Latest 3 Cases: Douglas v. Price (Civil Procedure), Winfield v. Dorethy (Civil Rights), United States v. Chaparro (Criminal Law)

Religions Harm People

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN

UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin points out ways in which religions harm people—manifested today as an insistence on exemptions to social COVID-19 distancing orders. Griffin argues that telling the truth about religion should not be viewed as a form of discrimination and endorses Katherine Stewart’s recent book, The Power Worshippers: Inside the Dangerous Rise of Religious Nationalism, which provides a detailed explanation of how the Religious Right has used its power to advance religion-based government in harmful ways.

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Conservative Authoritarianism Comes Out of the Shadows

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—comments on Harvard Law Professor Adrian Vermeule’s essay “Beyond Originalism,” which Sarat argues brings conservative authoritarianism out of the shadows. Sarat describes Vermeule as a modern-day Machiavelli, offering advice to the governing class and laying out a theory of governance Vermeule calls “common-good constitutionalism” but which in reality elevates the “common good” above individual goods in a manner antithetical to freedom, pluralism, and democracy.

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Douglas v. Price

Docket: 19-1868

Opinion Date: April 13, 2020

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Class Action, Legal Ethics

The $8.5 million proposed settlement of a class action that claimed that Western Union violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending unsolicited text messages, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). defined the class as: “All Persons in the United States who received one or more unsolicited text messages sent by or on behalf of Western Union.” Price, thinking she was a class member because she had received two text messages from Western, objected, arguing that the settlement inadequately compensated the class; class counsel’s fee request was too high; the plaintiff’s incentive award was too high; the class definition was imprecise; and the list of class members had errors. Western’s records confirmed that Price had enrolled in its loyalty program, checking a disclaimer box consenting to receive text messages. The judge certified the class, ruled that Price was not a member, approved the settlement, and reduced class counsel’s fees. Price did not appeal her exclusion from the class and did not seek to intervene but sought attorney’s fees and an incentive award. Her motion was denied because Price had cited “no authority for the highly questionable proposition that a non‐class member can recover fees and an incentive award under Rule 23.” The Seventh Circuit dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Price is not a party and lacks standing to appeal.

Winfield v. Dorethy

Dockets: 19-1441, 19-1547

Opinion Date: April 13, 2020

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Winfield confessed to shooting Garrett. Winfield was convicted of attempted murder. Winfield was also accused of killing Stovall in the same shooting but was acquitted on that charge because no credible witness had placed Winfield at the scene of the crime and his confession did not mention Stovall. The judge rejected Winfield’s argument that his confession was coerced and his “half-hearted” alibi defense. On appeal, Winfield raised one unsuccessful sentencing argument. Illinois state courts, on post-conviction review, concluded that trial counsel’s presentation of Winfield’s alibi was not so deficient that it violated the Constitution; they did not meaningfully address the performance of appellate counsel. On federal habeas review, the district court concluded that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), did not apply because the ineffective assistance claim had not been adjudicated on the merits in state court. It considered the claim without any deference to the state courts and found appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by omitting an argument that Winfield’s confession was uncorroborated. The Seventh Circuit held that Winfield is not entitled to relief. Winfield cannot overcome the deference applied to the state court’s finding that trial counsel performed reasonably because Winfield never told counsel that he was at home at the time of the shooting. The Constitution did not obligate Winfield’s appellate counsel to discover and present a complex and novel corpus delicti argument that may not have succeeded.

United States v. Chaparro

Docket: 18-2513

Opinion Date: April 13, 2020

Judge: HAMILTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Chaparro was convicted based on viewing child pornography in 2013, transmitting child pornography in August 2014, and viewing child pornography on a smartphone in November 2014. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The court rejected challenges, which were not raised in the district court, to the sufficiency of the evidence that he was the person using the electronic devices and to allegedly improper remarks made by the prosecutor. The court acknowledged that “the government’s case could have been stronger as to the identity of the devices’ user.” The computer forensics led investigators to a home, not to an individual, and little evidence showed that Chaparro resided at the address before December 2014. Any improper rebuttal comments did not affect Chaparro’s substantial rights. The admission of Chaparro’s statement to pretrial services that he lived at the address was an error; pretrial services information is “confidential” and its admission is specifically prohibited “on the issue of guilt,” 18 U.S.C. 3153(c)(1), (3). Chaparro’s lone witness, his uncle, testified that Chaparro did not live at the address where the crimes were committed until just before his arrest. The court allowed the testimony of the pretrial services officer for impeachment. Assuming an exception exists under section 3153(c)(3) for other forms of impeachment, applying that exception to include specific contradiction by a statement from someone other than the witness is contrary to the protections Congress enacted.