A Profile of John J. Gleeson, the Trial Court’s Proposed “Friend Of The Court” in the Michael Flynn Case

JEFFREY MORRIS, RODGER CITRON

Touro law professors Jeffrey B. Morris and Rodger D. Citron conduct a profile of John J. Gleeson, the lawyer and former judge who has been appointed as a “friend of the court” to advise the federal district court on a matter where the U.S. Department of Justice is seeking dismissal of the case against former national security advisor Michael Flynn. Morris and Citron describe Gleeson’s background both on and off the bench and predict that, if given the opportunity to fulfill his role, Gleeson will certainly be fair and proper in determining the proper way to deal with Michael Flynn’s case.

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Is There Any Point in Talking About Trump’s Upcoming Refusal to Leave Office?

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor Neil H. Buchanan reiterates his argument that Donald Trump will refuse to leave the White House even if he loses the 2020 election and considers why journalists are only just now beginning to recognize that as a possibility. Buchanan laments the possibility that there is nothing to be done about this existential threat to America’s constitutional democracy.

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Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles

Docket: A156062(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 2, 2020

Judge: Mark B. Simons

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

Vehicle Code section 13365(a) directs the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to suspend a person’s driver’s license “[u]pon receipt of notification of a violation of" section 40508(a) (the Misdemeanor Statute), which makes it a misdemeanor for a traffic offender to “willfully violat[e]” his written promise to appear in court. Plaintiffs challenged the DMV policy of suspending driver’s licenses upon notification of a failure to appear even without notification that this failure violated the Misdemeanor Statute. The DMV provides courts with electronic and paper methods to notify it of a person’s failure to appear; both require the court to indicate the “sections violated.” The DMV will suspend a driver’s license regardless of whether the form indicates that the Misdemeanor Statute is one of the sections violated. The trial court denied the petition. The court of appeal reversed, rejecting DMV’s argument that it is authorized under section 13365(a) to suspend a license upon receiving notification pursuant to the Notification Statutes. Notification of a violation of the Misdemeanor Statute is required before the DMV suspends a license pursuant to section 13365(a). The Notification Statute is broader and authorizes permissive notification upon violation of a “written promise to appear . . . , or . . . an order to appear in court." An order to appear in court is not equivalent to a written promise to appear. The Misdemeanor Statute also requires that the failure to appear be willful.”

People v. Tarkington

Docket: B296331(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 2, 2020

Judge: Lee Anne Edmon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, with a finding that he personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife. After the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437, defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, which the trial court summarily denied. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that defendant is ineligible for section 1170.95 relief as a matter of law because the record shows that defendant was the actual killer and was not tried using the natural and probable consequences doctrine or the felony murder rule. The court also held that defendant was not entitled to appointed counsel at the first prima facie review stage, and defendant's remaining arguments lack merit.

In re B.P.

Docket: B303804(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 2, 2020

Judge: Tricia A. Bigelow

Areas of Law: Family Law

Mother appealed a detention order based on a subsequent dependency petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 342. The Court of Appeal granted DCFS's motion to dismiss the appeal, because the detention order based on a section 342 petition is interlocutory and not appealable. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain mother's appeal of the detention order entered prior to disposition.