Latest 3 Cases: Mayle v. Illinois (Civil Procedure), United States v. Perez (Criminal Law), Fuqua v. United States Postal Service (Labor & ...

Rethinking Retroactivity in Light of the Supreme Court’s Jury Unanimity Requirement

MICHAEL C. DORF

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Monday in Ramos v. Louisiana, in which it held that the federal Constitution forbids states from convicting defendants except by a unanimous jury, Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the Court’s jurisprudence on retroactivity. Dorf highlights some costs and benefits of retroactivity and argues that the Court’s refusal to issue advisory opinions limits its ability to resolve retroactivity questions in a way that responds to all the relevant considerations.

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Mayle v. Illinois

Docket: 19-1691

Opinion Date: April 23, 2020

Judge: HAMILTON

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

Mayle, a self-proclaimed Satanist, is a follower of The Law of Thelema, a set of beliefs developed in the early 1900s by Aleister Crowley. As part of this religion, Mayle participates in what he calls “sex magick rituals” that he believes violate Illinois laws forbidding adultery and fornication. He claims that he reasonably fears prosecution for practicing his beliefs. He also says that he wants to marry more than one person at the same time and that if he were to do so, he would violate an Illinois law against bigamy. Mayle’s first challenge to the laws was dismissed. Mayle did not appeal, but the next year he filed another suit challenging the same statutes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the second suit, first rejecting a challenge to the district court’s grant of a two-day extension to allow Mayle to file a notice of appeal. Mayle’s bigamy claim was precluded by the 2017 final judgment on the merits. Mayle lacked standing to challenge the state’s adultery and fornication laws because he still showed no reasonable fear of prosecution; those laws are no longer enforced.

United States v. Perez

Docket: 18-3156

Opinion Date: April 23, 2020

Judge: KANNE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Beloit officers facilitated a recorded controlled buy of heroin from Perez, a suspected high-level drug dealer. Perez sold 98 grams of heroin to an informant. Based on that transaction alone, Perez pled guilty to distributing heroin. At Perez’s sentencing hearing, the judge expressed concern that the guidelines range of 33–41 months’ imprisonment did not reflect the full scope of his drug trafficking. The PSR described conduct that suggested that Perez was responsible for distributing large quantities of heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine. The judge continued the hearing, directing the government to file a memorandum, detailing which offense conduct it could support by a preponderance of the evidence. When the hearing reconvened, the government presented witness testimony that elaborated on conduct described in the PSR, including drug ledgers, Perez’s post-arrest conversation with his girlfriend, large sums of cash, a money counter, cell phones, and Perez’s passport. The judge calculated a higher guidelines range and imposed a 121-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentencing judge should have recused himself. Perez has not demonstrated that a reasonable observer would have questioned the judge’s impartiality nor did he allege that the judge was biased based on events outside the proceedings. The judge’s continuance was laudable, not prejudicial.

Fuqua v. United States Postal Service

Docket: 18-2415

Opinion Date: April 23, 2020

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Fuqua, a mail handler, was forced to transfer to a new location when his Chicago center was downsized. He did not receive placement within 30 miles of his home. He refused to appear for work in Kansas City and was fired. Fuqua alleged his termination caused him emotional distress and made an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671. The Postal Service denied his claim, ruling that his exclusive remedy was through the Department of Labor (DOL) under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. 8101. Fuqua filed suit for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA. During a stay in the proceedings, Fuqua corresponded with the DOL alleging he was injured because of defendants’ “extreme and outrageous conduct refusing to allow [him] to become assigned a station closer to [his] residence.” The DOL denied his FECA claim, explaining “[e]motional conditions that arise out of administrative and personnel matters, such as termination of employment are usually covered only if the weight of the evidence supports that the employer acted in an abusive manner or erred.” The district court dismissed Fuqua’s case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. FECA applied to Fuqua’s claim, its administrative scheme ran its course, and his claim was denied for lack of evidence. The district court had no subject matter jurisdiction over his FTCA claims. Fuqua’s allegation falls within the “transfer, or reassignment” definition of “personnel action.”