Not Letting Felons Vote Damages Democracy for All Citizens

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat— Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—argues that disenfranchising felons, as most American states do in some way, does substantial harm to everyone in our democracy. Sarat praises a recent decision by a federal district court in Florida striking down a state law requiring people with serious criminal convictions to pay court fines and fees before they can register to vote, but he cautions that but much more needs to be done to ensure that those who commit serious crimes can exercise one of the essential rights of citizenship.

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State ex rel. City of East Cleveland v. Dailey

Citation: 2020-Ohio-3079

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that it lacks original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions and dismissing the City of East Cleveland's petition for declaratory judgment sua sponte, holding that it is well settled that courts of appeals lack original jurisdiction over claims for declaratory judgment. The City of East Cleveland brought criminal charges against Randolph Dailey and Patricia Coleman, both of whom were sergeants in the Cleveland police department. A jury found Coleman not guilty. In an attempt to obtain review of the trial court's evidentiary rulings before Dailey went to trial, East Cleveland filed a petition for declaratory judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals lacked original jurisdiction over the City's claim for declaratory judgment.

State ex rel. Kendrick v. Parker

Citation: 2020-Ohio-3081

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by Appellant challenging the court of appeals' denial of his motion to certify a conflict, holding that this Court lacked the authority to review of the court of appeals' decision. Appellant was serving sentences for seven rape convictions when he filed a petition in the Second District Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus alleging that the trial judge in his case patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to sentence him for one of the offenses. The Second District granted summary judgment for the judge. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant, in the meantime, filed a motion asking the Second District to certify that its judgment conflicts with other appellate decisions. The Second District denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the Court lacks the authority to review a court of appeals' decision declining to certify the existence of a conflict.

State ex rel. Feltner v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision

Citation: 2020-Ohio-3080

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Judith L. French

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition sought by a property owner who was the subject of a board of revision foreclosure seeking to invalidate the foreclosure adjudication, holding that the board of revision did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction when it proceeded in the foreclosure action. The Cuyahoga Board of Revision (BOR) entered a judgment of foreclosure concerning real property owned by Elliott Feltner. More than a year later, Feltner filed this original action asserting multiple prohibition and mandamus claims against the BOR and others. The Supreme Court granted an alternative writ of prohibition as to two of the claims against the BOR and its members concerning whether the statutes under which the BOR proceeded violated the separation of powers doctrine or the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court then made a final determination denying the writ, holding (1) at the time of its judgment, the BOR acted with presumptively valid statutory authority and therefore did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed; and (2) this Court therefore has no authority to undo the BOR's final judgment and need not consider the merit of Feltner's constitutional challenge.