Latest 3 Cases: Breland v. United States (Bankruptcy), Helm v. Carroll (Civil Rights), United States v. Knights (Criminal Law)

The Oprah Interview as a Truth Commission

LESLEY WEXLER

Illinois Law professor Lesley Wexler explains how Oprah’s interview with Prince Harry and Meghan Markle might illuminate how a formal truth commission to deal with legacies of racism and colonialism might function in the British empire. Professor Wexler describes the purpose and function of state-operated truth commissions and notes the similarities and differences between those and the interview.

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Breland v. United States

Docket: 19-14321

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Newsom

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

After debtor voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court determined that he was transferring assets and defrauding creditors. The bankruptcy court removed him as the debtor-in-possession and appointed a trustee to administer the estate. Debtor appealed, arguing that the trustee's appointment violated his Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from "involuntary servitude"—because, he said, under the trustee's direction, all of his post-petition earnings would be put into the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of his creditors. The bankruptcy court dismissed debtor's Thirteenth Amendment claim as unripe, and the district court similarly held that debtor could not show an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that debtor's loss of authority and control over his estate, which he suffered as a result of his removal as the debtor-in-possession, constitutes an Article III-qualifying injury-in-fact that is both traceable to the bankruptcy court's appointment of the trustee and redressable by an order vacating that appointment. Therefore, debtor has standing to pursue his Thirteenth Amendment claim. The court left it to the district court on remand to consider the merits of debtor's arguments.

Helm v. Carroll

Docket: 19-11569

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Lagoa

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in her individual capacity and as guardian and next friend of T.D.H., a minor, alleging that Chief Carroll, the four named officers, and the City of Rainbow City violated her and T.D.H.'s constitutional rights to be free from the use of excessive force, failing to intervene in the use of that force, and falsely imprisoning and falsely arresting her and T.D.H. Plaintiff also alleged that Rainbow City and Chief Carroll failed to appropriately train and supervise the other named officers. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from defendants' actions while T.D.H. was suffering from a grand mal seizure at a concert. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to T.D.H., the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Officer Morris's repeated tasings amounted to excessive force prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, and that the constitutional violation was clearly established based on both materially similar case law and the obvious clarity exception. Therefore, the district court properly denied qualified immunity to Officer Morris, and the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on Count Five. Because the facts taken in the light most favorable to T.D.H. establish that Chief Carroll and Officers Kimbrough and Gilliland violated a clearly established right by failing to intervene, the court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that they are not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on Counts Eight, Eleven, and Twelve (in part). The court also affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on T.D.H.'s false imprisonment claim (Count Twenty-Two) against Officer Morris, and the denial of summary judgment on Counts One and Two.

United States v. Knights

Docket: 19-10083

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted defendant's motion for panel rehearing, vacated the original opinion in this appeal, and substituted in its place the following opinion. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence officers found in an investigatory stop and the statements he made to the officers. In this case, the officers saw defendant and another individual at 1:00 a.m. in a car that was parked in the front yard of a home; suspecting that the men might be trying to steal the car, the officers parked near it and approached defendant, who was in the driver's seat; when defendant opened the door, an officer immediately smelled marijuana; and an ensuing search of the car revealed ammunition and firearms. The court held that the officers did not violate defendant's right to be free from unreasonable seizures because defendant's interactions with the officers was an initially consensual encounter that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that a reasonable person in defendant's position would have felt free to leave. Here, the officers parked alongside the car with enough space for him to drive away. When the officers approached defendant to speak to him, they did not convey that defendant was required to comply. Defendant's other arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. The court clarified that race may not be a factor in the threshold seizure inquiry.