Should the Law Prohibit Anti-Fat Discrimination?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb explores the problem of fat discrimination and considers what a law of anti-fat discrimination might look like, and why it could be important. Professor Colb explores the similarities and differences between legally protected characteristics and fatness and expresses optimism that a change in law could persuade some individuals to recognize fat people for the colleagues, students, friends, partners, and neighbors that they are.

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Members-Only Unionism is Lawful and Can Make Sense

SAMUEL ESTREICHER

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher responds to an op-ed by Ron Holland criticizing the recent announcement of a members-only union of 300 Google workers. Professor Estreicher points out several errors and assumptions in Mr. Holland’s piece, and he argues that, in sum, there is no good public policy case for barring or restricting members-only unionism.

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United States v. Bennett

Docket: 19-4599

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Quattlebaum

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for seventeen financial crimes and affirmed defendant's 240-month sentence. Defendant's conviction stemmed from her efforts to induce individuals to invest in her website and from her spending large sums of money on personal expenses unrelated to the website. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's August 29, 2018 continuance motion where defendant had made multiple changes to her legal team and trial counsel stated that he would be prepared. The court upheld the criminal forfeiture order where any error regarding the securities fraud counts did not affect defendant's substantial rights; the district court did not plainly err in considering defendant's ability to pay the forfeiture judgment in addition to the restitution judgment; and the criminal forfeiture is not unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. In this case, the totality of the sentencing transcript demonstrates that the district court carried out its statutory duty by listening to the positions advanced by both parties and making an individualized finding pursuant to the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors. Furthermore, the district court thoroughly addressed the section 3553 factors, ultimately varying downward from the guidelines' range.

RXD Media, LLC v. IP Application Development LLC

Docket: 19-1461

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Barbara Milano Keenan

Areas of Law: Intellectual Property, Trademark

This appeal arose out of trademark litigation initiated by RXD against Apple over rights to use the "ipad" mark. After the district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Apple on all claims advanced by RXD and on all counterclaims asserted by Apple, the district court permanently enjoined RXD from any commercial use of the terms "ipad" or "ipod." RXD challenges the district court's infringement rulings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Apple on both its claims and counterclaims, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its award of injunctive relief to Apple. The court concluded that Apple had an established, protected mark capable of being infringed by RXD's use of the mark in 2016. The court explained that RXD's use of "ipad" on its ipadtoday.com website was not subject to "first user" protection. The court also concluded that a jury could not have reasonably concluded that RXD’s use of the "ipad" mark was unlikely to cause consumer confusion. Therefore, the district court did not err in awarding summary judgment to Apple on its claim of trademark infringement. Given the clear evidence of RXD's infringement of Apple's use of the "ipad" mark, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the injunctive relief in favor of Apple. The court rejected RXD's contention that the district court erred in holding that Apple met its burden of establishing a bona fide intent to use the "ipad" mark for cloud storage services. Rather, contrary to RXD's assertion, Apple did not apply to use the "ipad" mark for cloud storage. The court explained that Apple was not required to prove a bona fide intent to use a trademark for services not identified in its application. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Apple had a bona fide intent to use the mark for the services listed in its application.

Dowling v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Docket: 19-2141

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Stephanie Dawn Thacker

Areas of Law: Public Benefits

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision affirming the ALJ's determination that plaintiff's disability had ceased as of March 31, 2013. The court concluded that the ALJ committed two legal errors: first, the ALJ erred by failing to consider each of the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(c) before affording only negligible weight to the medical opinion of one of plaintiff's treating physicians; and second, the ALJ erred by assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) pursuant to an incorrect framework and without explaining his RFC-related findings in the manner required by Social Security regulations. Accordingly, the court remanded for further administrative proceedings.