Latest 3 Cases: Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis (Civil Rights), Colorado v. Monroe (Constitutional Law), In re Lucy & Meresa (Constitutional Law)

Stay the Course: The Supreme Court Respects Abortion Rights Precedent

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in June Medical Services v. Russo, in which a 5-4 majority of the Court struck down a Louisiana law regulating abortion providers. Grossman describes the history of abortion decisions that got us to this place today and explains why the core right to seek a previability abortion without undue burden from the government remains intact.

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What Chief Justice Roberts’s June Medical Concurrence Tells Us About the Future of Abortion

JAREB GLECKEL

Jareb Gleckel assesses what Chief Justice John Roberts’s concurrence in the June Medical decision might tell us about the future of abortion in the United States. Gleckel suggests that the concurrence suggests that the Chief Justice will not vote to overrule Roe and Planned Parenthood v. Casey but cautions that the test the Chief Justice embraces could provide a roadmap for anti-abortion states going forward.

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Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis

Citation: 2020 CO 66

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: Monica M. Márquez

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

In response to high-profile mass shootings in the state, the Columbine High School shootings of 1999 and the Aurora movie theater shooting in 2012. In both attacks, the shooters used large-capacity ammunition magazines. In response to the shootings, the Colorado General Assembly passed HB 1224 to prohibit the same, transfer or possession of any "large-capacity magazine." Plaintiffs Rocky Mountain Gun Owners (a Colorado nonprofit organization), the National Association for Gun Rights (a Virginia nonprofit organization), and John Sternberg, challenged this law as an infringement on the right to bear arms - not under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but under article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution. They argued that HB 1224 therefore operated to ban practically all detachable magazines, violating Coloradans' state constitutional right to bear arms in defense of home, person or property. To this, the Colorado Supreme Court disagreed, concluding Plaintiffs' interpretation of the definition of "large-capacity magazine" was inconsistent with the provision's plain text because it ignored the narrowing language, "designed to be readily converted to accept more than fifteen rounds of ammunition." The Court held that Plaintiffs failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that HB 1224 violated the state constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeals.

Colorado v. Monroe

Citation: 2020 CO 67

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: William W. Hood, III

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Colorado has long followed the no-duty-to-retreat rule in self-defense cases. During the closing arguments of Shiela Monroe’s trial, the prosecution repeatedly argued that Monroe didn’t act reasonably in self-defense because she failed to retreat. Although the trial court admonished the jury that Monroe didn’t have a duty to retreat, it instructed the jury that it could consider Monroe’s failure to retreat as relevant to whether she actually believed that she faced an imminent use of unlawful force. The jury found Monroe guilty of first degree assault and attempted first degree murder. Monroe appealed, arguing that because she had no duty to retreat the trial court should not have permitted any argument regarding her failure to do so, even if it was ostensibly directed at undermining the reasonableness of her claim of self- defense. A division of the court of appeals reversed Monroe's convictions. The appellate court abstained from deciding whether it was ever proper to argue that a defendant's failure to retreat undermines the reasonableness of a defendant's self-defense claim, but it concluded the prosecution's arguments impermissibly imposed on Monroe a duty to retreat and remanded for a new trial. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held the prosecution could not argue a defendant acted unreasonably in self-defense because she failed to retreat from an encounter. Thus, the trial court erred by permitting the prosecution’s arguments regarding Monroe’s failure to retreat. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals on different grounds. Monroe’s conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.

In re Lucy & Meresa

Citation: 2020 CO 68

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: Samour

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Colorado Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause in two cases out of Gilpin County, hoping to provide guidance on whether a trial court could grant the prosecution’s contested request for a continuance with a tolling of the statutory speedy trial period based on a public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic. In "Lucy," the prosecution has charged Maurice Lucy with criminal mischief, a class 2 misdemeanor. Lucy pled not guilty on June 12, 2019, but subsequently requested a continuance of his trial on October 9, 2019. As a result, his six-month speedy trial period was set to expire April 9, 2020. The county court scheduled his jury trial to commence on March 17, 2020, within the speedy trial deadline. In Meresa, the prosecution charged Desta Meresa with violation of a criminal protection order and unlawful sexual contact, both class 1 misdemeanors. Meresa pled not guilty on October 9, 2019, which meant that his six-month speedy trial period was set to expire on April 9, 2020. The county court scheduled Meresa’s jury trial to commence on March 17, the same day Lucy’s case was scheduled for trial. On March 16, 2020, the day before both cases were scheduled for trial, the Chief Judge of the First Judicial District issued an administrative order requiring that all jury trials set in the district through May 1, 2020, be vacated unless there were exigent circumstances presented or speedy trial constraints. The administrative order explained that this drastic measure was necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the Chief Judge’s order, the county court vacated the trials in the two cases at issue. The prosecution immediately filed a motion to continue and requested a tolling of the speedy trial period in each case. It relied on section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) C.R.S. (2019), which required the tolling of the speedy trial period for up to six months under certain circumstances when the court grants a continuance at the prosecution’s request without the defendant’s consent. The Supreme Court held that, absent the defendant’s consent, section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) authorized a trial court to grant the prosecution a continuance with a tolling of the speedy trial period for up to six months if the prosecution established that: (1) as a result of a public health crisis, evidence material to its case is unavailable; (2) it has exercised due diligence to obtain that evidence; and (3) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the unavailable evidence will be available on the new trial date. Because the county court erred in these two cases, the decisions reversed and matters remanded for further proceedings.