Is My Dog a Psychopath? What Predators May Tell Us About the Insanity Defense

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb describes an incident where her dog “K” stalked and killed a rabbit, and she considers what criminal-law inferences we might draw from observing such predators’ behavior toward their prey. Colb ponders what distinguishes a dog who kills a rabbit from psychopaths who commit heinous crimes, noting that among humans, a so-called “moral imbecile” lacks conscience and empathy for others, and our society deems such individuals as deserving punishment.

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Yang v. Kosinski

Docket: 20-1494

Opinion Date: June 1, 2020

Judge: Jose A. Cabranes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order of a preliminary injunction entered in favor of Democratic presidential candidate Andrew Yang and candidates for delegate seats who, if elected, would be pledged to Yang and fellow Democratic candidate, Senator Bernie Sanders. Yang, his delegates, and the Sanders delegates challenged the New York State Board of Elections' decision to remove all qualified candidates from the ballot, with the exception of former Vice President Joseph Biden, and cancel the Democratic presidential primary. The Board cancelled the Democratic presidential primary based on the coronavirus pandemic, claiming that doing so would further the State's interests in minimizing social contacts to reduce the spread of the virus and in focusing its limited resources on the management of other contested primary elections. At issue in this appeal was whether Yang, his delegates, and the Sanders delegates have demonstrated an entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief that reverses the effects of the Board's decision by requiring Yang and Sanders to be reinstated to the ballot, and the Democratic presidential primary to be conducted along with the other primary elections set for June 23, 2020. The court held that plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates have adequately established their entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief on the basis that the Board's decision unduly burdened their rights of free speech and association. The court held that plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates have made a strong showing of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief; demonstrated a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and demonstrated that the balance of the equities tips in their favor and that the public interest would be served adequately by the district court's preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting the application for a preliminary injunction, which was carefully tailored to secure the constitutional rights at stake and to afford the Board sufficient time and guidance to carry out its obligations to the electorate and to the general public.

Chamberlain v. City of White Plains

Docket: 16-3935

Opinion Date: June 1, 2020

Judges: Robert David Sack, Peter W. Hall

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The Estate of Kenneth Chamberlain, Sr. filed suit against officers of the White Plains Police Department and the City of White Plains under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims for unlawful entry and excessive force resulting in Chamberlain's death. Chamberlain, a 68 year old African American Marine veteran with mental illness, had accidentally activated his emergency medical-alert system. When the officers arrived at Chamberlain's apartment, he denied the officers entry, fearing that he would be shot by the armed officers. After an hour-long struggle to gain entry into the apartment, the officers removed the hinges to the apartment's door, crossed the threshold into the apartment, and, when lesser measures apparently failed to subdue Chamberlain, they fatally shot him. The Second Circuit principally held that the complaint and related materials properly considered by the district court upon the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim do state a plausible claim for unlawful entry and that it was also error to determine on such a motion to dismiss that officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court also vacated and remanded for further consideration portions of the judgment determining, on summary judgment, that an officer was not liable for use of excessive force and that certain officers did not have supervisory liability. The court affirmed in all other respects.

Sullivan-Mestecky v. Verizon Communications, Inc.

Docket: 18-1591

Opinion Date: June 1, 2020

Judge: John M. Walker

Areas of Law: ERISA

Plaintiff filed suit individually and as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy of her mother, Kathleen Sullivan, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), after the denial of Sullivan's life insurance benefits by Verizon and Prudential. The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) claim against both defendants and her section 502(a)(3) claim against Prudential. In this case, the terms limiting Sullivan's death benefits to a percentage of her annual income were accurately stated in the plan and its description, and thus the generous benefits plaintiff seeks never vested under the terms of the plan. However, the court held that the district court erred in dismissing the section 502(a)(3) claim against Verizon, because plaintiff pleaded estoppel as "appropriate equitable relief;" the fiduciary breach is sufficient to support the equitable remedy of surcharge; and reforming the plan to accord with Sullivan's reasonable expectations is an appropriate equitable remedy. Finally, the court rejected Verizon's arguments supporting its denial that it committed a fiduciary breach. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.