The Things That Are Caesar’s

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on the recent oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in Our Lady of Gaudalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, which raises the question how broadly to construe the word “minister” within the ministerial exception to anti-discrimination law required by the First Amendment. Colb explains where the ministerial exception doctrine might be headed and suggests that an exemption even for criminal misconduct against ministers might be within the existing doctrine.

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Libby v. Estabrook

Citation: 2020 ME 71

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Horton

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing, for lack of standing, Appellant's petition to establish de facto parentage of his stepson, holding that Appellant was entitled to a hearing to determine his standing. Appellant filed a petition to be adjudicated the child's de facto parent after the mother died unexpectedly. With the petition, Appellant included an affidavit alleging facts to support the existence of a de facto parent relationship with the child. The court dismissed the petition for lack of standing, concluding that Appellant could not establish a necessary element of standing even if the facts in his affidavit were true. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant's assertions, if believed, could have led to a find that he had standing; (2) Respondent's affidavit generated disputed material facts that must be resolved to determine Appellant's standing; and (3) the court abused its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve those factual disputes.

Friends of Lamoine v. Town of Lamoine

Citation: 2020 ME 70

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Andrew M. Mead

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the business and consumer docket vacating a decision by the Town of Lamoine Board of Appeals that reversed the Town Planning Board's denial of Hard MacQuinn, Inc.'s application for a permit under the Town's site plan review ordinance and affirming and reinstating the Planning Board's decision, holding that the lower court did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Me. R. Civ. P. 80B complaint filed by Friends of Lamoine and Jeffrey Dow as Trustee for the Tweedie Trust was timely; (2) the Board of Appeals properly conducted appellate review of the site plan permit decision rather than de novo review; (3) the Planning Board’s findings in denying the permit were supported by substantial evidence; and (4) MacQuinn's argument that the Planning Board should have waived a criterion of the ordinance as duplicative or inapplicable did not require discussion.

Raposa v. Town of York

Citation: 2020 ME 72

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Horton

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming a decision of the Town of York Board of Appeals purporting to grant Daniel and Susan Raposa's appeal from a decision of the Town's Code Enforcement Officer (CEO), holding that because the Board's written findings of fact directly nullified its decision to grant the appeal, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings. The Raposas contacted the Town's CEO to express their concern that Joshua Gammon's use of his property was not consistent with his predecessor's lawful nonconforming use. The CEO determined that Gammon's operation of his business on his property was not a change in use from his predecessor's use of the property. On appeal, the Board granted the Raposas' appeal as to the change-of-use issue. In the Board's written decision, however, the Board stated, "The use of the lot by Mr. Gammon's landscaping business does not constitute a change of use but is an intensification of the same use." The superior court affirmed, concluding that the Board's written decision was the operative decision for judicial review. The Supreme Judicial Court held that because the Board's written decision contained factual findings directly contradicting its initial decision, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings.