| United States v. Heindenstrom |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-2187 Opinion Date: December 30, 2019 Judge: Selya Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court in connection with Defendant's plea of guilty to a single count charging him with drug distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), holding that the sentence was supportable when viewed as an upward variance. Relying on a finding that a death resulted from the offense of conviction in this case, the district court imposed an above-the-range term of imprisonment. The court justified the sentence both as an upward departure and an upward variance. On appeal, Defendant challenged his sixty-month sentence both procedurally and substantively. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) any error in invoking a departure guideline was harmless where the district court would have imposed exactly the same sentence by means of a variance; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering in its decision to impose an upward variance the fact that an individual died after using the fentanyl-laced substance knowingly sold to him by Defendant; and (3) the sentence was not outside the universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes and therefore was substantively reasonable. |
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| United States v. Blaszczak |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-2811 Opinion Date: December 30, 2019 Judge: Richard J. Sullivan Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for wire fraud, Title 18 securities fraud, conversion of U.S. property, and conspiracy, arising from the misappropriation of confidential information from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. The federal wire fraud, securities fraud, and conversion statutes, are codified at 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1348, and 641, respectively. The court held that confidential government information may constitute "property" for purposes of the wire fraud and Title 18 securities fraud statutes. The court also held that the "personal-benefit" test announced in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), does not apply to those Title 18 fraud statutes. Finally, the panel found no prejudicial error with respect to the remaining issues presented on appeal. |
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| United States v. McLaughlin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-308 Opinion Date: December 30, 2019 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Personal jurisdiction exists whenever an individual, charged with a crime over which the Federal court has subject matter jurisdiction, is brought before that court. The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of obstruction of Government administration for making false statements to the IRS. The court held that the district court had personal jurisdiction over defendant where the district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case: an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. In this case, the indictment charged defendant and defendant was present before the district court. Therefore, the judgment was valid. |
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| United States v. Mumuni |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-1604 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: Jose A. Cabranes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Government appealed the substantive reasonableness of defendant's sentence for conspiring to provide material support to ISIS and attempting to murder a federal agent in the name of ISIS. The Second Circuit held that defendant's sentence of 17 years' imprisonment—which constitutes an 80% reduction from his recommended Guidelines range of 85 years—was substantively unreasonable in light of his exceptionally serious conduct involving a domestic terrorist attack against law enforcement in the name of ISIS; where a district court has accepted a defendant's guilty plea and his allocution to the elements of each charged offense, it cannot make findings of fact during sentencing that contradict or otherwise minimize the conduct described at defendant's plea hearing; where a sentencing court opts to compare the relative culpability of co‐defendants, it cannot selectively rely on a factor when it serves a mitigating function in one case, but then subsequently ignore the same factor when it serves an aggravating function in the other case; a defendant's legally‐required compliance with institutional regulations during his term of pre‐trial and pre‐sentencing detention is not a substantially mitigating factor for purposes of sentencing; and, at defendant's resentencing, the district court shall accord substantially greater weight to the specified 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| Bey v. Falk |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 18-1376, 18-1285 Opinion Date: December 31, 2019 Judge: Larsen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| At 2:30 a.m., Bey and two friends went out to purchase space heaters. Bey had purchased his older minivan days earlier, so it had a temporary registration tag but no license plate. The three went to a Livonia store but came away empty-handed. They drove to a Canton Walmart, where they purchased space heaters. Undercover Livonia police Sergeant McKinley noticed the minivan. Livonia had recently experienced several retail break-ins. McKinley followed the minivan on “a hunch” that criminals often use stolen, older vehicles for retail crimes. The officers noted that the minivan’s passengers were black. McKinley observed the paper temporary registration taped to the window; he later testified that officers ran the registration through the Michigan state database but found no matching records. Another officer recalled that McKinley said over the radio that the problem was that “it was unreadable.” On the freeway, the officers thought the minivan executed an evasive driving tactic. An officer followed the men into the Walmart and watched them pay for their merchandise. At Livonia’s request, the Canton Police Department dispatched uniformed officers, who surrounded Bey’s van and ordered him out of the vehicle. Bey was carrying a concealed weapon; he properly stated that he was armed and produced a concealed weapon license. That license had expired; Bey was arrested him. The state court found the stop unconstitutional; the case was dismissed with prejudice. Bey then sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit: dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, McKinley’s appeal of the denial of qualified immunity as to Bey’s equal protection claim; affirmed the denial of as to Bey’s Fourth Amendment claim; and reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the other officers. |
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| United States v. Antonio Vinton, Jr. |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-2354 Opinion Date: January 2, 2020 Judge: McKEAGUE Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| An undercover FBI analyst posted a photo of an “adult female in a provocative pose” with the text “Anybody into [child pornography]" on the Whisper social media application. In private messages, the analyst described herself as a 36-year-old female with a 12-year-old daughter and told Vinton that she was “into incest and young,” Vinton stated that he liked “incest and younger women” and asked “you want me to f*** your daughter . . . [a]nd you[?]” The analyst said that she and her daughter had done this before with her fictitious husband. Vinton asked what specific sexual acts the daughter would perform. At Vinton’s suggestion, the analyst sent a photo of the fictitious daughter. Vinton sent photos of himself and of male genitalia. Vinton stated “there is a lot of risk” but affirmed his desire to pursue a meeting. When Vinton arrived for that meeting, he was arrested and indicted for using a facility of interstate commerce to attempt to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce an individual under the age of 18 to engage in unlawful sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The court dismissed the indictment concluding that, as a matter of law, a reasonable juror could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Vinton had the requisite intent. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. Vinton argued that there was “insufficient evidence” that he had the “requisite intent to solicit a minor.” It was improper for the court to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence before trial; intent is a question of fact, reserved for the jury |
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| United States v. Buie |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2942 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession of child obscenity in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1466A(b)(1) and (d). The court held that the statute of conviction was neither overbroad and vague in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The court applied the Miller test and held that the visual depictions defendant possessed were obscene. |
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| United States v. Green |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 18-3589, 18-3591 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant Green's motion to suppress evidence, and affirmed Defendants Green and Herbert's sentences for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not clearly err by finding that the officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle in which Green was riding, because the vehicle was speeding and there were two possible state violations regarding the license plate. Furthermore, the first patdown of Green was justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion and the second frisk was also reasonable in light of the newly discovered firearm. The court also held that the district court did not procedurally err by implying a four-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for the use or possession of a firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a downward variance; the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a three-level upward departure; and the district court adequately explained the basis for its sentencing decision. |
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| United States v. Guzman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3488 Opinion Date: January 2, 2020 Judge: Roger Leland Wollman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracies to import and possess cocaine and attempted possession of the drug. The court also held that the district court did not err in calculating defendant's offense level based on its finding that the quantity of cocaine exceeded five kilograms, and the district court did not clearly err by imposing a sentencing enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(b), because defendant had acted as a manager or supervisor. |
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| United States v. Rodriguez-Gamboa |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-50014 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: Andrew David Hurwitz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order allowing defendant to withdraw her guilty plea to illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326, vacated the dismissal of the information, and remanded for the district court to resolve the factual issue of whether geometric isomers of methamphetamine exist. In Lorenzo v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2018)(Lorenzo I), the panel held that the definition of methamphetamine applicable to convictions under 8 U.S.C. 11378 is broader than the definition of methamphetamine under the federal Controlled Substances Act. In this case, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendant to withdraw her guilty plea after Lorenzo I, because that decision effectively invalidated defendant's underlying removal. Lorenzo I was subsequently withdrawn and replaced with a non-precedential memorandum disposition, Lorenzo v. Whitaker, 752 F. App'x 482 (9th Cir. 2019) (Lorenzo II). Lorenzo II stated that the government is not foreclosed from raising in other cases the argument that any difference between California and federal law about the definition of methamphetamine is illusory. The government contended that both California law and federal law prohibit the possession for sale of methamphetamine and its isomers, and thus they are identical. The panel declined the government's invitation to rewrite California law and noted that the government's argument required the panel to look beyond the statutory language to matters of organic chemistry. Rather, the panel reasoned that resolution of the factual issue of whether geometric isomers of methamphetamine exist has the potential to inform its disposition in this appeal and future cases. |
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| Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaria |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-4037 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr. Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Personal Injury |
| Antonio Caballero filed the underlying lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah seeking a “judgment on a judgment” he had obtained from a Florida state court. The complaint asserted he expected to proceed against assets located in Utah pursuant to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”). Caballero served defendants with process in the federal suit; none answered or otherwise participated i the Utah action. The federal district court registered the Florida state-court judgment under 28 U.S.C. 1963, but denied all other relief because Caballero did not establish personal jurisdiction over the defendants. As a result, Caballero could not utilize federal district court collection procedures. Caballero moved to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court denied. He appealed both orders. The Tenth Circuit determined section 1963 applied only to registration of federal-court judgments in federal courts, not to state-court judgments. Consequently, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment registering the Florida state-court judgment in Utah federal court. The Court determined Caballero’s civil cover sheet filed with the district court indicated the basis of jurisdiction was federal question; Caballero might have been able to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the TRIA if permitted to amend his complaint. The Tenth Circuit reversed to allow Caballero to amend his complaint. |
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| McCowan v. Morales |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-2169 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: David M. Ebel Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
| In an interlocutory appeal, Defendant Mark Moralez, a Las Cruces, New Mexico police officer, challenged a district court’s decision to deny him summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity from two of Plaintiff Warren McCowan’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. Those claims alleged that the officer: (1) used excessive force against McCowan while driving him to the police station after having arrested him for drunk driving; and (2) was deliberately indifferent to McCowan’s serious medical needs (his injured shoulders) while at the police station, before transporting McCowan to the county detention center where medical care was available. McCowan based his excessive-force claim on his assertion that Officer Moralez placed McCowan in the back seat of a patrol car, handcuffed behind his back and unrestrained by a seatbelt, and then drove recklessly to the police station, knowing his driving was violently tossing McCowan back and forth across the backseat. This rough ride, McCowan contended, injured his shoulders, after McCowan had advised the officer before the trip to the station that he had a previous shoulder injury. McCowan’s second claim alleged that Officer Moralez was deliberately indifferent to McCowan’s serious medical needs by delaying McCowan’s access to medical care until he arrived at the county detention center. The Tenth Circuit affirmed as to both counts; the allegations alleged a clearly established violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Officer Moralez qualified immunity. |
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| United States v. Fields |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 17-7031 Opinion Date: December 30, 2019 Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner Edward Fields pleaded guilty in federal court to two counts of first degree murder, two counts of using a firearm during a federal crime of violence causing the death of a person, and two counts of assimilative crime. Fields was sentenced by jury to death on each of the two murder convictions, and to significant terms of imprisonment on each of the remaining convictions. After completing the direct appeal process, Fields initiated proceedings before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals by filing a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court denied Fields’s petition, and also denied him a certificate of appealability (COA). The Tenth Circuit subsequently granted Fields a COA with respect to four issues. After its review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded to the district court with directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Fields’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present at trial evidence of his organic brain damage. |
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| Alvarez-Perdomo v. Alaska |
| Court: Alaska Supreme Court Docket: S-17170 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: Joel H. Bolger Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The court of appeals determined that Paino Manuel Alvarez-Perdomo was coerced to take the stand at his criminal trial, thus violating his privilege against self-incrimination in both the federal and Alaska constitutions. But the court of appeals held this error was not a structural error requiring reversal, and that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Alaska Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide an issue of first impression: whether the violation of a criminal defendant’s right not to take the stand was a structural error., The Court concluded it was indeed a structural error, because it implicated personal interests more fundamental than the ordinary risk of a wrongful conviction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded for a new trial. |
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| People v. Blanchard |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A156720(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 31, 2019 Judge: Peter J. Siggins Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Blanchard entered a no-contest plea to second-degree burglary. The court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Blanchard on behavioral health probation for three years. In 2018, Blanchard was twice charged with violating the terms of his probation; each time probation was reinstated. In November 2018, he was charged with a third violation for a possible commercial burglary. That charge was supplemented with two other charged violations. His counsel declared a doubt regarding Blanchard’s competence to stand trial. Blanchard objected to any finding of his incompetence. The judge appointed experts to evaluate him. On the basis of their reports, Blanchard was found incompetent to stand trial. The court referred Blanchard to the Contra Costa Conditional Release Program for a recommendation regarding his placement. Based on that recommendation, the court committed Blanchard to a state hospital for two years. Blanchard’s appeal was dismissed. The court determined that an independent review of the record was not required, applied the process identified by the California Supreme Court in Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007), reviewed the brief provided by appointed counsel, and found no arguable issues. |
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| People v. Lowery |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F076484(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 2, 2020 Judge: Herbert I. Levy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants Lowery and Green were convicted of four counts of second degree robbery and for being felons in possession of a firearm. Lowery received an aggregate prison term of 24 years eight months; Green received an aggregate prison term of 41 years; and the trial court imposed fees, fines and, assessments on both defendants. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant's contention that this matter must be remanded so the sentencing court may exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss their respective firearm enhancements pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620. The court held that a remand was not warranted on the SB 620 issue or on the issue of whether Green's five-year sentence enhancement should be stricken. The court held that, based on the sentencing record, it was abundantly clear that the trial court would not have exercised its discretion to strike or dismiss any of these enhancements. In the published portion of this opinion, the court held that defendants forfeited their claim relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157. The court ordered a clerical error to be amended in the respective abstracts of judgment and otherwise affirmed defendants' respective judgments. |
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| State v. Blaine |
| Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket: SC20087 Opinion Date: December 31, 2019 Judge: Ecker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming Defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, holding that there was no clear, obvious or indisputable error warranting reversal of Defendant's conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime, as required by State v. Pond, 50 A.30 950 (Conn. 2012). The appellate court held that there was no obvious or undebatable error in the jury instructions and that, even if the instructions were erroneous, there was no manifest injustice necessitating reversal of the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's jury instructions were sufficient to guide the jury in arriving at its verdict. |
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| Goodloe v. State |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0438 Opinion Date: December 26, 2019 Judge: McKeig Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court summarily denying Petitioner's third petition for postconviction relief, holding that Petitioner was conclusively entitled to no relief. Petitioner was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of relief. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the district court committed plain error when it gave the pattern jury instruction on premeditation. The Supreme Court affirmed. Twelve years later, Petitioner filed this petition arguing that the district court's instruction on premeditation did not accurately state the law. The district court summarily denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even when the alleged facts were viewed in a light most favorable to Petitioner, he was conclusively entitled to no relief. |
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| Petersen v. State |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0686 Opinion Date: December 26, 2019 Judge: G. Barry Anderson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's petition for postconviction relief asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, holding that Defendant's claim failed on the merits. In his petition for postconviction relief Defendant argued that his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder must be set aside based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The district court summarily dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant was entitled to no relief on his postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. |
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| Zumberge v. State |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0593 Opinion Date: December 26, 2019 Judge: Chutich Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court summarily denying Defendant's petition for postconviction relief, holding that the claims raised in the petition were procedurally barred and that the district court's failure to address Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel did not require a remand. Defendant was convicted of murder and attempted murder. Defendant later filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that counsel, the judge, and the prosecutor committed reversible errors during trial. In a supporting memorandum, Defendant alleged an additional claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The district court denied the petition without a hearing and failed to address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claims were barred by State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976); and (2) the facts conclusively showed that Defendant was entitled to no relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. |
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| New Mexico v. Lente |
| Court: New Mexico Supreme Court Citation: 2019-NMSC-020 Opinion Date: October 31, 2019 Judge: Nakamura Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The two issues presented by this case came to the New Mexico Supreme Court from a district court’s decision to grant Defendant Jesse Lente’s habeas petition. The first concerned Lente’s indictment, charging him with perpetrating various forms of sexual abuse on a regular basis against M.C., his stepdaughter (a so-called "resident child molester" case). The district court, relying on Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2005), and New Mexico v. Dominguez, 178 P.3d 834, concluded that Lente’s indictment included “carbon copy” charges - charges that were truly identical, and not distinguishable by time or date or by specification that each charge was predicated on different acts - that impermissibly subjected him to double jeopardy. The second issue concerned the district court’s determination that M.C.’s testimony was too generic and insufficient to support Lente’s multiple convictions. Her testimony, the district court concluded, could support only one conviction for each type of sex-abuse crime Lente perpetrated and, therefore, Lente’s multiple convictions violated double jeopardy. The Supreme Court disagreed as to both issues, finding the district court wrongly interpreted the principles articulated in Valentine and Dominguez and erred in determining that Lente’s indictment included carbon copy charges that produced a double jeopardy violation. The Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify the principles courts must utilize when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence presented in resident child molester cases. |
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| New Mexico v. Sloan |
| Court: New Mexico Supreme Court Citation: 2019-NMSC-019 Opinion Date: October 31, 2019 Judge: Thomson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After retrial, defendant Matthew Sloan appealed his convictions for burglary and felony murder. At the second trial, the State presented evidence that defendant, armed with a rifle and accompanied by two other men, broke into the victim’s house to retrieve drugs or money from the victim and that defendant shot and killed the victim during the burglary. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the district court denied him his right to be present and to confront witnesses against him by failing to determine whether he made a valid waiver of his right to be present at three pretrial hearings; (2) he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel; and (3) the district court committed reversible error by declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. Finding no reversible error, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions. |
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| Oregon v. Guzman |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S066328 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: Nelson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Consolidated cases concerned two defendants who were convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), a crime ordinarily a misdemeanor but that, in each case, was elevated to a felony based on the defendant’s two prior convictions from other jurisdictions. The common question these cases presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review was whether the foreign laws under which defendants were convicted were “statutory counterparts” to ORS 813.010, the statute criminalizing DUII in Oregon. After analyzing the relevant statutes, the Supreme Court concluded the appropriate inquiry required “close element matching,” between ORS 813.010 and the foreign offense, an approach that the Court has previously employed in giving legal effect to convictions from other jurisdictions. Applying that standard to defendants’ foreign convictions, the Court concluded that none of the convictions at issue in this were under a statutory counterpart to ORS 813.010. |
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| Oregon v. Henderson |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S066367 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: Thomas A. Balmer Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant and the victim had two children together. Defendant and the victim were formerly in a relationship, but they broke up before the victim moved into the house where the unlawful entry at the center of this case took place. Although the victim previously had allowed defendant to visit their children at her house, defendant had never lived there, and the victim had made it clear to defendant that he was no longer welcome. On the day in question, defendant came to the house and told the victim that he wanted to shower and talk. She refused to let him inside and made sure to lock all the doors and windows before she left for work, fearing that defendant would try to come in while she was away. After the victim left, defendant broke into the house and destroyed a number of the victim’s possessions, including a new television and several lamps. He intentionally cut his arm with a knife, bleeding on various pieces of her living room furniture. Defendant sent the victim text messages with pictures of his bleeding arm as well as messages blaming her for problems in his life. Based on those pictures, the victim realized defendant was in her house. The police were called and arrested defendant. Defendant was eventually charged with, among other things, first-degree burglary constituting domestic violence and second-degree criminal mischief. The question before the Oregon Supreme Court was whether a person commits the crime of first-degree burglary when the person enters a dwelling unlawfully without the intent to commit an additional crime and then develops that intent while unlawfully present in the dwelling. The Supreme Court held that forming the intent to commit an additional crime while unlawfully present after an initial unlawful entry constitutes first-degree burglary under ORS 164.225. |
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| Vermont v. Grant |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2019 VT 91 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: Beth Robinson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Timothy Grant was charged with one count of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, to which he pled not guilty. He was not fingerprinted or photographed before arraignment. At arraignment, the State asked the court to impose four conditions of release. The first three conditions, to which defendant did not object, were: that he come to court when directed; keep a current address and phone number on file with his attorney and the court clerk; and not engage in criminal behavior. The last condition required defendant to “report to Brattleboro PD for the taking of fingerprints and photographs.” Defendant objected to the final condition at his arraignment. The issue in this case was whether, as a matter of course, every defendant charged with a misdemeanor may be ordered to submit to fingerprinting pursuant to 20 V.S.A. 2061(d). In ordering Defendant to submit to fingerprinting, it essentially created a blanket rule authorizing fingerprinting in every misdemeanor case. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s action was counter to the Legislature’s direction, therefore reversing the trial court’s imposition of the condition. |
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| Byerly v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2019 WY 130 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: Michael K. Davis Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and battery, domestic battery, strangulation of a household member, violating a protective order, and witness intimidation, holding that there was one trial error in a single incident of prosecutorial misconduct, but Defendant suffered no prejudice from the comment. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on the State's alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by vouching for the credibility of the victim, but the comment was not prejudicial; (4) the district court did not err in joining charges against Defendant for trial; (5) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a Daubert hearing on the testimony of the State's domestic violence expert; and (6) cumulative error did not warrant reversal of Defendant's conviction. |
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| Cercy v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2019 WY 131 Opinion Date: December 27, 2019 Judge: Kate M. Fox Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of third-degree sexual assault, holding that, on retrial, the district court inadequately instructed the jury. Defendant's first jury trial ended in not-guilty verdicts on two counts and a mistrial on the third count. On retrial, the jury found Defendant guilty of third-degree sexual assault. Defendant appealed, asserting that the second trial violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding (1) Defendant's second trial for third-degree sexual assault did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy; but (2) the jury was not properly instructed on the law under which it could find Defendant guilty of third-degree sexual assault. |
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| Petersen v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2019 WY 132 Opinion Date: December 30, 2019 Judge: Michael K. Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence imposed in connection with his conviction of domestic battery and failure to register as a sex offender, holding that the district court gave Defendant adequate credit for his presentence confinement. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to domestic battery and failure to register as a sex offender. The court sentenced Defendant to a prison term of two to three years for the failure to register and a term of 180 days for the domestic battery, to run concurrently with each other and the sentence Defendant was already serving. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's requested credit; and (2) because Defendant was not promised credit in addition to that to which he was entitled by law, he was not impermissibly induced to plead guilty, and his protected interest in the credit was not affected. |
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