Should Animals Be Allowed to Sue?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on case in which Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) brought a civil damages suit on behalf of an abused horse, now named Justice, against the horse’s former owner. Colb dismantles three arguments critics raise in opposition to recognizing abused animals as plaintiffs in lawsuits such as this one.

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Elston v. County of Kane

Docket: 19-1746

Opinion Date: January 28, 2020

Judge: Barrett

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Elston and his friends were playing basketball at a DuPage County park, heckling one another with salty language. Demeter, an off-duty Kane County sheriff’s deputy, watching his child’s soccer game, demanded that they stop using expletives. Demeter flashed his badge and gun. The boys refused to clean up their language. Demeter grabbed Elston by the neck, threw him to the ground, and climbed on top of him. Bystanders separated the two. Demeter called 911, identifying himself as a police officer in need of assistance. Demeter told Elston’s father that he was a police officer attempting to take Elston into custody for disorderly conduct. Elston was never charged with any offense. Demeter pleaded guilty to violating Aurora’s ordinance against battery. Elston sued Demeter under 42 U.S.C. 1983, winning a default judgment and an award of $110,000. Elston also sued Kane County under Illinois’s Tort Immunity Act. The district court rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Demeter was acting as a private citizen, not within the scope of his duties as a deputy when he injured Elston. Demeter was not acting substantially within the time and space limits authorized by his employment; that Demeter used his badge, gun, and training in an unauthorized manner in q purely personal pursuit does not bring his conduct within the scope of his employment.

Crabtree v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

Dockets: 18-3405, 18-3416

Opinion Date: January 28, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Consumer Law

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) prohibits consumer reporting agencies from releasing credit information except under circumstances enumerated in 15 U.S.C. 1681b, including to provide prospective lenders with "prescreen lists" of consumers who meet their criteria if the sharing results in a “firm offer of credit or insurance” to every consumer on that list." Experian compiles consumer information. Western had contracted to receive prescreen lists from Experian through agents. Experian provided its consumer data to Tranzact, which used that information to create prescreen lists, which it sold to a marketing agency, which then extended offers backed by Western to the consumers on the list. Experian terminated its contract with Western, with November 18, 2011, as the cutoff date. A prescreen list with Experian’s data went to Western on November 30, 2011. Neither company knew there was any problem. The list, which included Crabtree, was shared when it should not have been. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Crabtree’s FCRA suit, noting that there was no evidence that anyone on the list did not receive a firm offer from Western. Crabtree, who claimed invasion of privacy and emotional distress, did not allege the requisite injury-in-fact to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement. Experian’s alleged statutory violation, without further allegations of harm, was insufficient to establish a concrete injury.

United States v. Helding

Docket: 18-3270

Opinion Date: January 28, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Police seized 143.7 kilograms of marijuana from Helding’s car and apartment. Harding pleaded guilty to possessing over 100 kilograms. At sentencing, the court held him responsible for the equivalent of 4,679.7 kilograms, based solely on the Presentence Investigation Report’s account that confidential informants told law enforcement Helding was dealing significant quantities of methamphetamine during the relevant period. The drug quantity determination resulted in his ultimate sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment; the quantity of 143.7 kilograms carries a sentencing range of 120-150 months. The quantity determined by the court carried a sentencing range to 210-262 months (plus five years for a firearm offense). The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing. A sentencing court acts within its discretion when it credits confidential informants’ statements about drug quantity, but when a defendant objects, the evidence supporting that quantity must be found to be reliable. The statements here fell short of that threshold. There was no description of the informants’ past work with law enforcement, their criminal history, the reliability of the accounts they had provided before, or whether and why officers believed the information provided to the probation office was reliable.