Latest 23 Cases This Week: Pogue v. Principal Life Insurance Co. (6th Cir.), Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley (10th Cir.), Elite Oil Field Enterprises ...

Pope Francis’s Statement Endorsing Same-Sex Civil Unions Undermines the Moral Legitimacy and Legal Arguments in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

DAVID S. KEMP, CHARLES E. BINKLEY

David S. Kemp, a professor at Berkeley Law, and Charles E. Binkley, MD, the director of bioethics at Santa Clara University’s Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, consider the implications of Pope Francis’s recently revealed statement endorsing same-sex civil unions as they pertain to a case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. Kemp and Binkley argue that the Pope’s statement undermines the moral legitimacy of the Catholic organization’s position and casts a shadow on the premise of its legal arguments.

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Stigma and the Oral Argument in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN

UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin explains why stigma is a central concept that came up during oral argument before the Supreme Court in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. Griffin points out that some religions have long supported racial discrimination, citing their religious texts, but courts prohibited such discrimination, even by religious entities. Griffin argues that just as religious organizations should not enjoy religious freedom to stigmatize people of color, so they should not be able to discriminate—and thus stigmatize—people based on sexual orientation.

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Pogue v. Principal Life Insurance Co.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-5133

Opinion Date: November 4, 2020

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Insurance Law

Pogue, believing that he had a severe anxiety disorder that prevented him from practicing as a family doctor, submitted a disability claim to his long-term disability insurers: Northwestern Mutual and Principal Life. Pogue failed to disclose that the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners had suspended his license for mis-prescribing painkillers. His insurers found out and denied both of his claims. Pogue sued, alleging breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In Pogue’s lawsuit against Northwestern, the district court granted Northwestern summary judgment on two alternative grounds: the suspension occurred before Pogue became disabled, and the suspension caused stress and anxiety and thus contributed to his disability. The Sixth Circuit court affirmed on the first ground and declined to consider the second ground. When Pogue’s lawsuit against Principal reached summary judgment, the district court applied issue preclusion and relied on the Northwestern district court’s holding that the suspension of Pogue’s license contributed to his disability. The court did not address whether the suspension occurred before Pogue became disabled and also granted summary judgment on Pogue’s bad-faith claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred by giving preclusive effect to an alternative holding on which the Sixth Circuit declined to rule.

Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 20-3054

Opinion Date: November 3, 2020

Judge: Scott Milne Matheson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Class Action, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

Plaintiff-appellant Terri Baker appealed the dismissal of this putative class action for lack of standing. She sued on behalf of herself and her son, S.F.B., to challenge Kansas laws and school district policies that: (1) required children to be vaccinated to attend school and participate in child care programs; and (2) provided a religious exemption from these requirements. She claimed these immunization laws and policies violated various federal and state constitutional provisions and statutes. Baker argued she and S.F.B. had standing because the immunization requirements and religious exemptions injured them in two ways: (1) the District misapplied Kansas law when it granted a religious exemption for S.F.B. to attend preschool despite being unvaccinated - her fear that the District would revoke S.F.B.'s religious exemption was an injury in fact that established standing; and (2) Baker "would like the option" of placing S.F.B. in a non-accredited private school (i.e., home school), school programs, or licensed child care - she contended Kansas law inhibited her from exercising these options and caused an injury in fact because she would be unable to secure a religious exemption for S.F.B. if she tried. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Elite Oil Field Enterprises v. Reed

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-1406

Opinion Date: November 3, 2020

Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

Defendants Garrett Reed, Reilly Reed, Element Services, LLC, Jhenna Reed, Reedesign Concepts, and Robert Kubistek appealed a district court order remanding this case from federal district court to Colorado state court due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff Elite Oil Field Enterprises, Inc. (Elite) moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Plaintiff Elite was a Colorado corporation formed in March 2012 to provide roustabout services for the oil field industry. Immediately after its formation, Elite formed two subsidiaries: Elite Oil Field Services, Inc. and Elite Oil Field Equipment, Inc. At some point after the formation, Reilly Reed (Reilly) became upset that he only had a 25% ownership interest in Elite and believed that he was entitled to a 50% share. Reilly and his brother Garrett Reed (Garrett), allegedly devised a scheme for Reilly to form, surreptitiously, a competing company known as Element Services, LLC (Element), and for Element to improperly lure away Elite’s customers and employees with the intent of economically harming Elite and rendering Elite unable to continue its operations. As part of the scheme, Reilly filed a civil lawsuit in Colorado federal district court against Elite, its two subsidiaries, his former business partner Dustin Tixier, and business manager Jason Whisenand, alleging in pertinent part, Elite's corporate documents were altered such that Reilly owned only 25% of the total outstanding corporate stock rather than the originally agreed upon 50%. Plaintiffs moved to transfer and consolidate the multiple civil suits and counterclaims to Colorado state court. The Tenth Circuit determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, thereby granting Elite's motion to dismiss this appeal.

Ex parte Alabama Department of Revenue.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190826

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Michael F. Bolin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Alabama Department of Revenue ("DOR") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order Judge Eddie Hardaway to recuse himself from an appeal challenging a decision of the Alabama Tax Tribunal in favor of Greenetrack, Inc. In 2009, the DOR determined Greentrack owed $75 million in sales taxes and consumer-use taxes for its electronic-bingo activities for the period from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2008. In 2013, the Alabama Department of Revenue moved for Judge Hardaway to recuse himself, arguing that recusal was required because Judge Hardaway had recused himself two months earlier from another case on a related matter involving these same parties. In the present dispute, the DOR asked Judge Hardaway to recuse himself. This time the circuit court denied the request without providing any specific rationale or reasoning in its order, finding the "cases and authorities relied upon by the Alabama Department of Revenue do not support recusal under the facts and circumstances of this case." Finding the DOR demonstrated a clear, legal right to the recusal of Judge Hardaway in this matter, the Alabama Supreme Court granted its petition and directed Judge Hardaway to recuse himself.

Ex parte Alfa Mutual Insurance Company.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190117

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Mitchell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law

Alfa Mutual Insurance Company intervened in a lawsuit brought by its insured, Danielene Myricks, against Kelisha Saulsberry, an uninsured motorist. Two weeks before trial, Alfa moved to opt out of the lawsuit. The circuit court issued an order granting that motion, but it later vacated the order and required Alfa to continue participating in the case as a named defendant. Alfa appealed, asking the Alabama Supreme Court to direct the circuit court to allow it to opt out. Finding that Alfa did not establish a clear legal right to intervene then opt out before trial, the Supreme Court denied Alfa's petition for mandamus relief.

Ex parte D.R.J.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190769

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Sellers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

Defendants D.R.J. and his mother, Dana Sides, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate two orders holding that a pro tanto release executed in their favor was void, thus restoring them as defendants in the underlying lawsuit. Kathy and Barry King sued D.R.J. and Sides seeking damages for injuries the Kings sustained as a result of an automobile accident allegedly caused by D.R.J.'s negligence in driving Sides' vehicle. D.R.J. was a minor at the time of the accident. Defendants and their insurer, Alfa Mutual Insurance Company, offered to settle the Kings' claims for $95,000. Counsel for the Kings notified their insurer, State Farm, of the settlement offer, preserving its subrogation rights against defendants. State Farm responded by offering the Kings $25,000 to settle the UIM claim, which the Kings rejected. The Kings then accepted the $95,000 settlement offer without State Farm's consent, expressly reserving their UIM claim against State Farm. The Kings then moved to dismiss all claims against defendants, and the trial court entered an order dismissing defendants with prejudice. When State Farm learned of the pro tanto release, it moved the trial court for summary judgment, arguing the Kings forfeited their rights to UIM benefits by executing the pro tanto release without its consent. The trial court found State Farm validly objected to the Kings' settlement, made no ruling on State Farm's motion, and declared the pro tanto release void, thus restoring the "status quo" of the case. Defendants argued the trial court should have granted State Farm's motion and ended the litigation. The Supreme Court determined defendants' situation was not one in which they had a clear legal right to relief sought but the trial court refused to grant. They thus had not met their burden for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, and the Court denied their petition.

Ex parte The Terminix International Co., LP, et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1180863

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Mitchell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Legal Ethics

Birmingham law firm Campbell Law, P.C., represented consumers in legal proceedings against pest-control companies, including The Terminix International Co., LP, and Terminix International, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Terminix"). After Campbell Law initiated arbitration proceedings against Terminix and Matthew Cunningham, a Terminix branch manager, on behalf of owners in the Bay Forest condominium complex ("Bay Forest") in Daphne, Terminix and Cunningham asked the circuit court to disqualify Campbell Law from the proceedings because it had retained a former manager of Terminix's Baldwin County office as an investigator and consultant. The trial court denied the motion to disqualify. Terminix and Cunningham petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct required Campbell Law's disqualification. In support of their petition, Terminix argued the investigator/consultant possessed privileged and confidential information related to disputes between Terminix and parties represented by the law firm, and that Campbell Law violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Supreme Court concluded the petitioners did not demonstrate Campbell Law violated the Rules, thus did not establish they had a clear legal right to mandamus relief. The petition was denied.

Gustin v. Vulcan Termite and Pest Control, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190255

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Tom Parker

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Construction Law, Contracts

Brenda and James Gustin appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Vulcan Termite and Pest Control, Inc. ("Vulcan"), and its general manager, Fred Smith. In 1998, Vulcan was hired by a construction company to pretreat a house in Shelby County, Alabama for termites. The house was three stories tall, with three concrete decks overlooking a lake. The decks were supported by 18 wooden columns. Additionally, to the left of the front door was a porte cochere for vehicles to pass through on their way up the driveway. The exterior of the house was entirely covered in faux-stone cladding. The Gustins purchased the house in 2006. In 2009, the Gustins entered into a contract with Vulcan for termite-damage inspection, treatment, and repair. In 2015, they hired a decorating company to renovate on of the rooms in the house. The company removed several sections of beadboard from the porte cochere, revealing extensive termite damage. Removing some of the cladding from the facade, the Gustins discovered active termites and severe damage to all levels and all sides of the house, as well as damage to a deck. The Gustins hired an expert, who estimated it would cost roughtly $950,000 to repair the house. Several days after the damage was discovered, Smith went to the house to inspect, and observed the active termites. Vulcan did not repair the house. The Gustins sued. In granting summary judgment, the trial court found "no evidence Vulcan breached the contract by failing to discover hidden termites. The Gustins presented no evidence that the annual inspection were not performed in accordance with the regulations or industry standards." The Alabama Supreme Court's review of the record indicated the Gustins submitted "substantial evidence" that Vulcan committed acts and omissions underlying each of their seven breach-of-contract claims. That evidence created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Vulcan breached its duty to "perform all services in a workmanlike manner," as the contract required. While the Court agreed with the trial court and affirmed as to some causes of action, it reversed with respect to others, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Magers v. Alabama Women's Center Reproductive Alternatives, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190010

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Health Law

Ryan Magers appealed the dismissal of his wrongful-death claim against Alabama Women's Center Reproductive Alternatives, LLC ("the AWC"), for its role in the abortion of Baby Roe. In 2017, Baby Roe was aborted at approximately six weeks of gestation after the AWC provided Baby Roe's mother with an abortifacient pill to end her pregnancy. Magers, Baby Roe's father, then petitioned the Probate Court to be appointed personal representative of Baby Roe's estate. Magers' argument consisted of one conclusory statement followed by a string citation. The brief did not discuss how the cited authority was relevant to his argment. Because Mager's brief failed to conform to Rule 28, Ala. R. App. P., the Alabama Supreme Court determined it had nothing to review on appeal and affirmed dismissal.

S.C. et al. v. Autauga County Board of Education et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190382

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Michael F. Bolin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

The circuit court dismissed with prejudice a complaint relating to an alleged sexual assault of a minor at an Autauga County, Alabama school. Multiple requests for continuances were granted. The last such grant, the circuit court admonished it would not grant additional continuances "absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances." A few days later, plaintiffs moved for another continuance, citing a scheduling conflict involving mediation in a separate case in another county. The circuit court did not rule on the motion, instead issuing an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the circuit court exceeded its discretion in dismissing S.C. and K.C.'s claims when there was no clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiffs. "By contacting court personnel, the parties were attempting to find a date for the circuit court's convenience as well as to make sure that the case proceeded to the merits in a timely manner. . . . That most severe sanction in the spectrum of sanctions is not warranted in this case."

Changsha Metro Group Co. v. Xufeng

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E073322A(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 3, 2020

Judge: Miller

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

The trial court found defendants Peng Xufeng and Jia Siyu filed a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion against Changsha Metro Group Co., Ltd. (Changsha). Changsha sued defendants for: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) constructive fraud; (3) aiding and abetting; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) a constructive trust. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court ordered defendants to pay Changsha $61,915 for Changsha’s attorney’s fees in opposing the anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants contended the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Changsha because: (1) defendants were not given a 21-day safe harbor period; and (2)Changsha requested attorney’s fees in its opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, rather than in a separate motion. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court.

Pinto Lake MHP LLC v. County of Santa Cruz

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H045757(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Grover

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Landlord - Tenant

Under the Santa Cruz Mobilehome Ordinance, a park owner may make an annual general rent adjustment without notice to the county, based on specified criteria. An owner who believes the annual adjustment does not provide for “a just and reasonable return” may petition for a special rent increase. Pinto, a 177-space mobile home park, filed a special petition seeking to increase rents by 47 percent. Notice was provided to the residents, who hired counsel and submitted objections. A hearing officer denied the proposed increase. Pinto filed a petition for administrative mandamus and complaint for declarative relief naming the county and the hearing officer as respondents. The county argued that Pinto failed to join the mobile home park residents as indispensable parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 389. Instead of amending its complaint/petition, Pinto elected to stand on the original pleadings. A judgment of dismissal was entered. The court of appeal remanded The trial court, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 389(a), concluded that the residents are necessary parties but did not address section 389(b)--whether the case should be dismissed due to the residents’ absence. The parties disagreed about whether the statute of limitations had run on joinder and the owner’s election to stand on its original pleading truncated the process. The court granted the unopposed motion to dismiss without deciding whether the residents could be made parties or whether the lawsuit could continue without them.

Freirich v. Rabin

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 CO 77

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: William W. Hood, III

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics, Trusts & Estates

When Louis Rabin died, he left everything to his widow, Claudine. She was also named as the personal representative to manage his estate in probate. Louis’s former wife, Suyue Rabin, made a claim against the estate based on a couple of promissory notes. These notes totaled $200,000 and were made payable to Suyue upon Louis’s death, and were executed while Louis was married to Claudine. Claudine didn’t know the notes existed until Suyue made the claim. Claudine asked Louis’s longtime attorney, Mark Freirich, for all of Louis’s legal files, most of which had nothing to do with the notes. He refused, citing confidentiality concerns. She then subpoenaed the files. When Freirich refused, a lawsuit was filed, reaching the Colorado Supreme Court. After review, the Court held: (1) Colorado’s Probate Code did not grant a personal representative a general right to take possession of all of a decedent’s legal files as “property” of the estate; (2) a decedent’s lawyer was ordinarily prohibited from disclosing a decedent’s legal files, even to the personal representative; but (3) a decedent’s lawyer could provide the personal representative with otherwise privileged or confidential documents if such disclosure was necessary to settle the decedent’s estate. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's order quashing the subpoena. That portion of the appellate court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Atlanta Women's Specialists, LLC et al. v. Trabue et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S19G1138, S19G1140

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in five appeals consolidated appeals for review to address two discrete issues – one related to pleading vicarious liability, and the other related to vicarious liability and apportionment. In August 2009, Keith Trabue’s wife, Shannon, suffered a catastrophic brain injury resulting from pulmonary edema leading to full cardiac arrest within days of giving birth to the couple’s daughter at Northside Hospital in Atlanta. At the hospital, Shannon was treated by physician-employees of Atlanta Women’s Specialists, LLC (AWS), including Dr. Stanley Angus and Dr. Rebecca Simonsen. Trabue and the bank serving as his wife’s conservator (Plaintiffs) later filed a medical malpractice action naming as defendants only Dr. Angus and AWS, although the complaint contained allegations regarding Dr. Simonsen’s conduct and alleged that AWS was vicariously responsible for the acts and omissions of both Dr. Angus and Dr. Simonsen. The complaint did not allege any independent acts of negligence on the part of AWS. At a two-week trial in 2017, after the close of the evidence, Dr. Angus and AWS, asked the court to require the jury to assess the percentages of fault of Dr. Angus and Dr. Simonsen and to apportion the damages between Dr. Angus and AWS under OCGA 51-12-33 (b). The Supreme Court asked the parties to brief two questions: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently pled a claim for vicarious liability against AWS based on the conduct of Dr. Simonsen?; and (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that, to obtain apportionment of damages with regard to the negligence of Dr. Simonsen, the defendants were required to comply with OCGA 51-12-33 (d) by filing a pretrial notice of nonparty fault? The Supreme Court answered both questions in the negative and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

Quynn v Hulsey et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S19G1612

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this wrongful death and personal injury case to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that TriEst Ag Group, Inc., the employer of the driver whose truck struck and killed the decedent, was entitled to summary judgment on the estate’s claims of negligent entrustment, hiring, training, and supervision because TriEst admitted the applicability of respondeat superior and the estate was not entitled to punitive damages. The Supreme Court concluded OCGA 51-12-33 ("the apportionment statute") abrogated the decisional law rule on which the Court of Appeals relied in affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, judgment was reversed.

Berian v. Berberian

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47122

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Stegner

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

This case arose from a number of disputes between two brothers, Galust Berian (Galust) and Ovanes Berberian (Ovanes). In June 2017, Galust and Julia Berian (Galust's daughter and Ovanes' niece) were arrested after Ovanes reported to law enforcement that Galust and Julia had stolen several items from him. After the reported theft, Galust and Julia were arrested for unlawful entry onto property shared by Ovanes and his ex-wife, Socorro Berberian (Socorro), and for resisting arrest. After these charges were dropped, Galust and Julia filed suit against Ovanes and Socorro, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, defamation, breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and conversion. Ovanes counterclaimed for conversion. Ovanes and Socorro moved for summary judgment on all of Galust’s and Julia’s claims, which the district court granted except for their conversion claim. The district court also certified its grant of partial summary judgment as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b). Galust and Julia appealed the grant of summary judgment, arguing that summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to each of their other causes of action. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed affirm the grant of summary judgment regarding the tort claims of invasion of privacy and negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as the contract and fraud claims. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment regarding the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and defamation. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Burns Concrete v. Teton County

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46827

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

This appeal arose from a dispute over the construction of a ready-mix concrete manufacturing facility in Teton County, Idaho. In 2007, Burns Holdings entered into a development agreement with Teton County regarding property owned by Burns Concrete. The development agreement required the construction of a permanent concrete manufacturing facility on the property within 18 months of the execution of the agreement, but allowed operation of a temporary facility in the meantime. Burns Concrete, the concrete company that would operate the facility, and Burns Holdings, a holding company that was to eventually take title to the property, wanted to build a permanent facility that was 75-feet tall, but the applicable zoning ordinance limited building heights to 45-feet. The County denied Burns Holdings’ application for a conditional use permit and its subsequent application for a variance to exceed the height limit. The Burns Companies operated the temporary facility for several years but never constructed the permanent facility. In 2012, the County sent written notice revoking the authority to operate the temporary facility and demanding that the temporary facility be removed. The Burns Companies subsequently filed this action, stating claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and unjust enrichment. The County counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory judgment for the removal of the temporary facility. This began a multi-year period of litigation that included two appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court, each followed by a remand to the district court. This case has returned to the Supreme Court again, this time as a result of the parties’ cross-appeals of the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the Burns Companies on their breach of contract claim, its award of $1,049.250.90 in damages, and its award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment on the issue of breach of contract, but vacated the district court’s judgment for a recalculation of damages. In its recalculation of damages, the district court was instructed to reverse its reduction of damages by the difference between the Temporary Facility’s sales and cost of sales. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s award of attorney fees and remanded the matter for an explanation of the district court’s reduction of requested attorney fees.

Carter v. Gateway Parks LLC

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47246

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

Scott Carter, Amelia Carter, and Scott Carter, Inc., dba Carter Dental (collectively “Carter”) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Gateway Parks, LLC (hereinafter “Gateway”). This case concerned Carter’s second attempt to litigate the propriety of the use of his investment funds in a proposed snowpark in Eagle, Idaho. Carter sued Gateway for common law fraud in the inducement and under the “general fraud” provisions of the Uniform Securities Act of 2004 (Idaho Code section 30-14-501, et seq), alleging Gateway had misrepresented and failed to disclose its use of Carter’s investment funds in Gateway with an intent to defraud him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Gateway, finding Carter’s claims were: (1) barred by the statute of limitations and res judicata; and (2) because Carter could not establish the essential elements of a fraud claim. The district court also awarded attorney fees and costs to Gateway. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court.

Arell v. Palmer

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0553

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Donovan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

Defendants Henry Palmer and Janis Monty-Palmer appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs Richard Arell, Jr. and Natalie Allard-Arell. In their petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the Arells asserted that the Palmers’ temporary easement to use a well on the Arells’ property required the Palmers to develop their own water source. The trial court ordered the Palmers to investigate the cost and feasibility of developing a well on their own property, and, if possible and reasonable, to install a well within three years. Because the clear and unambiguous language of the Palmers’ deed did not support the trial court’s decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

Ladue v. Pla-Fit Health, LLC

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0354

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: James P. Bassett

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Plaintiff Theresa Ladue was injured in a fall at a gym in Nashua, New Hampshire, operated by defendant Pla-Fit Health, LLC (Planet Fitness). Ladue brought a negligence claim against Planet Fitness. Planet Fitness moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court granted the motion, finding that Ladue’s claim was barred by a release of liability provision in her membership agreement. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

New Hampshire Center for Public Interest Journalism v. New Hampshire Department of Justice

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0279

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

The New Hampshire Department of Justice (DOJ) appealed a superior court order denying its motion to dismiss a petition filed by plaintiffs' New Hampshire Center for Public Interest Journalism, The Telegraph of Nashua, Union Leader Corporation, Newspapers of New England, Inc., Seacoast Newspapers, Inc., Keene Publishing Corporation, and American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire. The petition sought a declaration that the “Exculpatory Evidence Schedule” (EES), excluding the names of police officers with pending requests to be removed from the list, had to be made public pursuant to the New Hampshire Right-to-Know Law. In denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court rejected the DOJ’s arguments that the EES was “confidential” under RSA 105:13-b (2013) and that it was exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law either because it was an “internal personnel practice” or a “personnel file” under RSA 91-A:5, IV (2013). After review, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determinations that the EES was neither “confidential” under RSA 105:13-b nor exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law as an “internal personnel practice” or a “personnel file.” Nonetheless, the Court vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded for it to determine, in the first instance, whether as the DOJ contended, the EES constituted an “other file whose disclosure would constitute invasion of privacy.”

Powers v. Turner County Board of Adjustment

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 S.D. 60

Opinion Date: November 4, 2020

Judge: Devaney

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court dismissing Petitioners' appeal from the decision of the Turner County Board of Adjustment approving an application for the construction and operation of a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) on the grounds that Petitioners lacked standing, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing the appeal for an inadequate showing of standing. After the Board voted unanimously to approve the CAFO application Petitioners, who owned land near the proposed CAFO, petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari. The circuit court concluded that Petitioners lacked standing because they failed to present sufficient facts demonstrating a unique and personal injury compared to Turner County taxpayers in general. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioners set forth sufficient specific facts showing a personal and pecuniary loss not suffered by taxpayers in general.

Martinez-Cuevas v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, Inc.

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 96267-7

Opinion Date: November 5, 2020

Judge: Barbara Madsen

Areas of Law: Agriculture Law, Civil Procedure, Class Action, Labor & Employment Law

This case concerned the constitutionality of RCW 49.46.130(2)(g), the provision exempting agricultural workers from the overtime pay requirement set out in the Washington Minimum Wage Act, ch. 49.46 RCW. Jose Martinez-Cuevas and Patricia Aguilar worked for DeRuyter Brothers Dairy as milkers. DeRuyter milkers used mechanized equipment to milk close to 3,000 cows per shift, 24 hours a day, three shifts a day, 7 days a week. In 2016, Martinez-Cuevas and Aguilar filed the present class action suit along with about 300 fellow DeRuyter dairy workers, claiming that DeRuyter failed to pay minimum wage to dairy workers, did not provide adequate rest and meal breaks, failed to compensate pre- and post-shift duties, and failed to pay overtime. The complaint also sought a judgment declaring RCW 49.46.130(2)(g) unconstitutional. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the class, finding the exemption violated article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution and the equal protection clause. After review, the Washington Supreme Court concurred with the trial court and affirmed that judgment.