Bringing Home the Supply Chain

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, JONATHAN F. HARRIS

NYU law professors Samuel Estreicher and Jonathan F. Harris describe how the COVID-19 pandemic is forcing the United States to confront the problem of unchecked globalization. Estreicher and Harris argue that once the pandemic subsides, U.S. policymakers should, as a matter of national security, mandate that a minimum percentage of essential supplies be manufactured domestically.

Read More

Unconstitutional Chaos: Abortion in the Time of COVID-19

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, MARY ZIEGLER

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and Florida State University law professor Mary Ziegler discuss the abortion bans implemented in several states in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Grossman and Ziegler explain why the bans are constitutional and comment on the connection between the legal challenges to those bans and the broader fight over abortion rights.

Read More

Birchansky v. Clabaugh

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 18-3403

Opinion Date: April 14, 2020

Judge: Erickson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

Plaintiffs, health care providers and their patients, filed suit against Iowa's Department of Public Health and its Health Facilities Council, alleging that Iowa's Certificate of Need laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses. The Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs' Privileges and Immunities Clause claim was foreclosed by the Slaughter-Houses cases. Applying rational basis review to the Certificate of Need (CON) regime and capital expenditures exemption, the court held that Iowa's CON requirement is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in full-service hospital viability. Furthermore, Iowa's decision to exempt competitors who are non-hospital CON-holders is rationally related to its interest in protecting the viability of full-service hospitals. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's orders dismissing plaintiffs' Privileges and Immunities claim and granting summary judgment in favor of the state defendants on the remaining claims.

Caldara v. City of Boulder

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 18-1421

Opinion Date: April 10, 2020

Judge: Stephanie Kulp Seymour

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Plaintiffs were citizens of the City of Boulder, Colorado and entities with various interests in the sale or possession of firearms within the city. They filed suit against the City of Boulder and several of its officials, alleging that Boulder City Ordinances 8245 and 8259 violate the U.S. Constitution, the Colorado State Constitution, and Colorado state statutes, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-11.7-102 & 103. The ordinances at issue banned the sale of "assault weapons," and raised the legal age for possessing a firearm from eighteen to twenty-one. The City of Boulder is a home-rule municipality under the Colorado Constitution, which granted the City to pass ordinances in “local and municipal matters” that supersede “any law of the state in conflict therewith.” The district court abstained and stayed the proceedings pending resolution of the state law preemption question in state court. Plaintiffs appealed, and finding that the district court properly abstained as “appropriate regard for the rightful independence of state governments reemphasize[s] that it is a wise and permissible policy for the federal chancellor to stay his hand in absence of an authoritative and controlling determination by the state tribunals,” the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Gulf South Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-1074

Opinion Date: April 10, 2020

Judge: Rao

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

The DC Circuit held that FERC's rejection of Gulf South's application for incremental-plus rates was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that FERC failed to justify the disparity between how materially identical shippers will pay dramatically different rates for the use of the same facilities. Furthermore, FERC's decision violated fundamental ratemaking principles—namely, that rates should generally reflect the burdens imposed and benefits drawn by a given shipper. Accordingly, the court vacated the order denying incremental-plus rates and remanded for further proceedings. The court denied Gulf South's petition for review in all other respects.

United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Postal Regulatory Commission

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-1026

Opinion Date: April 14, 2020

Judge: Harry Thomas Edwards

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The DC Circuit granted UPS's petition for review, challenging the Commission's Order Adopting Final Rules Relating to the Institutional Cost Contribution Requirement for Competitive Products, No. 4963. The order modified Commission regulations that are meant to ensure that all of the Postal Service's competitive products collectively cover what the Commission determines to be an appropriate share of the institutional costs of the Postal Service. The court held that two aspects of the Commission's order require a remand. First, the Commission has not adequately explained how the statutory phrases "direct and indirect postal costs attributable to [a particular competitive] product through reliably identified causal relationships" and "costs . . . uniquely or disproportionately associated with any competitive products" can coincide. Second, in focusing on costs attributed to competitive products under 39 U.S.C. 3633(a)(2), the Commission failed to discharge its responsibility under section 3633(b) to "consider . . . the degree to which any costs are uniquely or disproportionately associated with any competitive products." Therefore, the order is arbitrary and capricious because it is largely incomprehensible with respect to the matters in issue. Accordingly, the court remanded for further consideration.

Bozeman Financial LLC v. Federal Reserve Bank

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 19-1018

Opinion Date: April 10, 2020

Judge: Kimberly Ann Moore

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Intellectual Property, Patents

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board conducted covered business method (CBM) review and found all of the claims of Bozeman’s patents, directed to methods for authorizing and clearing financial transactions to detect and prevent fraud, ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101.1. Bozeman challenged the Board’s authority to decide the petitions, arguing that the Federal Reserve Banks are not “persons” under the America Invents Act (AIA). The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Banks are “persons” who may petition for post-issuance review under the AIA. While the Supreme Court has held that federal agencies are not “persons” able to seek post-issuance review of a patent under the AIA, the Banks are distinct from the government for purposes of the AIA. They are operating members of the nation’s Federal Reserve System, which is a federal agency, but they are not government-owned and are operationally distinct from the federal government. The claims at issue are directed to the abstract idea of “collecting and analyzing information for financial transaction fraud or error detection” and do not contain an inventive concept sufficient to “transform the nature of the claims into patent-eligible applications of an abstract idea.”

Golden v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 19-2134

Opinion Date: April 10, 2020

Judge: O'Malley

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Intellectual Property, Patents

Golden, pro se, filed this suit in 2019, under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a), seeking “reasonable and entire compensation for the unlicensed use and manufacture” of his “inventions described in and covered by” various patents. He had filed an unsuccessful patent infringement suit against the government in 2013; a fifth amended complaint had alleged “Fifth Amendment Takings.” In 2014, the government sought inter partes review (IPR) of the patents; Golden is challenging an unfavorable decision as “ultra vires.” The Claims Court dismissed Golden’s 2019 complaint as largely duplicative of the 2013 suit. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Claims Court did not have jurisdiction over these section 1491 claims because patent infringement claims against the government are to be pursued exclusively under 28 U.S.C. 1498. A patent owner may not pursue an infringement action as a taking under the Fifth Amendment. With respect to claims arising from the IPR proceedings, the court noted that Golden voluntarily filed a non-contingent motion to amend the claims on which the IPR was instituted. His substitute claims were found unpatentable. The claims at issue were canceled as result of Golden’s own voluntary actions; cancellation of the claims in the government-initiated IPR cannot, therefore, be chargeable to the government under any legal theory.

Barnebey v. Alaska Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-16844

Opinion Date: April 10, 2020

Judge: Peter J. Maassen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Jason Barnebey was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the police station he was administered a breath test by a DataMaster testing instrument, which showed a result of .081 percent alcohol, above the .08 legal limit. Barnebey elected to obtain an independent chemical test, which showed a result of .073. Following an administrative hearing, a hearing officer relied on the DataMaster breath-test result to sustain the Department of Motor Vehicles’s revocation of the Barnebey's license pursuant to AS 28.15.165(c). Barnebey appealed, arguing, as he had at the administrative hearing, that it was error not to consider the DataMaster’s inherent margin of error in determining whether his test result was over the legal limit. The superior court affirmed the hearing officer’s decision and awarded attorney’s fees to the State; Barnebey appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court determined the hearing officer properly interpreted the governing law and did not violate due process in her consideration of the DataMaster’s margin of error. The Court affirmed the decision revoking the man’s license. However, the Court concluded it was error for the superior court to award attorney’s fees to the State without considering whether the man was entitled to protection as a constitutional litigant under AS 09.60.010(c)(2). The fee award was therefore vacated, and the matter remanded for further consideration of only that issue.

White County Judge v. Menser

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 140

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Kemp

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the vacated the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission affirming and adopting the findings of the administrative law judge (ALJ) awarding an additional-benefits claim to Bruce Menser, holding that Menser's additional-benefits claim was time barred by the statute of limitations. At the time Menser requested a hearing before the Commission, he was receiving workers' compensation benefits. The ALJ found that Menser sustained compensable brain and neuropathy injuries during the course and scope of his employment and that the statute of limitations did not bar Menser's claim for additional medical benefits because it had been tolled. The Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ's decision. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission erred in determining that Menser's claim for additional medical benefits sufficiently tolled the statute of limitations, and to the extent that Arkansas case law does not comport with this holding, those cases are overruled.

Idaho ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Sky Down Sky Diving

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47077

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on whether Sky Down Skydiving, LLC, improperly designated its tandem skydiving instructors and parachute packers as independent contractors, rather than as employees, thereby eliminating the need for worker’s compensation insurance. After notifying the company that it was in violation of Idaho Code section 72-301, the Industrial Commission filed a civil law suit against Sky Down for penalties and injunctive relief. Following a bench trial, the magistrate court concluded that the instructors and parachute packers were independent contractors. The magistrate court then dismissed the Commission’s complaint with prejudice. After the case was dismissed, a witness contacted the Industrial Commission’s counsel to recant his earlier testimony. The Commission then filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the magistrate court. The Commission filed an intermediate appeal with the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. The Commission then timely appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded because both lower courts erred by failing to apply the proper test, and the district court erred in concluding there was substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings.

Noel v. City of Rigby

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 45425

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Stegner

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

Nine-year-old girl Shaeley Noel was seriously injured while playing on playground equipment owned by the City of Rigby (City) and located in the City’s South Park. Shaeley and her parents (collectively the Noels) filed suit in district court alleging willful and wanton conduct by the City in the construction and/or maintenance of its playground equipment. The City claimed the park was closed for winter at the time Shaeley was injured. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of the City when it found that the City did not owe a duty to Shaeley. The Noels filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court granted. The City appealed the district court’s decision to grant a new trial, as well as the district court’s decisions to deny the City’s motion for a directed verdict and the City’s motion to exclude the Noels’ expert witness. The Noels cross-appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) rejecting of evidence of Shaeley’s unadjusted medical bills; (2) preventing the Noels’ expert witness from testifying regarding the City’s purported willful and wanton conduct; (3) allowing a jury instruction regarding comparative negligence; and (4) admitting of evidence regarding the seasonal closure of the park. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court decisions with regard to: (1) the City’s motion for a directed verdict; (2) the Noels’ motion for a new trial; (3) the Noels’ expert testifying; (4) the jury instruction; and (5) admission of evidence of the park closure. Additionally, the Court reversed the district court with respect to: (1) the Noels introducing Shaeley’s unadjusted medical bills; and (2) preclusion of the Noels’ expert from testifying that the City engaged in willful and wanton conduct. As a result, the matter was remanded for a new trial.

Woolley v. Idaho Dept. of Labor

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46743

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Public Benefits

Brett Woolley appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”) decision that found him ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Commission determined that Woolley was ineligible for benefits because he was a corporate officer whose claim for benefits was based on wages from a corporation in which he had an ownership interest. The Commission also determined Woolley willfully made a false statement by saying he had not received wages or performed services as a corporate officer. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s determination that Woolley was ineligible for benefits due to his status as a corporate officer because it was supported by substantial and competent evidence. However, the Court found Woolley did not willfully misrepresent his status as a corporate officer, "The statute makes no mention of a claimant’s performance of services as a corporate officer. To compound the confusion, IDOL provides no information in the unemployment handbook or on its website to explain why it is necessary for claimants to report their corporate officer status when filing a claim for benefits. To serve as the basis for a willful failure to report a material fact, the question to be answered by a claimant must be accurately grounded in the legal requirements of the statute."

Kelly v. Legislative Coordinating Council

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 122765

Opinion Date: April 11, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

In this controversy arising from emergency proclamation issued by Governor Laura Kelly in response to the global public health crisis related to COVID-19 and her follow-up executive orders the Supreme Court granted in part the Governor's petition in quo warranto, holding that the Legislative Coordinating Council's purported revocation of Executive Order 20-18 was a nullity because the LCC did not act within its lawful authority. On March 12, the Governor proclaimed a state of disaster emergency. The Legislature then adopted House Concurrent Resolution (HCR) 5025 extending the Governor's declaration to May 1, 2020. On April 7, the Governor issued Executive Order 20-18 relating to her March 12 emergency proclamation. The executive order temporarily prohibited mass gatherings, including religious gatherings and funerals. On April 8, the LCC revoked Executive Order 20-18. On April 9, Governor Kelly filed this original action in quo warranto challenging the purported revocation of her executive order. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding that the Legislature's alleged revocation of the executive order was a nullity because the LCC lacked authority to do so under the terms of HCR 5025.

MSAD 6 Board of Directors v. Town of Frye Island

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 45

Opinion Date: April 14, 2020

Judge: Humphrey

Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court determining that the Town of Frye Island may not withdraw from Maine School Administrative District 6 (MSAD 6) in the absence of legislation expressly authorizing the Town to invoke the statutory withdrawal process set forth in Me. Rev. Stat. 20-A, 1466, holding that the superior court did not err. The residents of Frye Island voted unanimously to withdraw from MSAD 6. The Legislature responded by enacting L.D. 500, which stated that the Town could not withdraw from MSAD 6 unless withdrawal was first authorized. Frye Island later amended its charter and again sought to withdraw from MSAD 6. MSAD 6 sought a declaratory judgment that Frye Island's effort to withdraw from MSAD 6 was unlawful. The court granted summary judgment for MSAD 6. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the amendment to the Town's charter did not expressly or implicitly repeal L.D. 500 by operation of law; (2) L.D. 500 does not violate the Maine Constitution's special legislation clause; and (3) the court did not err in dismissing Frye Island's claims arising under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Maine Constitutions.

AT&T Corp. v. Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2019-CC-00353-SCT

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: James W. Kitchens

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts

The Mississippi Department of Information Technology Services (ITS) issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for telecommunications services. After vendors responded, ITS selected the proposal submitted by Telepak Networks, Inc., d/b/a C Spire (C Spire) for a statewide voice and data network. AT&T Corp. (AT&T) protested the award, arguing that ITS’s award of the contract to C Spire was erroneous because C Spire’s proposal did not match the specifications set forth in the RFP. ITS denied AT&T’s challenge, and it appealed. The Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County affirmed, finding that ITS’s award of the contract to C Spire was not arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence. AT&T appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the ITS decision that C Spire’s proposal matched the RFP’s specifications was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, we affirm.

Mississippi Department of Transportation v. Musgrove

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2018-IA-01139-SCT

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: James W. Kitchens

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant declared a state of emergency on January 27, 2014, in anticipation of an imminent winter storm. In response to the governor’s declaration, Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) placed limestone material on roadways as a remedial measure. Four days after the state of emergency was declared, Kenneth Musgrove lost control of his car and crashed on Highway 37, where MDOT had placed the limestone material, severely injuring his wife and himself. The Musgroves filed a complaint against MDOT for damages from the car accident. MDOT filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it was participating in emergency-management services under the Mississippi Emergency Management Law (MEML) and therefore was immune from liability. The trial court denied MDOT’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there was a “genuine issue of material fact as to whether MDOT exercised due care in maintaining the road by placing gravel on the road and failing to warn drivers” of the gravel. MDOT timely filed its petition for interlocutory appeal, arguing that the MEML explicitly grants state agencies complete immunity from liability and that the trial court had erred by applying the standards set forth in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) instead of applying the willful-misconduct standard set forth in the MEML. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found MDOT indeed had immunity under the MEML, and that the trial court erred by applying the MTCA’s immunity standards instead of applying the MEML’s standard.

Schoen v. Mid-Missouri Mental Health Center

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC98168

Opinion Date: April 14, 2020

Judge: George W. Draper, III

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying Employee's workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that she failed to prove her work injury was the prevailing or primary factor causing any permanent disability and denying Employee's claim against the Second Injury Fund as moot, holding that the Commission did not err. Employee was exposed to cypermethrin, an insecticide, while working for Employer. When Employee was at the doctor's office for testing, another patient's dog got loose and tripped Employee. Employee fell and allegedly sustained permanent injuries to her knees, lower back, hip and neck. Employee filed a claim for workers' compensation asserting that, in addition to cypermethrin exposure, she sustained injuries from being tripped while walking out of the doctor's office. An ALJ awarded Employee benefits. The Commission reversed, concluding that Employee failed to meet her burden of proving her exposure to cypermethrin was the prevailing or primary factor in causing any alleged injury from being tripped accidentally. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee was not entitled to workers' compensation for any injury sustained from her accidental tripping; and (2) because Employee's accidental tripping did not arise out of and in the course of her employment, the Fund was not implicated.

Nieves v. Office of the Public Defender

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: a-69-18

Opinion Date: April 15, 2020

Judge: Jaynee LaVecchia

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

This case arose from the representation of plaintiff Antonio Nieves by a state public defender, Peter Adolf, Esq. After his conviction, Nieves was granted post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. DNA evidence later confirmed that Nieves was not the perpetrator, and the underlying indictment against him was dismissed. Nieves subsequently recovered damages from the State for the time he spent wrongfully imprisoned. He then filed the present legal malpractice action seeking damages against the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) and Adolf. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA) barred the damages sought because Nieves failed to vault N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d)’s verbal threshold. The motion court concluded that the TCA and its verbal threshold were inapplicable. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that “public defenders are public employees that come within the TCA’s immunities and defenses” and that Nieves’s claim fell squarely within the TCA. The Appellate Division also held that plaintiff’s claim for loss of liberty damages fell within the TCA’s limitation on recovery for pain and suffering in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), which Nieves failed to satisfy. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the TCA applied to Nieves’s legal malpractice action, and his claim for loss of liberty damages failed to vault the verbal threshold for a pain and suffering damages claim under the strictures of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). Defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

State ex rel. Neitzelt v. Industrial Commission

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1453

Opinion Date: April 15, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting Christina Neitzelt's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission to vacate its order disallowing an L4-L5 disc herniation as an allowed condition in Appellant's workers' compensation claim, holding that under the some evidence standard, the Commission did not abuse its discretion. After Neitzelt had back surgery the Commission granted her employer's request to disallow the L4-L5 disc herniation from Neitzelt's claim based on evidence arising from the surgery. The court of appeals concluded that the Commission's exercise of its continuing jurisdiction was untimely and therefore improper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that some evidence before the Commission supported its conclusion that Neitzelt's employer established both new or changed circumstances and a mistake in fact.

State ex rel. O'Neill v. Athens County Board of Elections

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1476

Opinion Date: April 14, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by Katie O'Neill ordering the Athens County Board of Elections to declare that she was an eligible candidate for the Democratic nomination to the office of state representative for the 94th Ohio House District and to include in its official canvass of the primary election the votes cast for O'Neill, holding that the board abused its discretion by rejecting O'Neill's petition. On December 18, 2019, O'Neill filed her petition seeking to run for the Democratic nomination for the office of state representative for the 94th Ohio House District. The Board unanimously certified O'Neill's name to the primary ballot. Keith Monk filed a protest against O'Neill's candidacy. After a hearing, the Board voted in favor of the protest, concluding that O'Neill was not an eligible candidate for the nomination because she had not resided in the district for one year next preceding the November 3, 2020 general election and that the petition was invalid because O'Neill was not a registered voter in Athens County when she began circulating her part-petitions. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the Board abused its discretion and disregarded applicable law by upholding the protest to O'Neill's candidacy.

State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Loomis

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1463

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus against the Trumbull Correctional Institution and Julie Loomis, the assistant to the warden (collectively, TCI), holding that the appellate court erred in dismissing Appellant's public-records mandamus complaint. While incarcerated at the Trumbull Correction Institution, Appellant submitted a handwritten public-records request to TCI seeking legal-mailroom logs and the dates and times that the institutional inspector made rounds in the housing units for certain periods. Loomis provided copies of the portions of the requested legal-mailroom logs in which Appellant's name appeared but none of the remaining records. Appellant filed a complaint seeking to compel TCI to provide him with the rest of his requested records. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, determining that the complaint was moot because Appellant had already received all the requested records to which he was entitled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where TCI provided no evidence demonstrating that it complied with the second part of Appellant's records request, the court of appeals erred when it concluded that Appellant's claim was moot.

Citizens for Resp. Devel. in The Dalles v. Walmart

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S066596

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Flynn

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Oregon Department of State Lands (DSL) issued a permit, pursuant to ORS 196.825, for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Walmart”) to fill and remove some wetlands on private property in order to build a new store in The Dalles. Citizens for Responsible Development in The Dalles (Citizens) opposed the project and appealed the fill permit, arguing that DSL lacked authority to issue the permit because DSL did not find that there was a “public need” for the project. The Court of Appeals agreed with Citizens that DSL erred in issuing the permit “[b]ecause DSL found that it was inconclusive whether the project would address a public need.” The Oregon Supreme Court granted certiorari to construe ORS 196.825, and thereafter affirmed the Court of Appeals: the matter was remanded to DSL. "[A]lthough we disagree with its premise that ORS 196.825 conditions the issuance of every permit on a finding that the proposed project will serve a 'public need,' . . . Because DSL found that all categories of public benefit from the project were 'inconclusive' but failed to find that the project would not 'interfere' with the state’s 'paramount policy,' the record does not support its determination that the project will not 'unreasonably interfere.'”

Friends of Danny DeVito, et al v. Wolf

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 68 MM 2020

Opinion Date: April 13, 2020

Judge: Donohue

Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Petitioners were four Pennsylvania businesses and one individual who sought extraordinary relief from Governor Wolf’s March 19, 2020 order compelling the closure of the physical operations of all non-life-sustaining business to reduce the spread of the novel coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”). The businesses of the Petitioners were classified as non-life-sustaining. In an Emergency Application for Extraordinary Relief, Petitioners raised a series of statutory and constitutional challenges to the Governor's order, contending the Governor lacked any authority to issue it and that, even if he did have such statutory authority, it violates various of their constitutional rights. Petitioners asserted the exercise of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s King’s Bench jurisdiction was not only warranted but essential given the unprecedented scope and consequence of the Executive Order on businesses in the Commonwealth. Exercising King's Bench jurisdiction, the Supreme Court concluded Petitioners could not establish any constitutional bases for their challenges. The claim for relief was therefore denied.

Peterson v. Dep't of Revenue

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 97410-1

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Steven González

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

More than 70 years ago, two railroad companies helped the United States Atomic Energy Commission build a track to the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in return for the right to use the track without paying rent. After the nuclear reactors at Hanford were decommissioned, the United States transferred nearly 800 acres, including the track at issue, to the Port of Benton (Port), subject to existing agreements and potential reversion to the United States if certain conditions were not met. The Port continued to honor the agreements and operate the railroad. The Port’s decision not to charge rent was challenged by a taxpayer, Randolph Peterson, as an unconstitutional gift of public funds. This challenge was dismissed at summary judgment. After review of the trial court record, the Washington Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and affirmed dismissal.

Washington v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 96604-4

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Yu

Areas of Law: Agriculture Law, Constitutional Law, Consumer Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

In November 2013, Washington voters rejected Initiative 522 (I-522), which would have required labels on packaged foods containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) opposed state-level GMO labeling laws, including I-522. Over the course of the 2013 election cycle, GMA solicited over $14 million in optional contributions from its member companies, $11 million of which went to support the “No on 522” political committee. The payments to No on 522 were attributed solely to GMA itself, with no indication of which companies had provided the funds. Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, GMA was not registered as a political committee and did not make any reports to the Public Disclosure Commission (PDC). The State filed a complaint alleging that GMA intentionally violated the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA)'s registration and disclosure requirements and the FCPA’s prohibition on concealing the sources of election-related spending. GMA countered that it cannot be subject to the FCPA’s registration and disclosure requirements because those requirements violate the First Amendment as applied. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The trial court agreed with the State, imposed a $6 million base penalty on GMA, and trebled the penalty to $18 million after determining GMA;s violations were intentional. The Court of Appeals largely affirmed, but revered the treble penalty, holding that one had to "subjectively intend to violate the law in order to be subject to treble damages." After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion that the FCPA, and that the FCPA was constitutional as applied. The Court reversed the appellate court on the treble penalty, holding that the trial court applied the proper legal standard to determine GMA intentionally violated the FCPA. The matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of GMA's claim that the penalty imposed violated the excessive fines clauses of the federal and Washington constitutions.