Latest 3 Cases: Finance Authority of Maine v. Grimnes (Commercial Law), Colucci v. Colucci (Family Law), Doyon v. Fantini (Real Estate & Property Law)

Not Letting Felons Vote Damages Democracy for All Citizens

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat— Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—argues that disenfranchising felons, as most American states do in some way, does substantial harm to everyone in our democracy. Sarat praises a recent decision by a federal district court in Florida striking down a state law requiring people with serious criminal convictions to pay court fines and fees before they can register to vote, but he cautions that but much more needs to be done to ensure that those who commit serious crimes can exercise one of the essential rights of citizenship.

Read More

Finance Authority of Maine v. Grimnes

Citation: 2020 ME 76

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Horton

Areas of Law: Commercial Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court against Appellant, guarantor of a promissory note held by Finance Authority of Maine (FAME), holding that the superior court correctly determined that neither of two of the default provisions contained in Article 9 of Maine’s Uniform Commercial Code - 11 M.R.S. 9-1607 and 9-1626 - required FAME to prove the reasonableness of its decision not to pursue the collateral before it could obtain a judgment against Appellant. FAME extended a loan to Harbor Technologies, LLC. Harbor executed a promissory note and security agreement under which its assets were pledged as collateral to secure the note. Appellant executed a personal guaranty of Harbor's obligations to FAME. After Harbor defaulted on the loan, FAME sued Appellant on his guaranty for the entire amount due. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of FAME. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the independent and unconditional nature of Appellant's guaranty, the court was correct when it determined that neither section 9-1607 nor section 9-1626 imposed a burden on FAME to prove the commercial reasonableness of its decision not to pursue the collateral before it could obtain a judgment against Appellant.

Colucci v. Colucci

Citation: 2020 ME 75

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court granting Susan Colucci's complaint for divorce, holding that the court did not have an adequate evidentiary basis from which it could make the findings necessary for it to set aside the parties' dog to the correct party. On appeal, Stephen Colucci argued that the district court erred in awarding the parties' dog, Louise, to Susan because the dog was his nonmarital property. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that because the parties did not present any evidence of who, whether Susan or Stephen, acquired Louise five years before the marriage, the district court should have reopened the record for the parties to submit additional evidence regarding the ownership of Louise prior to entering a final judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Doyon v. Fantini

Citation: 2020 ME 77

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Andrew M. Mead

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court entering a declaratory judgment in favor of Ingrid Doyon, Trustee of the Oscar Olson Jr. Trust, holding that the trial court erred in interpreting a 1941 deed that contained language restriction development of three lots in a subdivision. In 2012, Ingrid Doyon acquired the three lots - Lots 3, 5, and 72 - as trustee of her father's trust. Doyon subsequently conveyed two of the lots but retained her interest in Lot 72. In 2014, Doyon initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the restrictive covenant burdening Lot 72 permitted her to construct a single family home and garage on the property. The court issued a judgment in favor of Doyon. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the 1941 deed unambiguously limited the construction that could take place on Lot 72 to a garage to be used with Lot 3, subject to certain setback specifications.