Drafted and Shafted: Who Should Complain About Male-Only Registration?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor comments on a recent opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding that requiring men but not women to register for the draft is constitutional under mandatory U.S. Supreme Court precedents. Specifically, Colb considers what the U.S. Supreme Court should do if it agrees to hear the case and more narrowly, whether the motives of the plaintiffs in that case bear on how the case should come out.

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Uniformed Fire Officers Ass'n v. DeBlasio

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-2400

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Jon O. Newman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The Second Circuit denied a motion brought by unions representing uniformed New York City officers to stay, pending appeal the district court's July 29, 2020 order modifying the district court's July 22, 2020 order such that the order no longer applies to non-party NYCLU. This dispute arose out of the action of the New York legislature repealing section 50-a of the State's Civil Rights Law, which had shielded from public disclosure personnel records of various uniformed officers including police officers. The court stated that the effect of the modification is to permit the NYCLU publicly to disclose information concerning disciplinary records of approximately 81,000 New York City police officers, records alleged to contain unsubstantiated and nonfinal allegations. The court held that the district court properly excluded the NYCLU from the disclosure prohibition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2)(C) because it was not "in active concert" with a party bound by a TRO or a preliminary injunction. The court explained that the NYCLU could not be "in active concert" with such a party because it lawfully gained access to the information at issue before the July 22 disclosure prohibition was issued against it and obviously could not have known of a prohibition that did not then exist. Therefore, because appellants had no probability of success on the appeal from the July 29 order, the court denied the motion for a stay pending appeal, thereby terminating the emergency stay that a judge of this court had entered pending consideration of the stay motion by a three-judge panel.

Defense Distributed v. Attorney General New Jersey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-1729

Opinion Date: August 25, 2020

Judge: Patty Shwartz

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

Firearm interest organizations, together with one of their members, challenged the New Jersey Attorney General’s efforts to prevent unregistered and unlicensed persons from distributing computer programs that can be used to make firearms with a three-dimensional (3D) printer. The same claims by some of the same plaintiffs were already pending in Texas. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction in New Jersey, but the district court stayed the proceedings until the Texas action was resolved and dismissed the injunction motion. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal. The stay and dismissal orders are not appealable. The orders here do not have the “practical effect of refusing an injunction.” The court removed the motion from its docket pending the stay, without prejudice, and did not substantively deny the request for an injunction or dismiss the claims. The stay does not impose “serious, perhaps irreparable consequence[s].” The court noted that the federal government and several state attorneys general are still preventing the dissemination of the files at issue; a stay that delays consideration of a request for injunctive relief is of no consequence because, even if the district court considered granted an injunction, that injunction would not alleviate the alleged censorship.

Colonial Oaks Assisted Living Lafayette, LLC v. Hannie Development, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-30995

Opinion Date: August 26, 2020

Judge: Don R. Willett

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Business Law, Civil Procedure, Contracts

After Buyers purchased two care facilities from Sellers, Buyers filed suit alleging that Sellers made fraudulent or, at best, negligent misrepresentations in the parties' sale agreements. Buyers also brought claims against Sellers' representatives in their individual capacities. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Buyers' claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court held that the district court properly dismissed Buyers' non-fraud claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contractual representations and warranties because these claims were subject to arbitration. In regard to the remaining claims, the court held that Buyers have not adequately pleaded a misrepresentation with respect to both facilities and thus they failed to meet the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Therefore, because there was no misrepresentation, there was no fraud.

Global Commodities Trading Group, Inc. v. Beneficio De Arroz Choloma, S.A.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-16026

Opinion Date: August 26, 2020

Judge: William A. Fletcher

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, International Law

Global filed suit against Bachosa in district court after Bachosa fell behind on its payments on two contracts. The district court dismissed Global's claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and denied as moot Bachosa's motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had personal jurisdiction over both the corporate and individual defendants and that litigation in the Eastern District of California would not result in disproportionate inconvenience. In this case, Bachosa maintained numerous contacts with California during the course of its years-long business relationship with Global. Furthermore, those contacts gave rise to this dispute, and it was reasonable for Bachosa to expect that it would be haled into court in California to fulfill its obligations and to account for harm it foreseeably caused there. In regard to the individual defendants, the district court had specific personal jurisdiction over them based on Global's claims in its initial complaint. Finally, the panel exercised its discretion to reach the issue of dismissal based on forum non conveniens, and held that the balance of private and public interest factors did not favor dismissal. Moreover, California law will likely govern key issues and any burdens on the foreign defendant are insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of Global's choice of its home forum. Therefore, the panel reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to deny the forum non conveniens motion on the merits.

Nutrition Distribution LLC v. IronMag Labs, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-55251

Opinion Date: August 25, 2020

Judge: Daniel A. Bress

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics

Nutrition Distribution filed suit against IronMags, alleging that the company violated the Lanham Act by falsely advertising IronMag's nutritional supplements. After the district court entered judgment, Nutrition Distribution did not file a notice of appeal but, instead, filed a post-judgment motion for attorneys' fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and then filed a notice of appeal 30 days after the district court denied that fees motion. The Ninth Circuit held that, because Nutrition Distribution did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the district court's judgment or obtain a Rule 58(e) order extending the time to appeal, the notice of appeal was untimely as to the district court's underlying judgment. The notice of appeal was timely as to the district court's later order denying attorneys' fees. The panel explained that the Federal Rules are clear that ordinarily, the entry of judgment may not be delayed, nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees. Furthermore, a motion for attorneys' fees does not extend the time to appeal the underlying judgment unless the district court so orders under Rule 58(e). In this case, Nutrition Distribution did not seek such an order, nor did the district court enter one. The panel also held that Nutrition Distribution's attempt to now save its untimely appeal of the underlying judgment by recasting its fees motion as a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment likewise fails. The panel stated that the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules and the Supreme Court precedent that gave rise to them make clear that attorneys' fees motions cannot be recharacterized as Rule 59 motions to extend the time to appeal an underlying judgment. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the denial of fees, and otherwise dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

United States v. Obaid

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-56657

Opinion Date: August 24, 2020

Judge: Johnnie B. Rawlinson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying claimant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for lack of proper venue a civil forfeiture case. This case arose from claimant's shares of stock in Palantir Technologies, a corporation with its principal place of business in California. Petitioner is a citizen of Saudi Arabia who wired $2 million from his account in Switzerland to a bank in California to purchase 2,500,000 shares of Series D preferred stock in Palantir. In this case, the government filed an in rem civil forfeiture action against claimant's Palantir shares, alleging that the shares were forfeitable because they were derived from proceeds traceable to a wire fraud and money laundering scheme. The panel held that the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004), supports the panel's conclusion that the district court did not err when it determined that the constitutional due process requirements set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), were inapplicable to this in rem action. The Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), addressed quasi-in-rem actions rather than in rem actions directed solely toward a res instead of property seized as a substitute for the defendant. The panel explained that in an in rem action, the focus for the jurisdictional inquiry is the res, in this case claimant's Palantir shares, rather than claimant's personal contacts with the forum. The panel also held that venue was proper because sufficient acts giving rise to the civil forfeiture occurred in the Central District.

Kansas Natural Resource v. United States Dept of Interior

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-3108

Opinion Date: August 24, 2020

Judge: Carolyn Baldwin McHugh

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Plaintiff Kansas Natural Resource Coalition (“KNRC”) sought an order to enjoin the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”) to submit its rules to Congress, pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”), before those rules “take effect.” The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the CRA contained a provision prohibiting judicial review of any “omission under this chapter.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed based on KNRC’s lack of Article III standing. Furthermore, the Court declined to remand the case so that KNRC could amend its complaint because, in any event, the district court was correct that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Walters v. Stevens, Littman, Biddison

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-1206

Opinion Date: August 24, 2020

Judge: David M. Ebel

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure

Eric Wagenknecht and his wife, Susan Colbert, filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in January 2016 (the “Petition Date”). The case was converted to Chapter 7 in April 2017. Jared Walters was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee for the estate (the “Trustee”). Prior to the Petition Date, the Law Firm provided legal services to Eric. By the end of 2015, Eric owed the law firm of Stevens, Littman, Biddison, Tharp & Weinberg, LLC (the “Law Firm”) over $20,000. Eric borrowed money from his mother to pay the Law Firm, and executed a promissory note to repay her. In January 2018, the Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against the Law Firm. The Trustee alleged that the payment to the Law Firm was a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. 547. The Trustee therefore sought to avoid and recover the payment under 11 U.S.C. sections 547 and 550. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and the bankruptcy court entered an order denying the Law Firm’s motion for summary judgment and granting the Trustee’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that because Eric did not exercise control or dominion over the payment to the Law Firm, and because the payment did not diminish Eric’s bankruptcy estate, the payment did not constitute a “transfer of an interest of the debtor in property” under section 547(b). Therefore, the bankruptcy court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the Trustee.

Thomas v. Albany Area Primary Healthcare Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-11187

Opinion Date: August 25, 2020

Judge: Hull

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice suit against AAP and several other defendants. Under the Federally Supported Health Care Assistance Act of 1999 (FSHCAA), 42 U.S.C. 233, the government removed the case to federal district court. The government sought to have the United States substituted as the defendant and the suit converted to an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Then the government acknowledged that its section 233 scope-of-employment certification was in error, withdrew the certification, and stipulated to the remand of the case to state court. The district court then remanded the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants Dr. Tolliver and AAP Healthcare appealed, seeking review of the district court's order remanding the case. The Eleventh Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) precludes the court from reviewing the district court's order remanding this action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Sowinski v. California Air Resources Board

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 19-1558

Opinion Date: August 21, 2020

Judge: Pauline Newman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

In 2015, Dr. Sowinski sued the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and others, alleging infringement of the 033 patent, violation of California elder abuse laws, and violation of California Business & Professions Code 17200. The patent, entitled “Pollution Credit Method Using Electronic Networks,” describes an electronic method and apparatus for validating and trading consumer pollution control tax credits. Sowinski stated that the patent is infringed by California’s Cap-and-Trade Program auctions. Sowinski did not file a response to motions to dismiss. After the period set in the local rules, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Federal Circuit affirmed. In 2018, Sowinski filed suit in the California Superior Court of Orange County, substantially identical to his prior complaint but seeking damages only for infringement after the dismissal. He voluntarily dismissed that action and filed the same complaint in the Northern District of California, stating the same three counts as the first suit. CARB was the only named defendant. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata, observing that the dismissal of the same claims in the prior litigation against the same defendant “was an adjudication on the merits.” The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that res judicata did not apply because the present complaint seeks damages only for infringement that occurred after the conclusion of his prior suits and because the prior suit was resolved on procedural grounds, without reaching the merits of infringement.

Holt v. Holt

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190025

Opinion Date: August 21, 2020

Judge: Greg Shaw

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates

Michael Holt, the coexecutor of the estate of Geneva Holt, deceased, and the defendant in an action involving the estate, appealed a circuit court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff and coexecutor of the estate, Jere Holt. In October 2007, Jere and Michael's mother, Geneva Holt, died. In May 2008, Jere and Michael filed a petition to probate their mother's will. In August 2016, Jere filed a petition in the Walker Circuit Court to remove the proceedings from the probate court. In a separate motion, Jere asked the circuit court to construe the provisions of the will to allow the remaining assets in Geneva's estate to be used to satisfy a $140,000 cash bequest to him in Geneva's will. Michael filed a response to Jere's motion in which he asserted a counterclaim seeking a judgment declaring that the specific bequest to Jere had adeemed. In 2019, the circuit court entered an order in favor of Jere, holding that the cash bequest to Jere could be satisfied by selling assets of the estate. Michael appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court determined there was no order of removal from probate to circuit court. Without such order, the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the administration of Geneva's estate. The Supreme Court concluded the 2019 circuit court order was void, and this appeal was therefore dismissed.

Akopyan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B304957(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 24, 2020

Judge: Feuer

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its order granting real party in interest's peremptory challenge to Judge Anthony J. Mohr under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 filed after this court conditionally reversed the judgment entered after a jury trial in favor of petitioner on real party's claim for medical malpractice. The court agreed with petitioner that the trial court has not yet been "assigned to conduct a new trial" on remand under section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). Therefore, the court held that the trial court should have waited to rule on the peremptory challenge until it conducted the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, then granted the disqualification motion only if it ordered a new trial.

Riverside County Transportation Comm. v. Southern Cal. Gas Co.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E069462(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 24, 2020

Judge: Manuel A. Ramirez

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Riverside County Transportation Commission (Commission) sought to extend its Metrolink commuter rail line from Riverside to Perris, using the route of a preexisting rail line that it had acquired. At five points, however, the new rail line would cross gas pipelines owned by the Southern California Gas Company. The Gas Company had installed these pipelines under city streets decades earlier, pursuant to franchises granted by the relevant cities and, in some instances, pursuant to licenses granted by the then-owner of the preexisting rail line. The new rail line could not be built as long as the pipelines remained in place. The Commission terminated the licenses and demanded that the Gas Company relocate its pipelines at its own expense. The parties agreed that the Gas Company would relocate its pipelines, to other points also owned by the Commission, and the Commission would pay the estimated expenses, but only provisionally; the Commission could still sue for reimbursement, and the Gas Company could then sue for any additional expenses. The trial court ruled that the Gas Company had to bear all of the costs of relocation; however, it also ruled that the Gas Company had never trespassed on the Commission’s land. Both sides appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal held the Gas Company did have to bear all of the costs of relocation. However, the Court also held that, at those points where the Gas Company held licenses for its pipelines, once the Commission terminated the licenses, the Gas Company could be held liable for trespass.

Thurston v. Fairfield Collectibles of Georgia, LLC

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E072909(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 26, 2020

Judge: Manuel A. Ramirez

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Consumer Law, Internet Law

Plaintiffs Cheryl Thurston and Luis Licea (collectively Thurston) were California residents who purchased items from defendant Fairfield Collectibles of Georgia, LLC (Fairfield), a Georgia limited liability company, through the company's website. Thurston alleged Fairfield’s website was not fully accessible by the blind and the visually impaired, in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The trial court granted Fairfield’s motion to quash service of summons, ruling that California could not obtain personal jurisdiction over Fairfield, because Fairfield did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the evidence showed that Fairfield made some eight to ten percent of its sales to Californians. "Hence, its website is the equivalent of a physical store in California. Moreover, this case arises out of the operation of that website." The trial court therefore could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Fairfield.

In re WeWork Litigation

Court: Delaware Court of Chancery

Docket: CA #2020-0258-AGB

Opinion Date: August 21, 2020

Judge: Bouchard

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

The Court of Chancery held that management of a Delaware corporation does not have the authority unilaterally to preclude a director of the corporation from obtaining the corporation's privileged information. This dispute concerned obtaining access to privileged communications among management of a company, its in-house counsel, and its outside counsel. The company, acting by and under the direction of a special committee of the company's board of directors, filed an action against a corporation and an L.P. alleging that the defendants breached contractual obligations they owed to the company. The special committee sought access to the privileged communications in order to oppose the company's motion for leave to voluntarily dismiss the complaint. The Court of Chancery held that the members of the special committee were entitled to discovery of the privileged communications.

Bellevue Properties, Inc. v. Town of Conway

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0302

Opinion Date: August 25, 2020

Judge: Donovan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Plaintiff Bellevue Properties, Inc. appealed a superior court order affirming the Town of Conway’s decision to discontinue a public way that provided access to the plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff argued the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard to evaluate the Town’s decision and erred in concluding that the Town’s interests in discontinuing the road outweighed plaintiff’s interest in its continuance. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the trial court applied the proper legal standard, and its decision was supported by the record.

City of Glen Ullin, et al. v. Schirado, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 185

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The dispute concerned lots, streets, and alleys within or near the City of Glen Ullin. The lots, streets, and alleys were all surveyed and platted, but undeveloped. The Park District owned or had authority over the lots. The City had authority over the streets and alleys, which ran adjacent to and between the lots. The Schirados owned land near both the Park District property and the City property. The Shirados appealed after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the Park District, concluding the case was res judicata due to a prior lawsuit between the Park District and the Schirados. The court entered judgment enjoining the Schirados from placing any obstruction or personal property on certain City lands and on certain Park District lands and awarded attorney’s fees. After its review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court properly applied the doctrine of res judicata to the Park District lands, which were the subject of the prior lawsuit, but it erred when it applied res judicata to the City lands, which were not included in the prior lawsuit. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the award of attorney’s fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Gimbel v. Magrum, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 181

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

This dispute concerned two parcels of real estate located in Emmons County, North Dakota. Jeff and Donna Magrum appealed a district court judgment quieting title to real estate in Leslie Gimbel. The Magrums argued the court erred when it determined they did not acquire ownership of the property by adverse possession or acquiescence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

Instasi v. Hiebert

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 180

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law

Alysha Instasi appealed a district court judgment dismissing her motion to amend a Washington child custody judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Instasi and Jeremy Hiebert had two children. In December 2015, a judgment was entered in Washington relating to residential responsibility, parenting time, and child support. In July 2018, Instasi moved to amend the Washington judgment in North Dakota district court. In an affidavit supporting the motion, Instasi stated that she and the children have been living in North Dakota since October 2015. The district court entered a default judgment after Hiebert failed to respond to Instasi’s motion. In June 2019, Hiebert moved to vacate the default judgment, arguing the North Dakota court lacked jurisdiction to decide Instasi’s motion to amend the Washington judgment. After a hearing, the court vacated the default judgment and dismissed Instasi’s motion. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to modify the initial child custody determination made in Washington. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction in North Dakota.

Kvande v. Thorson

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 186

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

Dennis Thorson appeals from a judgment ordering him to remove a building from Keith Kvande’s property. Kvande owns real property described as Lot 3 in Block 1 of the School Addition to the City of Wheelock, Williams County, North Dakota. In 2012, Thorson purchased a building located in Epping, North Dakota. Kvande and Thorson had multiple discussions about moving the building to Kvande’s property. Thorson claimed they discussed moving the building onto Kvande’s property permanently, but Kvande claimed they only discussed moving the building onto his property for temporary storage. The parties did not have a written agreement about the property or the building. In fall 2012, Thorson had a concrete foundation poured for the building on Kvande’s property and moved the building onto the foundation. Thorson hooked the building up to sewer, water, and electrical service, and he began living in the building. Thorson did not pay Kvande rent or purchase the property. In May 2015 or 2016, Kvande demanded Thorson vacate the property, but Thorson did not leave. Kvande then attempted to evict Thorson from the property. In September 2017, Kvande sued Thorson, requesting the district court order Thorson to remove the building from the property and return the property to its prior state or award him the cost of having the building removed and the property restored. On appeal, Thorson argued laches and equitable estoppel applied and prevented Thorson’s removal from the property. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err by finding laches and equitable estoppel did not apply and did not preclude the court from ordering the removal of the building from Kvande’s property.

Muhlbradt, et al. v. Pederson, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 187

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

Appellants, the Pederson defendants, appealed after a district court granted summary judgment quieting title to certain mineral interests in appellees, the Muhlbradt plaintiffs. The Pederson defendants argued the court erred in deciding a deed did not except or reserve a future 50 percent interest in the disputed mineral interests to the defendants or their predecessor in interest. They further contended the court erred in relying on division orders to conclude the defendants’ predecessor in interest conveyed the disputed mineral interests. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court.

Wilkinson, et al. v. Board of University and School Lands of the State of N.D.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 183

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Board of University and School Lands of the State of North Dakota, the State Engineer, and Statoil Oil & Gas LP appeal from a judgment determining William Wilkinson and the other plaintiffs owned mineral interests in certain North Dakota land. Although the judgment was not appealable because it did not dispose of all claims against all parties, the North Dakota Supreme Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to review the summary judgment. The Court concluded the district court did not err in concluding N.D.C.C. ch. 61-33.1 applied and the disputed mineral interests were above the ordinary high water mark of the historical Missouri riverbed channel, but the court erred in quieting title and failing to comply with the statutory process. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

S&T Bank v. Groskop

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 113

Opinion Date: August 26, 2020

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

In this complaint brought by Black Diamond Energy and Black Diamond Energy of Delaware (together, the BDE Companies) and seventeen limited partnerships (the Limited Partnerships) the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing with prejudice the complaint, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice. The complaint alleged that S&T Bank's lending policies in the wake of the 2008 economic recession caused severe financial loss to the seventeen limited partnerships (the Limited Partnerships) managed by Black Diamond Energy and Black Diamond Energy of Delaware (together, the BDE Companies). Daniel Groskop, the trustee of a trust formed by the Limited Partnership, was later substituted for the Limited Partnerships as the true party in interest on the condition that the BDE Companies' claims against the Bank be dismissed with prejudice. Due to Groskop's noncompliance with discovery orders and the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Groskop's violation of two court orders compelling discovery, two orders awarding attorneys' fees, and the failure to fulfill the representative duties associated with Wyo. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) required dismissal with prejudice.