A Profile of John J. Gleeson, the Trial Court’s Proposed “Friend Of The Court” in the Michael Flynn Case

JEFFREY MORRIS, RODGER CITRON

Touro law professors Jeffrey B. Morris and Rodger D. Citron conduct a profile of John J. Gleeson, the lawyer and former judge who has been appointed as a “friend of the court” to advise the federal district court on a matter where the U.S. Department of Justice is seeking dismissal of the case against former national security advisor Michael Flynn. Morris and Citron describe Gleeson’s background both on and off the bench and predict that, if given the opportunity to fulfill his role, Gleeson will certainly be fair and proper in determining the proper way to deal with Michael Flynn’s case.

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Is There Any Point in Talking About Trump’s Upcoming Refusal to Leave Office?

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor Neil H. Buchanan reiterates his argument that Donald Trump will refuse to leave the White House even if he loses the 2020 election and considers why journalists are only just now beginning to recognize that as a possibility. Buchanan laments the possibility that there is nothing to be done about this existential threat to America’s constitutional democracy.

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Abdisamad v. City of Lewiston

Docket: 19-1852

Opinion Date: June 2, 2020

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Personal Injury

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's federal and state civil rights claims and state wrongful death claims against the City of Lewiston, the Lewiston School Department (collectively, the City Defendants), and the Maine Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry (DACF), holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error. Appellant brought this suit after his seventh-grade son died while on a Lewiston school field trip to a state park. The complaint alleged due process violations and wrongful death claims. DACF filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion, holding that sovereign immunity insulated DACF from Appellant's claims in federal court. The court then granted the City Defendants' motion to dismiss after construing Appellant's due process violation claim as a substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Maine Civil Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, 4682. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellant waived any challenge to the dismissal of his claims against DACF; and (2) Appellant's allegations were insufficient to state a constitutional tort claim against the City Defendants.

Russomano v. Novo Nordisk Inc.

Docket: 20-1173

Opinion Date: June 2, 2020

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Contracts, Labor & Employment Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Novo Nordisk Inc.'s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Thomas Russomano, one of its former employees, and BioMarin Pharmaceutical, Inc., Russomano's current employer, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Novo Nordisk could not show a likelihood of success on the merits. Novo Nordisk sought to enforce the terms of a confidentiality and non-compete agreement that Russomano signed when he was employed at Novo Nordisk. The agreement prohibited Russomano from working for a competitor for one year after the end of his employment at Novo Nordisk and from disclosing confidential information. The district found that Novo Nordisk was not likely to succeed on the merits. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Novo Nordisk's termination letter was unambiguous that Russomano's employment ended on August 2, 2018.

Dagi v. Delta Airlines, Inc.

Docket: 19-1056

Opinion Date: June 2, 2020

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Appellant's complaint alleging that he received an injury that occurred in connection with his 2015 Delta Airlines flight to London, holding that Appellant's complaint fell within the scope of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for Intentional Carriage by Air (Montreal Convention) and was, as a result, time barred. When an airline passenger suffers bodily injury on board an aircraft or in the course of embarking or disembarking, his only legal recourse is to sue the airline for recovery under the Montreal Convention, which preempts any local law claims the passenger could bring. Appellant, who missed the Montreal Convention's two-year deadline to sue, argued that his injury occurred after his disembarkation and was therefore outside the scope of the Montreal Convention. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that the Montreal Convention preempted and time barred Appellant's claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's injury began inflight and therefore fell within the scope of the Convention; and (2) as a result, Appellant's claim was time barred.