Should the Law Prohibit Anti-Fat Discrimination?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb explores the problem of fat discrimination and considers what a law of anti-fat discrimination might look like, and why it could be important. Professor Colb explores the similarities and differences between legally protected characteristics and fatness and expresses optimism that a change in law could persuade some individuals to recognize fat people for the colleagues, students, friends, partners, and neighbors that they are.

Read More

Members-Only Unionism is Lawful and Can Make Sense

SAMUEL ESTREICHER

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher responds to an op-ed by Ron Holland criticizing the recent announcement of a members-only union of 300 Google workers. Professor Estreicher points out several errors and assumptions in Mr. Holland’s piece, and he argues that, in sum, there is no good public policy case for barring or restricting members-only unionism.

Read More

United States v. Abell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 20-1120

Opinion Date: January 15, 2021

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law, White Collar Crime

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting the government's request to garnish Appellant's husband's 401(k) account and apply the proceeds to his nearly four million dollar criminal restitution obligations, holding that Appellant had no vested legal interest in her husband's account. Appellant's husband (Husband) pleaded guilty to eight counts of wire fraud, money laundering, and unlawful monetary transactions. The district court sentenced him to a term of incarceration and ordered him to pay $3,879,750 in restitution. The government later asked the district court for a writ of garnishment directed at Husband's 401(k) plan, which Husband held individually in his own name. The district court rejected Appellant's objections and issued a garnishment order. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Massachusetts law did not give Appellant a vested legal interest in Husband's 401(k) account; and (2) it was not plain error for the district court to issue the writ of garnishment without compensating Appellant for her contingent death benefit under the policy.

Scalia v. Alaska

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-35824

Opinion Date: January 15, 2021

Judge: Paul Jeffrey Watford

Areas of Law: Family Law, Labor & Employment Law

When an employee working a "one week on, one week off" schedule takes continuous leave, an employer may count both the on and off weeks against the employee's Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave entitlement. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Secretary in an action alleging that Alaska miscalculated the amount of FMLA leave that certain employees of the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) were entitled to take. The panel held that the term "workweek" in 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1) has the same meaning it carries under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The panel explained that it is a fixed, pre-established period of seven consecutive days in which the employer is operating. Under that reading of the term, when a rotational employee takes continuous leave, both his on and off weeks count as "workweeks of leave" under section 2612(a)(1). Thus, the panel concluded that Alaska may insist that rotational employees who take 12 workweeks of continuous leave return to work 12 weeks later. The panel also held that it need not defer to the Secretary's contrary interpretation of the statute under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

Mahlendorf v. Mahlendorf

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 308 Neb. 202

Opinion Date: January 15, 2021

Judge: Stacy

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed an order of modification, holding that Appellant was not entitled to assign error to a consent judgment that reflected her negotiated agreement and that was entered at her request. In 2010, the parties' marriage was dissolved by the district court. Appellant was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the parties' two minor children, and Appellee was ordered to pay monthly child support. The decree was subsequently modified to approve a downward deviation in Appellee's child support. In 2016, the district court entered a stipulated order of modification approving the parties' agreement to increase the amount of Appellee's monthly child support obligation but continuing the existing downward deviation. In 2019, Appellant filed the current complaint to modify requesting that the downward deviation in child support be eliminated. The court entered an order of modification reflecting an agreement of the parties. Appellant appealed, arguing that the court erred in determining that Appellee was still entitled to a downward deviation in his child support obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the order of modification approved the parties' agreement on the disputed issues it was, in all respects, a consent judgment entered at the request of the parties, and therefore, Appellant could not complain of error on appeal.