military disposable retired pay accrued during the marriage or, if he waived a portion of his military retirement benefits in order to receive military disability benefits, he would continue to pay Deborah an amount equal to what she would have received had Ray not elected to receive such supplemental disability benefits. Because Ray was injured during combat, he was eligible for combat-related special compensation (CRSC), and Ray applied for CRSC around the time of his retirement. Deborah filed for divorce in November 2007, and the consent judgment was entered in December 2008. Deborah was receiving slightly more than $800 per month under the consent judgment until February 2010. When Ray began receiving CRSC, his disposable retirement benefit amount had been reduced, and Deborah's monthly payment was reduced to a little more than $200 per month. Ray failed to pay Deborah the difference between the reduced amount of retirement pay she was receiving and the amount that she had received shortly after entry of the consent judgment. Ray was ultimately held in contempt of court; he appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by not finding Deborah's attempts to enforce the consent judgment preempted by federal law. The Court of Appeals concluded there was no preemption and affirmed the trial court’s contempt order. Defendant sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Howell v. Howell, 137 S Ct 1400 (2017). On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the trial court’s finding of contempt, concluding that Howell did not overrule the Court of Appeals’ decision in Megee v. Carmine, 290 Mich App 551 (2010). Ray appealed again. The Supreme Court found federal law indeed preempted state law, such that the consent judgment was unenforceable to the extent it required Ray to reimburse Deborah for the reduction in the amount payable to her due to his election to receive CRSC. "Although the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement with plaintiff’s assertion that defendant was engaging in an improper collateral attack against the consent judgment, the panel did not discuss the effect of federal preemption on the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction or defendant’s ability to challenge the terms of the consent judgment outside of direct appeal." The matter was remanded for the Court of Appeals to address the effect of the Supreme Court's holding on Ray's ability to challenge the terms of the consent judgment.

Mississippi ex rel. Fitch v. Yazaki North America, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2019-CA-00094-SCT

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Civil Procedure, Consumer Law

In 2012, the executives of several Japanese auto-parts manufacturers pled guilty to federal crimes based on an international scheme to fix the price of Automotive Wire Harness Systems (AWHS). Three years later, the State of Mississippi sued the American subsidiaries of these federally prosecuted companies, alleging violations of the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) and the Mississippi Antitrust Act (MAA), as well as a civil conspiracy to violate the MCPA and MAA. The trial court dismissed the State’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The State appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed: the alleged unfair trade practices were too remote in time to support the State’s claim for injunctive relief under the MCPA; the complaint alleged no “wholly intrastate” transactions that would make the alleged illegal cartel punishable under the MAA; and because the State alleged no viable claim for a statutory violation, its civil-conspiracy claim, based solely on the alleged statutory violations, also failed.

Young v. Air Masters Mechanical Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2018-CT-00401-SCT

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Griffis

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Trusts & Estates

Daniel Tewksbury and Bobbie Young were previously married and were the parents of two minor children, Lane and Emma. They divorced in May 2006, and Daniel was ordered to pay child support. Daniel stopped making child-support payments in 2008. Bobbie later married Gerald Young, Jr. Gerald filed a petition to adopt Lane and Emma. In the adoption, Daniel’s parental rights were terminated. As of the termination of his parental rights, Daniel owed Bobbie $34,759 for child support. On April 5, 2015, Daniel died in an automobile accident. The accident occurred while Daniel was in the course and scope of his employment with Air Masters Mechanical, Inc. Bobbie then filed a petition with the Workers’ Compensation Commission on behalf of Lane and Emma, claiming that the children were entitled to Daniel’s workers’ compensation death-benefit proceeds and sought the payment of the $34,759 in outstanding child support. The Workers’ Compensation Commission Administrative Judge (AJ) determined that the child-support lien of $34,759 was valid and payable under Section 71-3-129. Air Masters and Associated General Contractors filed a petition for review with the Commission. The Commission concluded that Lane and Emma were not entitled to Daniel’s death benefits because they were not his statutory dependents under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-25 (Supp. 2019). The Commission reversed the AJ’s order and dismissed Bobbie’s petition. On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed the Commission’s decision, concluding the child-support lien was valid. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, finding Section 71-3-129 did not authorize a lien on death benefits payable directly to the deceased employee’s statutory dependents. Accordingly, the child-support lien did not apply to Daniel’s death benefits. Further, because Daniel had no statutory dependents, there were simply no benefits to which the lien can attach in this case. As a result, the Commission properly dismissed the claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission was reinstated and affirmed.

Buckles v. Continental Resources, Inc.

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 107

Opinion Date: April 28, 2020

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Continental Resources, Inc.'s motion to dismiss for lack of specific personal jurisdiction Plaintiff's complaint alleging that Continental was liable for the death of Zachary Buckles, holding that Plaintiff raised sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss. Buckles died at a North Dakota oil well site owned by Continental, allegedly from exposure to high levels of hydrocarbon vapors while manually gauging tanks. The district court concluded that Continental, an Oklahoma corporation authorized to do business in Montana, was not subject to specific personal jurisdiction because the events leading to Buckles' death did not satisfy Montana's long-arm statute and because exercising jurisdiction over Continental would violate the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Continental failed to present a compelling case that jurisdiction would be unreasonable should Plaintiff prove her claims.

Huls v. Meyer

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 S.D. 24

Opinion Date: April 29, 2020

Judge: Salter

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Contracts

The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction Appellants' appeal from the circuit court's order granting summary judgment dismissing some but not resolving all of the parties' claims, holding that the circuit court's summary judgment order was indisputably not final. The circuit court's order granting summary judgment did not resolve all of the parties' claims, and it was not certified as a final decision prior to Appellants' appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of the appeal, holding that because the circuit court resolved only part of the case and the summary judgment order did not cite S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-54(b) (Rule 54(b)), did not designate the order as final, and was not accompanied by a reasoned statement supporting a Rule 54(b) certification, this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction.