Taking Stock: A Review of Justice Stevens’s Last Book and an Appreciation of His Extraordinary Service on the Supreme Court

RODGER CITRON

Rodger D. Citron, the Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship and a Professor of Law at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, comments on the late Justice John Paul Stevens’s last book, The Making of a Justice: Reflections on My First 94 Years. Citron laments that, in his view, the memoir is too long yet does not say enough, but he lauds the justice for his outstanding service on the Supreme Court.

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Aponte-Bermudez v. Colon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 18-1266

Opinion Date: December 20, 2019

Judge: Boudin

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this case alleging negligent design, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Defendants on the ground that Plaintiff failed to establish the applicable standard of care, a breach of duty, and that the accident giving rise to this action was foreseeable to Defendants, holding that judgment was properly granted for Defendants. When a vehicle was driven into another vehicle parked outside a building, the parked vehicle crashed into the building's open terrace, injuring several individuals sitting within the terrace, including Plaintiff, Plaintiff sued the owner of the building, his heirs, and his insurer, arguing that the terrace was negligently designed. The district court entered judgment for the defense. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to show damage through fault or negligence of Defendants.

Penate v. Hanchett

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1187

Opinion Date: December 13, 2019

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Personal Injury

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the magistrate judge concluding that Defendant, a state drug lab supervisor, was not entitled to qualified immunity from a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and vacated the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss an intentional infliction of emotional distress state law claim, holding that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the section 1983 claim. Plaintiff's conviction was vacated after the discovery of the drug abuse of Sonja Farak, a chemist at the Amherst Drug Lab on the campus of the University of Massachusetts. Plaintiff brought this complaint alleged that Defendant's inadequate supervision Farak constituted deliberate indifference to Defendant's constitutional rights. Defendant also claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress. The magistrate judge denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the section 1983 claim and held that Defendant's behavior showing a disregard for "repeated red flags" was enough to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. The First Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the section 1983 claim; and (2) because the sole basis for federal jurisdiction was dismissed the judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress state law claim is remanded to state court.

Ryder v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-30824

Opinion Date: December 16, 2019

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Transportation Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific in an action alleging that the company negligently contributed to a fatal railroad collision. In this case, the trucks in front of a caravan had left insufficient room for the last truck to clear the Oil & Gas Crossing. The last truck stopped on the tracks where, seconds later, a Union Pacific train collided with it, killing all three individuals inside. The court found plaintiffs' claim that Union Pacific breached a duty to provide adequate visual warning devices at the Oil & Gas Crossing unpersuasive; the Crossing was not a "dangerous trap;" and, although a jury could reasonably conclude that Union Pacific had a duty to plaintiffs to protect against the unique hazard presented by the Crossing, plaintiffs have failed to show why the signs Union Pacific installed were insufficient to fulfill this duty. The court also held that plaintiffs' claims that Union Pacific was negligent in operating the locomotive horn was either preempted by federal law or otherwise unsupported by sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.

Gordon v. ARC Manufacturing, Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D075373(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Construction Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

Beau Gordon, a professional roofer, fell 35 feet through a "camouflaged hole" in a warehouse roof he was inspecting. For the resulting head injury, a jury awarded Gordon approximately $875,000 against the building's owner, ARC Manufacturing, Inc. (ARC) and Joseph Meyers. The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court correctly refused to instruct on primary assumption of risk where, as here, defendants did not hire or engage Gordon. The Court of Appeal concluded that primary assumption of risk did not apply, rejected appellants' other contentions, and affirmed the judgment.

Loeb v. County of San Diego

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D074347(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 16, 2019

Judge: Judith L. Haller

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Sally Loeb sued the County of San Diego (County) for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when she tripped on an uneven concrete pathway in a County park. The County filed successive motions for summary judgment based on a "trail immunity" defense, which provided absolute immunity to public entities for injuries sustained on public trails that provide access to, or are used for, recreational activities. The trial court denied these motions, finding disputed facts existed regarding whether the pathway was used for recreational purposes. But when Loeb conceded during argument over the proposed special verdict forms that the pathway was used, at least in part, for recreational purposes, the trial court granted a nonsuit in the County's favor. Loeb contended the trial court erred procedurally and substantively. Finding no reversible error in the grant of a nonsuit, the Court of Appeal affirmed.

Riley v. Alameda County Sheriff's Office

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A156407(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 17, 2019

Judge: Mark B. Simons

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Riley was riding a motorcycle through a green light in Oakland, when he was struck by a car fleeing from Sheriff’s deputies in marked cars. The suspects in the car that struck Riley were suspected of theft and the car had been reported as stolen. Riley traveled on the hood of the car for some distance, until the car crashed. Riley suffered serious bodily injury. Riley filed suit. Defaults were entered against the suspects. The court dismissed the individual officers from the action and later granted the Sheriff summary judgment, concluding the Sheriff is entitled to immunity under Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which provides a public agency immunity from liability for collisions involving vehicles being pursued by peace officers if the agency “adopts and promulgates a written policy on, and provides regular and periodic training on an annual basis for, vehicular pursuits.” The court of appeal affirmed. The Oakland Policy does effectively “control and channel the pursuing officer’s discretion” in determining the speed of pursuit. The Sheriff showed that deputies were trained in accordance with the Policy and that the training included adequate consideration of speed limits as required by Penal Code section 13519.8(b).

Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Ameron Pole Products LLC

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C088360(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 26, 2019

Judge: Renner

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

In September 2014, a driver was rear-ended by an SUV driven by a Union Pacific employee. The motorist lost control of her car, spinning off the freeway and onto the dirt shoulder, where it struck a roadside light pole. The light pole, which was manufactured by Ameron Pole Products, was designed to “break away” on impact, causing the pole to pass over the impacting vehicle, thereby reducing the force of the collision and concomitant risk of injury. On this occasion, however, the light pole did not break away, but instead remained standing. The driver sustained multiple injuries, including skull fractures, injuries to her brain and face, a fracture of the right scapula, and bilateral chest trauma. The driver sued Union Pacific Railroad Comapny and Ameron. Union Pacific cross-complained against Ameron for equitable indemnity and apportionment. Ameron moved for summary judgment, arguing the driver would be unable to prove causation as a matter of law. Union Pacific opposed the motion, arguing Ameron failed to carry its initial burden or showing judgment as a matter of law. Alternatively, Union Pacific argued the evidence submitted raised triable issues of fact as to whether Ameron’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the driver’s injuries. The trial court entered judgment in Ameron’s favor. The Court of Appeal reversed, concurring with Union Pacific’s alternate grounds. Summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Lieupo v. Simon's Trucking, Inc.

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC18-657

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Ricky Polston

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the First District Court of Appeal by holding that the private cause of action contained in Fla. Stat. 376.373(3) permits recovery for personal injury, thus receding from precedent. Plaintiff brought this suit alleging that Defendant was strictly liable for injuries he suffered after one of Defendant's tractor-trailers spilled battery acid onto the highway. Plaintiff filed his complaint under section 376.373(e), which imposes strict liability for the discharge of certain types of pollutants. The jury found the battery acid caused Plaintiff's injuries and awarded him more than $5 million in damages. The First District reversed, concluding that Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010), required it to apply the 1970 Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act's definition of damages, which precluded Plaintiff's cause of action for personal injuries. The Supreme Court quashed the First District's decision, holding (1) Curd incorrectly applied the 1970 Act's definition of "damage" to a claim brought under the 1983 Act; and (2) the plain meaning of "all damages" in section 376.313(3) of the 1983 Act includes personal injury damages.

Sanchez v. Miami-Dade County

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC18-793

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal concluding that Petitioner's "negligent security" claim against Miami-Dade County was barred by sovereign immunity, holding that the conflict issue in this case was a dead issue that has been resolved by this Court in previous opinions. Petitioner was shot and injured at a birthday party hosted at one of the County's public parks. The Third District concluded that Petitioner's personal injury claim was predicated on the County's alleged failure to allocate off-duty police officers to the party and that sovereign immunity protects the County's policy and planning decisions about where to allocate its limited police resources. The Third District reached its holding irrespective of any duty owed to Petitioner by the County. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that the existence of duty rendered sovereign immunity inapplicable. The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's petition for review without reaching the merits, holding that the merging of duty and sovereign immunity has already been resolved by this Court in opinions making clear that duty and sovereign immunity are not to be conflated.

Collins et al. v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, P.A.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S19G0007

Opinion Date: December 23, 2019

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Health Law, Internet Law, Personal Injury

Plaintiffs alleged in 2016, an anonymous hacker stole the personally identifiable information, including Social Security numbers, addresses, birth dates, and health insurance details, of at least 200,000 current and former patients of Athens Orthopedic Clinic (“the Clinic”) from the Clinic’s computer databases. The hacker demanded a ransom, but the Clinic refused to pay. The hacker offered at least some of the stolen personal data for sale on the so-called “dark web,” and some of the information was made available, at least temporarily, on Pastebin, a data-storage website. The Clinic notified plaintiffs of the breach in August 2016. Each named plaintiff alleges that she has “spent time calling a credit reporting agency and placing a fraud or credit alert on her credit report to try to contain the impact of the data breach and anticipates having to spend more time and money in the future on similar activities.” Plaintiffs sought class certification and asserted claims for negligence, breach of implied contract, and unjust enrichment, seeking damages based on costs related to credit monitoring and identity theft protection, as well as attorneys’ fees. They also sought injunctive relief under the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”), and a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Clinic must take certain actions to ensure the security of class members’ personal data in the future. The Clinic filed a motion to dismiss based on both OCGA 9-11-12 (b) (1) and OCGA 9-11-12 (b)(6), which the trial court granted summarily. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the injury plaintiffs alleged they suffered was legally cognizable. Because the Court of Appeals held otherwise in affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’ negligence claims, the Supreme Court reversed that holding. Because that error may have affected the Court of Appeals’s other holdings, the Court vacated those other holdings and remanded the case.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Hartry et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S19G0008

Opinion Date: December 23, 2019

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Transportation Law

On June 16, 2010, crossing gates were down at a public railway-roadway crossing -- a position that normally indicated: (1) a train was approaching the crossing; (2) a railway was performing maintenance; or (3) they were malfunctioning. As Marvin Johnson, Jr. approached the railroad crossing driving his 28-foot-long truck with attached dumpster, he saw that the gates were down but cars were driving around the gates and over the crossing. Johnson followed suit, driving around the crossing gates into the path of an oncoming train on which Winford Hartry was serving as engineer. Hartry was injured as a result of the collision. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether Winford Hartry’s claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) was precluded by regulations issued pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”). Because the Supreme Court concluded that FRSA and its regulations did not preclude Hartry’s FELA claim, it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Eldridge v. West, Turpin & Summit

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 45214

Opinion Date: December 20, 2019

Judge: Stegner

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Health Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

This was a permissive appeal brought by Phillip and Marcia Eldridge1 in a medical malpractice action they filed against Dr. Gregory West (West), Lance Turpin, PA-C (Turpin), and Summit Orthopaedics Specialists, PLLC (Summit). The Eldridges alleged that Phillip became infected with Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) as a result of malpractice committed by West, Turpin, and agents of Summit. The Eldridges claimed West and Turpin breached the standard of care that was due them and as a result, sustained damages. The district court granted various motions, including a motion to dismiss certain causes of action against West, Turpin, and Summit, as well as a motion for summary judgment brought by Turpin and Summit, and a motion for partial summary judgment brought by West. On appeal, the Eldridges contended the district court erred in: (1) dismissing their claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, gross negligence, and reckless, willful, and wanton conduct; (2) denying their motion to strike the affidavits of West and Turpin; (3) limiting their claim for damages; and (4) concluding that the Eldridges could only present evidence of damages, specifically medical bills, after the Medicare write-offs had been calculated. The Idaho Supreme Court concurred with the Eldridges, reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Gomez v. Crookham

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 45542

Opinion Date: December 20, 2019

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Agriculture Law, Business Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury, Products Liability

Francisca Gomez died as the result of a horrific industrial accident while she was cleaning a seed sorting machine as part of her employment with the Crookham Company (“Crookham”). Her family (the Gomezes) received worker’s compensation benefits and also brought a wrongful death action. The Gomezes appealed the district court's decision to grant Crookham’s motion for summary judgment on all claims relating to Mrs. Gomez’s death. The district court held that Mrs. Gomez was working within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, that all of the Gomezes’ claims were barred by the exclusive remedy rule of Idaho worker’s compensation law, that the exception to the exclusive remedy rule provided by Idaho Code section 72-209(3) did not apply, and that the Gomezes’ product liability claims failed as a matter of law because Crookham was not a “manufacturer.” In affirming in part and reversing in part, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the trial court erred when it failed to consider whether Crookham committed an act of unprovoked physical aggression upon Mrs. Gomez by consciously disregarding knowledge that an injury would result. As such, the matter was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Wood v. Farmers Insurance Co of Idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46765

Opinion Date: December 20, 2019

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

Deena Wood was seriously injured in a car collision. At the time of the collision, Wood had auto insurance through Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, which included $100,000 of underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage but also contained a provision stating that the amount of coverage would be reduced by the liability limit of the at-fault driver. Because the at-fault driver’s bodily injury liability limit was equal to Wood’s underinsured motorist limit, Farmers determined that no underinsured benefits were owed to Wood. Wood challenged the denial in district court, arguing in a motion for reconsideration that the offset provision should be declared void as against public policy because it “diluted” UIM coverage. The district court rejected Wood’s argument. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision.

Ammons v. Canadian National Railway Co.

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2019 IL 124454

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Rita B. Garman

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Ammons and Riley sued Wisconsin Central under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51, for injuries they sustained when the train they were operating struck another train. Both alleged Wisconsin Central was negligent in violating various rules and regulations, which resulted in their injuries. Wisconsin Central alleged that plaintiffs failed to exercise ordinary care and that multiple locomotives, railroad cars, track, and track structures sustained significant damage, which caused it to spend significant amounts of money to repair, perform environmental cleanup and remediation, and incur other incidental and consequential damages. Wisconsin Central sought damages in excess of $1 million. Section 55 of the FELA prohibits “[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from liability.” Section 60 prohibits “[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose, intent, or effect of which shall be to prevent employees of any common carrier from furnishing voluntarily information to a person in interest as to the facts incident to the injury or death of any employee.” Plaintiffs argued that Wisconsin Central’s counterclaims constituted a “device” designed to exempt itself from liability to pay damages to injured employees, to deter railroad employees from providing information regarding injury or death of an employee, or both. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the counterclaim was not prohibited, citing the employer’s long-standing right to sue its employees for negligence, the statute's plain language, and federal court decisions. Unlike a contractual agreement or a release, a counterclaim does not extinguish a plaintiff’s FELA cause of action or exempt the railroad employer from liability.

Andrews v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2019 IL 124283

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Anne M. Burke

Areas of Law: Construction Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Metropolitan Water Reclamation District entered into a contract with the Joint Venture, for the “Primary Settling Tanks and Grit Removal Facilities” project to be carried out at the Calumet water reclamation plant. Under the contract, the Joint Venture was responsible to determine the procedures and methods for the work and furnish all temporary structures and safety equipment and was responsible for the safety of all personnel on the worksite. The contract required the Joint Venture to submit plans for the work to the District’s engineer but state that the engineer’s acceptance of the plans did not relieve the Joint Venture of its responsibility for safety, maintenance, and repairs on the project. Andrews, a Joint Venture employee, suffered severe, career-ending head injuries while working on the project. In a suit alleging construction negligence, willful and wanton construction negligence, and loss of consortium, the District alleged immunity under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201). The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the District was not entitled to summary judgment of immunity. The Act immunizes a local governmental entity from liability for injuries arising out of its employee’s acts or omissions while determining policy and exercising discretion. The District did not provide evidence that its employees made discretionary or policy decisions with respect to the two-ladder configuration that resulted in Andrews’s injuries. Seven witnesses testified that no District employees weighed in on worksite safety decisions.

Jones v. Pneumo Abex LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2019 IL 123895

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Lloyd A. Karmeier

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Products Liability

In 2013, the Joneses sought to recover damages suffered when John contracted lung cancer, resulting from his exposure to “asbestos from one or more” of numerous companies while he was involved in the construction industry and while he repaired the brakes on motor vehicles he owned. Owens and Abex were among the named defendants. The Joneses asserted that the defendants knew that asbestos was dangerous but conspired to misrepresent its dangers and to falsely represent that exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products was safe or nontoxic. Abex and Owens argued that the civil conspiracy claims were based on the same facts as those advanced unsuccessfully by other plaintiffs in numerous earlier cases, particularly the Illinois Supreme Court’s 1999 McClure decision. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Instead of undertaking a meaningful evaluation of the applicability of the legal principles governing civil conspiracy as articulated in the cited precedent, and with no real assessment of whether and to what extent any factual differences between those cases and this one might justify a different result, the appellate court summarily distinguished the prior decisions on the sole grounds that the civil conspiracy claims advanced against Owens and Abex in those cases were decided in the context of motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, while here they were resolved on motions for summary judgment.

Padmanabhan v. Cooke

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12718

Opinion Date: December 12, 2019

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the county court denying Petitioner's petition for relief in the nature of certiorari pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 4, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief. Petitioner brought this action against Respondent alleging slander, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Petitioner sought to have the Attorney General disqualified from representing Respondent, but Petitioner's motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration of the issue were denied. Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 118 seeking review. The appeals court denied the petition on the basis that it was not timely filed. Petitioner then sought relief in the nature of certiorari. The Supreme Judicial Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his claims were not otherwise reviewable.

Buma v. Providence Corp. Development

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 135 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 60

Opinion Date: December 12, 2019

Judge: Kristina Pickering

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

In this case involving workers' compensation for "traveling" employees the Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court denying Appellants' petition for judicial review of the denial of their request for workers' compensation benefits, holding that the appeals officer failed to apply Nev. Rev. Stat. 616B.612(3). Jason Buma died in an ATV accident while on a required business trip for Respondent, his employer. Appellants, Buma's wife and daughter, filed a workers' compensation claim for workers' compensation benefits. Respondent denied the claim. The hearing officer affirmed, concluding that Buma's death occurred during an activity that was not part of his work duties. The appeals officer affirmed the denial, and the district court denied judicial review. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order, holding (1) under section 616B.612(3), a traveling employee is under his employer's control for the duration of his business trip; and (2) because the appeals officer failed to apply the statute the case is remanded for reevaluation under the correct standards.

Rosen v. Tarkanian

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 135 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 59

Opinion Date: December 12, 2019

Judge: James W. Hardesty

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss in a tort action, holding that, in determining whether the communications were made in good faith, the court must consider the "gist or sting" of the communications as a whole, rather than parsing each individual word in the communications to assess it for its truthfulness. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleged libel per se, slander per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, determining that Defendant did not meet her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because she did not show that the statements were made in good faith. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its analysis of whether Defendant's statements were made in good faith; and (2) Defendant showed by a preponderance of the evidence that she made the statements in good faith under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and Plaintiff could not demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on this claim under the second prong.

Anderson v. WBNS-TV, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2019-Ohio-5196

Opinion Date: December 18, 2019

Judge: Donnelly

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of WBNS-TV, Inc. and dismissing Plaintiffs' defamation claim, holding that the court of appeals applied an incorrect standard in determining whether the fault element of the defamation claim had been met. The Columbus Police Department sent an information sheet to WBNS describing the robbery of a hoverboard from an eight-year-old. A photograph accompanying the information sheet depicted three siblings as potential suspects. The police department later released a statement that the people in the photograph had not been involved in the robbery. The siblings and their mother filed a complaint against WBNS alleging defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment for WBNS, concluding that Plaintiffs could not prove an essential element - fault - of their defamation claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the cause to the court of appeals, holding (1) the standard set forth in Landsdowne v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 512 N.E.2d 979 (Ohio 1987), was the appropriate standard to apply in this case; and (2) the court of appeals erred by not applying this standard.

Williams v. Meeker North Dawson Nursing, LLC

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2019 OK 80

Opinion Date: December 17, 2019

Judge: Tom Colbert

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Health Law, Personal Injury, Trusts & Estates

The estate of an individual that died as a result of an injury incurred while being a patient of a nursing home sued the nursing home facility in a wrongful death action. The district court entered default judgment for Plaintiff after Defendant failed to file a response or appear in court multiple times. Over 200 days later, Defendant filed a petition to vacate default judgment and the petition was granted. Plaintiff appealed the ruling, and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), affirmed the trial court's decision. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded it was "patently clear" Defendant's arguments for the Petition to Vacate Judgment as to liability was without merit. "[The Nursing Home] Meeker was given a multitude of opportunities to respond to the litigation, but failed to respond to a single instance for 280 days after the initial service of process. Meeker failed to respond to any service of process or appear at any hearing, and did not have an argument with merit to support the inability to respond to the litigation." Accordingly the Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the trial court's judgment granting the Petition To Vacate Judgment as to liability, and remanded this matter for a trial on damages.

Ferreira v. Child and Family Services of Rhode Island

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-177

Opinion Date: December 17, 2019

Judge: Paul A. Suttell

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint against Child and Family Services of Newport County (CFS) alleging defamation, constructive termination, discrimination, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, holding that the hearing justice properly dismissed Plaintiff's claims. Specifically, the Court held (1) where the complaint did not allege that CFS made any false statements about Defendant, Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege a claim for defamation; (2) Plaintiff did not properly plead a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) the complaint did not include sufficient facts to allege a prima facie case of either employment discrimination or a civil rights violation; and (4) the hearing justice did not err in dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice.

Lang v. Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 17-295

Opinion Date: December 18, 2019

Judge: Gilbert V. Indeglia

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and quashed in part the final decree of the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) upholding an award of accidental disability benefits for occupational cancer to Petitioner, holding that the WCC had jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's appeal but erred in finding that R.I. Gen. Laws 45-19.1-1 contains a conclusive presumption that all cancer in firefighters is occupational cancer. Petitioner served as a firefighter for the City of Cranston until he was diagnosed with colon cancer. Petitioner applied for accidental disability benefit based upon his cancer diagnosis. The Retirement Board of the Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island denied the application, finding that Petitioner did not prove that his cancer arose out of and in the course of his employment as a firefighter. The WCC then filed his petition arguing that, pursuant to chapter 19.1 of title 45, all cancers contracted by firefighters are presumed to be work-related. The trial judge agreed and reversed the board. The Supreme Court quashed the decree in part, holding that chapter 19.1 of title 45 does not contain any presumption that all cancers in firefighters are occupational cancers.

Godfrey v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates, Ltd.

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 96952-3

Opinion Date: December 19, 2019

Judge: Steven González

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury, Products Liability

A wine bottle shattered in Rolfe Godfrey's hand while he was working as a bartender, injuring him. He filed a products liability suit against the winery, St. Michelle Wine Estates, Ltd. and the bottle manufacturer, Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc. (collectively, Ste. Michelle). The case was assigned to Pierce County, Washington Superior Court Judge Garold Johnson, who set the initial case schedule, including discovery deadlines. The case was later reassigned to Judge Katherine Stolz, who, upon a stipulated and jointly proposed order, extended the parties' deadlines to disclose their witnesses. This case turned on the nature of that stipulated order. Two months later, and before Judge Stolz made any other rulings in the case, Godfrey filed an affidavit of prejudice and a motion for Judge Stolz's recusal under former RCW 4.12.040 and .050. Judge Stolz denied the motion, concluding that the earlier stipulated order to extend witness disclosure deadlines involved discretion and, thus, the affidavit of prejudice was not timely. Judge Stolz presided over the bench trial. Ste. Michelle prevailed, and Godfrey appealed. The Washington Supreme Court concluded that under Washington law, a party does not lose the right to remove a judge when the judge takes certain categories of actions, including arranging the calendar. The Court held that a stipulated order extending discovery deadlines that did not delay the trial or otherwise affect the court's schedule was an order arranging the calendar under the former RCW 4.12.050. Accordingly, the affidavit of prejudice was timely, and the case should have been reassigned to a different judge.