Latest 3 Cases: Cook v. Ohio National Life Insurance Co. (Civil Procedure), Wilson v. Williams (Civil Rights), United States v. Dunnican (Criminal ...

Would Eliminating Qualified Immunity Substantially Deter Police Misconduct?

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the proposal that eliminating or substantially reducing the qualified immunity currently enjoyed by police officers would address racism and police brutality. Although the idea has lately garnered some bipartisan support and could potentially have some benefit, Dorf describes two reasons to be skeptical of the suggestion. He concludes that for all of its flaws, qualified immunity may actually facilitate the progressive development of constitutional rights.

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Cook v. Ohio National Life Insurance Co.

Docket: 19-3984

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: Gilbert Stroud Merritt, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

Cook sold variable annuities on behalf of Ohio National, under a contract between Ohio National and a broker-dealer, Triad. Ohio National paid commissions on the previously sold annuities to Triad, which in turn paid commissions to Cook pursuant to a separate agreement between Cook and Triad. After Ohio National terminated its agreement with Triad, Ohio National refused to pay further commissions on annuities sold during the term of the agreement. Cook sued Ohio National for breach of its agreement with Triad. Triad is not a party to the suit. Cook claimed that as a “third-party beneficiary” to the agreement between Ohio National and Triad, he had standing to bring suit. The district court found that, under Ohio law, Cook not an “intended” third-party beneficiary and could not maintain an alternative claim of unjust enrichment against Ohio National. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The plain language of the Selling Agreement makes it clear that plaintiff is not an intended third-party beneficiary under the Agreement. The Agreement unambiguously directs Ohio National to pay commissions to Triad; Cook is precluded from bringing an unjust enrichment claim against Ohio National.

Wilson v. Williams

Docket: 20-3447

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: Gibbons

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Inmates housed in the low-security Elkton Correctional Institution, on behalf of themselves and others, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to obtain release from custody to limit their exposure to the COVID-19 virus. They sought to represent all current and future Elkton inmates, including a subclass of inmates who—through age and/or certain medical conditions—were particularly vulnerable to complications, including death, if they contracted COVID-19. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in April 2020, directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to evaluate each subclass member’s eligibility for transfer by any means, including compassionate release, parole or community supervision, transfer furlough, or non-transfer furlough within two weeks; transfer those deemed ineligible for compassionate release to another facility where testing is available and physical distancing is possible; and not allow transferees to return to Elkton until certain conditions were met. The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction. While the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241, that section does not permit some of the relief the petitioners sought. The court rejected the BOP’s attempts to classify the claims as “conditions of confinement” claims, subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The district court erred in finding a likelihood of success on the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim. There was sufficient evidence that the petitioners are “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” but the BOP responded reasonably to the known, serious risks posed by COVID-19.

United States v. Dunnican

Docket: 19-3092

Opinion Date: June 9, 2020

Judge: Bush

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Dunnican's convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D); and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court upheld the introduction of data extracted from Dunnican's cellular telephone and text messages. The stipulations of Federal Rule of Evidence 902 were met and the evidence was properly authenticated. Dunnican’s text messages are not hearsay because they are Dunnican’s own statements, regardless of the medium. Text messages regarding Dunnican's other drug transactions were relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show a necessary element of the charge: Dunnican’s intent to distribute the drug. The court properly allowed a DEA agent to offer expert opinion testimony that the marijuana appeared to be packaged for distribution. The agent offered no opinion on Dunnican’s mental state or intent but, drawing upon his training, experience, and the evidence, simply shared his subjective assessment of the facts. Dunnican was not entitled to a new trial following the dismissal of the only African-American jury member for health reasons. Dunnican’s speculation that there was “documented misconduct” during jury deliberations had no basis. A 21-month upward variance on Dunnican’s sentence was appropriate; the court reasonably concluded that an above-Guidelines sentence was necessary to advance the objectives of protecting the public and deterring Dunnican from future criminal conduct