Latest 22 Cases This Week: Arevalo v. Barr (1st Cir.), Gao v. Barr (1st Cir.), Canada, Jr. v. United States (Internal Revenue Service) (5th Cir.)

The Clients’ Waiver of Their Rights Under Regulation BI of the Securities and Exchange Commission

TAMAR FRANKEL

BU Law emerita professor Tamar Frankel discusses the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s Regulation Best Interest (BI), which imposes on broker-dealers a commitment to act in the best interests of their clients. Specifically, Frankel addresses the SEC’s treatment of client waivers of the Regulation BI, which goes even further than general fiduciary law to prohibit any waiver of the broker-dealer’s conflicting interests.

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Arevalo v. Barr

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 18-1834

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The First Circuit denied two petitions for judicial review challenging the orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) first finding that Petitioner was not entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection and then placing the case back on the docket and proceeding from where it left off before the case was administratively closed, holding that the BIA correctly interpreted the word "recalendar." In 2010, the BIA upheld the IJ's decision denying Petitioner's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The Petitioner petitioned for judicial review. First Circuit remanded the case to the BIA, and on remand, the government moved to close the proceedings administratively. The BIA granted the motion and administratively closed the case in 2013. The parties then filed a stipulation of dismissal, and the First Circuit dismissed the pending petition for judicial review and entered a judgment of voluntary dismissal. In 2016, the government moved to reinstate the case. The BIA granted the motion and decreed that its original 2010 decision "now takes effect." Petitioner petitioned for judicial review. The First Circuit denied both petitions for judicial review, holding that "recalendar" means to reinstate the case to the active docket in the same posture as it occupied when it was paused for administrative closure.

Gao v. Barr

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1694

Opinion Date: February 20, 2020

Judge: Stahl

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial by an immigration judge (IJ) of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. Thereafter, Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings. The IJ denied Petitioner's applications and ordered his removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the denial of Petitioner's asylum application was supported by substantial record evidence; (2) because Petitioner could not succeed on his asylum claim his claim for withholding of removal was properly denied; and (3) Petitioner's claim regarding the denial of CAT protection was waived.

Canada, Jr. v. United States (Internal Revenue Service)

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-11398

Opinion Date: February 20, 2020

Judge: Hanen

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Tax Law

After plaintiff successfully challenged in bankruptcy court a tax penalty assessed against him by the IRS that exceeded $40 million, plaintiff filed suit against the IRS and three IRS agents, in their individual capacities, pleading a claim for damages against the individual defendants under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for allegedly violating his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process. Plaintiff also sought attorney's fees he incurred litigating the penalty issue in his Chapter 11 bankruptcy case under 26 U.S.C. 7430 and the Equal Access to Justice Act. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion and dismissal of the action with prejudice. The court held that the district court properly concluded that this case was a new Bivens context and that special factors existed under Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). The court also held that plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorney's fees because his request was untimely under 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B) and he was not a "prevailing party" under 26 U.S.C. 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).

Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. DOWCP, et al.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-60698

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Clarence Ceasar, Jr. injured his neck and back while working as a longshoreman for Sea-Land Services, Inc. in 1997. Because of those injuries, Ceasar was unable to work and had to undergo several medical procedures. Thirteen years later, Ceasar and Sea-Land reached a settlement, under which Ceasar received a lump sum instead of continuing disability payments. Sea-Land remained on the hook for Ceasar’s ongoing medical expenses. Ceasar was cleared to return to longshoreman duties in 2010 with no restrictions, despite chronic neck and lower back pain. Ceasar started working for Universal Maritime Service Company ("UMS") and was injured again a year later when a coworker lowered a cargo container onto his hands. Sea-Land petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of an order of the Benefits Review Board (“BRB”) which upheld the determination of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) that Ceasar did not aggravate his 1997 injury at Sea-Land while working for UMS in 2011. After review, the Fifth Circuit determined the BRB did not err, denying Sea-Land's petition.

Democratic Executive Committee of Florida v. National Republican Senatorial Committee

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-14758

Opinion Date: February 19, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Florida's 2018 U.S. Senate election triggered a statewide recount. The Democratic Executive Committee challenged the signature-match requirements of Florida’s vote-by-mail statute, which gave voters who learned that their votes had been blocked for signature mismatch until “5 p.m. one day before the election” to verify their identities by submitting an affidavit and an accepted form of identification. They also challenged Florida’s law allowing prospective voters who could not prove their eligibility to cast provisional ballots; provisional ballots rejected because of signature mismatch could not be cured after the fact. The district court entered a modified preliminary injunction allowing the “ballots of those voters who were belatedly notified of signature mismatch” to be counted, provided that “those voters timely verified their identities.” The National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) sought an emergency stay, which was denied by the Eleventh Circuit. The preliminary injunction expired two days later. About three months later, the motions panel issued an opinion explaining its denial of the emergency stay. In 2019, S.B. 7066, significantly amended the signature-match provisions. The plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit. Defendants moved to dismiss their appeal of the preliminary injunction. The NRSC agreed that the case was moot but moved to vacate the order granting a preliminary injunction and the stay-panel opinion. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that it retained jurisdiction to consider the proposed motions but declined to vacate the prior opinions because they will not have negative collateral effects on any party.

Kondrat'yev v. City of Pensacola,

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 17-13025

Opinion Date: February 19, 2020

Judge: Newsom

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Relying on an earlier decision (Rabun County), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a decision ordering the removal of a 34-foot Latin cross from the City of Pensacola’s Bayview Park, finding that the maintenance of the cross violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. While the city's petition for certiorari was pending, the Supreme Court held, in "American Legion," that a 32-foot Latin cross on public land in Bladensburg, Maryland does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court vacated the earlier decision and remanded for further consideration in light of American Legion. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it remains bound by Rabun to conclude that plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge Pensacola’s maintenance of the cross but that American Legion abrogates Rabun to the extent that the latter disregarded evidence of “historical acceptance.” When "American Legion" is applied, the cross’s presence on city property does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Bayview cross (in one iteration or another) stood in the same location for more than 75 years; there is no evidence of the city's original purpose in its placement. The message and purposes of the cross have changed over time. A strong presumption of constitutionality” attaches to “established” monuments,

Sow v. U.S. Attorney General

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 17-15245, 18-12162

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Charles R. Wilson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

Hamid Sow, a citizen of Guinea, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his motion to remand based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, and motion to reopen based upon new evidence. In December 2016, Sow entered the United States and immediately applied for asylum because he was a homosexual, and the stigma of being a homosexual in a devout Muslim community in his homeland meant danger for himself and his family. Sow only spoke French, and relied on other detainees to relate information to his attorney. Without a translator, Sow's counsel did not fully understand Sow’s concerns: Sow tried to communicate to his counsel that the content of affidavits counsel “did not match up with what happened.” When asked about discrepancies in facts from the affidavits presented, Sow responded he could not explain them because he did not have an opportunity to read them. In his oral decision, the IJ said that he “unfortunately” had to deny Sow’s application based solely on an adverse credibility finding. In coming to this conclusion, the IJ specifically highlighted the inconsistencies in statements made in affidavits. He noted that, if it were true that Sow were a homosexual, then he “clearly should get” asylum. Sow, represented by new counsel, appealed to the BIA. He argued that the IJ erred in failing to assess Sow’s well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA denied Sow’s motion to remand. It held that the IJ did not clearly err in making an adverse credibility determination and the record did not establish that Sow was entitled to relief “independent of his discredited claim of past harm.” It also denied Sow’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, reasoning that counsel “reasonably relied on, and submitted the evidence provided by, the respondent and his friends.” The Eleventh Circuit concluded the BIA abused its discretion in denying Sow’s motion to remand based on ineffective assistance of counsel. It therefore granted Sow’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decisions, and remanded to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ for reconsideration of Sow’s asylum application.

Gresham v. Azar

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-5094

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Sentelle

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Public Benefits

Kentucky and Arkansas residents sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services based on the approval under 42 U.S.C. 1315(a) of an “experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of Medicaid. The district court held that the Secretary failed to analyze whether the projects would promote the primary objective of Medicaid—to furnish medical assistance. Kentucky terminated its project and obtained voluntary dismissal. The D.C. Circuit affirmed with respect to the Arkansas Works program, which required beneficiaries aged 19-49 to “work or engage in specified educational, job training, or job search activities for at least 80 hours per month,” except beneficiaries who show they are medically frail or pregnant, caring for a dependent child under age six, participating in a substance treatment program, or are full-time students. Works proposed to eliminate retroactive coverage, to lower the income eligibility threshold from 133% to 100% of the federal poverty line, and eliminated using Medicaid funds to assist beneficiaries in paying the premiums for employer-provided health care coverage. Instead of analyzing whether the demonstration would promote the objective of providing coverage, the Secretary identified three alternative objectives. Congress has not conditioned the receipt of Medicaid benefits on fulfilling work requirements or taking steps to end receipt of governmental benefits

Jackson v. Modly

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 18-5180

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Henderson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Military Law

Jackson served in the Marine Corps, 1977-1991. Almost 30 years after his honorable discharge, Jackson filed a pro se complaint alleging that toward the end of his military career, his supervising officers discriminated against him because he is a black male, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court inferred additional claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), and the Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. 204 but ultimately dismissed all of Jackson’s claims. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The court noted the unanimous rulings of other sister circuits, concluding that Title VII does not apply to uniformed members of the armed forces. Jackson’s APA claim was untimely and, although the limitations period is no longer considered jurisdictional, the facts alleged were insufficient to apply equitable tolling. Jackson was able to manage his affairs and comprehend his rights; he alleged that at the time of the alleged discrimination, he knew that he “had been subjected to wrongdoing and strongly desired justice.” The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the dismissal of Jackson’s Military Pay Act claim; the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of such claims.

Citizens for South Bay Coastal Access v. City of San Diego

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D075387(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 18, 2020

Judge: Joan Irion

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The City of San Diego (the City) appealed a judgment in a lawsuit filed by Citizens for South Bay Coastal Access (Plaintiff), which challenged the City's issuance of a conditional use permit allowing it to convert a motel that it recently purchased into a transitional housing facility for homeless misdemeanor offenders. Specifically, the City contended the trial court erred by ruling that the City was required to obtain a coastal development permit for the project because the motel was located in the Coastal Overlay Zone as defined in the City's municipal code. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in concluding that a coastal development permit was required under state law regulations promulgated by the California Coastal Commission (the Commission). Because the Commission certified the City's local coastal program, those provisions applied here rather than the Commission's regulations. "Under the City's local coastal program, the project is exempt from the requirement to obtain a coastal development permit because it involves an improvement to an existing structure, and no exceptions to the existing- structure exemption are applicable." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment.

Lateef v. City of Madera

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F076227(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Snauffer

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Junaid Lateef appealed a judgment entered in favor of the City of Madera (city) and the Madera City Council (city council) (collectively, respondents), which denied his petition for administrative mandamus and requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. At issue was the meaning of Madera Municipal Code section 10-3.1310(E), which set forth the minimum number of council votes required to overturn the Madera Planning Commission’s (commission) denial of an application for a conditional use permit: “A five-sevenths vote of the whole of the Council shall be required to grant, in whole or in part, any appealed application denied by the Commission.” Lateef appealed the denial of his application to the seven-member city council, which voted four-to-one to grant his appeal; however, one councilmember recused himself and another council seat was vacant. The city council denied Lateef’s appeal, ruling that he needed five votes (five-sevenths times the total membership of the council) to prevail. Arguing to the Court of Appeal, Lateef contended the city council was required to grant his appeal because the ordinance requires a five-sevenths vote of those councilmembers present and voting, and he received five-sevenths of the five votes that were cast, namely four votes. He also contended he was denied a fair trial because the recused councilmember and vacant seat were included as councilmembers when determining the number of votes needed to grant his appeal. Finding no merit to Lateef’s contentions, the Court of Appeal affirmed.

DNREC v. McGinnis Auto & Mobile Home Salvage, LLC

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 139, 2019

Opinion Date: February 20, 2020

Judge: Seitz

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

McGinnis Auto & Mobile Home Salvage, LLC salvaged discarded and dilapidated mobile homes on its property in Kent County, Delaware. According to the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC), a large and unsightly waste pile, possibly contaminated with asbestos, had accumulated over time. DNREC cited McGinnis for environmental violations and for operating a reclamation facility without a permit. DNREC gave McGinnis a chance to bring the property into compliance, but McGinnis failed to do so. DNREC responded by issuing a cease and desist order requiring McGinnis to remove the waste pile from the property in an environmentally responsible manner. McGinnis appealed the order to the Environmental Appeals Board, arguing that DNREC could order the illegal activity to stop, but could not order McGinnis to take affirmative action to remove the waste pile from the property. The EAB agreed with McGinnis, finding that the order exceeded the scope of its authority. The Superior Court affirmed the EAB’s decision, finding that DNREC did not have the authority under its cease and desist power to require McGinnis to remove the waste pile, direct how the waste had to be removed, or demand documentation. On appeal, DNREC contended that the EAB and Superior Court took too narrow of a view of DNREC’s cease and desist authority. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed: "it follows that the only way to cease and desist from the violation is to remove the contaminated debris from the site. ... the Secretary can require a violator to cease and desist from continuing the illegal storage of solid waste. If the violator ignores the Secretary’s order, Section 6005 provides the possible remedies for a violation of 'any order of the Secretary.' The Secretary may impose monetary penalties. The Secretary may seek injunctive relief in the Court of Chancery. And, in his discretion, the Secretary may opt for conciliation. None of the possible remedies is mandatory or inconsistent with the Secretary’s authority to enter a cease and desist order."

Day v. Idaho Transportation Dept

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 45552

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Joel D. Horton

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Bennett Day, Trustee of Trust B of the Donald M. and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust, John Day, Dan E. Day, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC, Donna Day Jacobs, and David R. Day (collectively, the Day family) appealed a district court's decision dismissing their claims against the State of Idaho and the Idaho Transportation Department (the Department). This case related to certain property the Day family owned near Isaacs Canyon in Ada County, Idaho. In the 1990s, the State began working on the Isaacs Canyon Interchange near the Day property. The frontage road (Eisenman Road) was extended to the interchange. Eisenman Road did not reach the Day property. In late 1997, which the parties each stipulated was the date for valuation of any taking, the Department substantially completed construction of the Isaacs Canyon Interchange project. After the interchange was completed, the State transferred jurisdiction and maintenance of Eisenman Road southwest of the Interchange to the Ada County Highway District (ACHD). In 2014, the Department applied to ACHD to obtain access from Eisenman Road to the Day property. In 2015, the Department offered the Day family $560,000 to build an access road themselves, but the Days rejected the offer. In May 2016, ACHD advised the Department that it would “not accept a public street” needed to create the access desired by the Day family. Following ACHD’s denial of the Department’s application, the Day family filed this action, asserting claims against the Department for inverse condemnation, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment and the Department moved to dismiss the Day family’s complaint. The Day family appealed when the district ocurt dismissed its claims. Their appeal presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review: (1) a question of whether the district court erred by considering the Department’s motion to dismiss without notifying the Day family that it would consider matters outside of the pleadings; (2) a question of whether the district court correctly dismissed the Day family’s claims for lack of standing and for untimeliness; and (3) whether either party was entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. The Supreme Court determined the district court: erred in granting summary judgment for the Department on all of the Day family’s inverse condemnation claims; erred by granting summary judgment on the contract claim; and incorrectly held that the statute of limitations barred the inverse condemnation claims of Donna Day Jacobs and David R. Day. Furthermore, the Court determined the district court erred by dismissing the Day family’s contract-based claims.

Hiatt v. Health Care ID Credit Union

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46672

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Siranoush Hiatt appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission decision that affirmed the Idaho Department of Labor’s denial of her request for unemployment benefits. The Commission determined that Hiatt was ineligible for benefits because she was terminated from Health Care Idaho Credit Union (“HCICU”) for workplace-related misconduct. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed based on the substantial evidence in the record which supported the Commission’s decision.

Irland v. Iowa Board of Medicine

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 18-0353

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision affirming the district court's dismissal of a physician's petition for judicial review of the Iowa Board of Medicine's decision to use a "confidential letter of warning" to impose conditions on the physician's return to the practice of medicine over his objection, without a finding of probable cause, and without judicial review, holding that the district court erred by ruling that the Board's letter was not judicially reviewable. Before the physician voluntarily ceased practicing medicine the Board had opened an investigation into the physician. The Board closed the investigation without a finding of probable cause that the physician had violated any rule or standard of practice. In its letter, the Board told the physician that if he returned to practicing medicine he must complete a comprehensive clinical competency evaluation. The physician sought judicial review, contending that the Board's letter constituted illegal agency action. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the letter was not a disciplinary sanction subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court vacated the decision, holding that the Board's letter was subject to judicial review because the physician was aggrieved by the Board's action where he was unable to resume practicing his profession without triggering the competency evaluation.

Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Fowlkes Plumbing, L.L.C.

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2019-FC-01285-SCT

Opinion Date: February 20, 2020

Judge: Josiah D. Coleman

Areas of Law: Construction Law, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law

In May 2015, the Chickasaw County School District entered into a contract with Sullivan Enterprises, Inc., for window restoration work on the Houlka Attendance Center. In July 2015, during construction, a fire began that completely consumed the attendance center. Liberty Mutual, the school district’s insurer, paid the school district $4.3 million for the damage to the building. Liberty Mutual then filed a subrogation suit against Sullivan Enterprises, Fowlkes Plumbing, LLC, and Quality Heat & Air, Inc. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi found that the waiver of subrogation did not apply to damages to the “non-Work” property, thus Liberty Mutual could proceed in litigation as to “non-Work” property damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit allowed an interlocutory appeal and certified a question to the Mississippi Supreme Court regarding whether the subrogation waiver applied to “non-Work” property. The Supreme Court determined that based on the plain meaning of the contract language, the waiver of subrogation applied to both work and non-work property.

Mississippi Department of Public Safety v. Herrington

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2019-CA-00145-SCT

Opinion Date: February 20, 2020

Judge: Leslie D. King

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Justin Herrington, a law-enforcement officer with the Columbia Police Department, was convicted of violating Mississippi Code Section 97-3-104, which prohibited sexual activity between a law-enforcement employee and an offender on correctional supervision. The trial court ordered Herrington to register as a sex offender under Mississippi Code Sections 45-33-21 through 45-33-51. The trial court then amended its order and removed Herrington’s registration requirement. The Mississippi Department of Public Safety (MDPS) appealed and argued that the trial court erred by removing Herrington’s requirement to register as a sex offender. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed and reversed the trial court’s order dispensing with Herrington’s registration requirement.

State ex rel. White v. Franklin County Board of Elections

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-524

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Tiffany White and Tiffany White 4 for the People compelling the Franklin County Board of Elections to place White's name on the March 17, 2020 primary ballot as a candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for the office of state representative for the 25th Ohio House District, holding that White did not establish that she had a clear legal right to have her name appear on the ballot. The Board informed White that her name would not appear on the ballot because her petition was one signature short of the required fifty signatures. Before the Supreme Court, White asserted that the Board abused its discretion by failing to validate three signatures on her nominating petition. White also filed a motion to strike the brief of amicus curiae Miranda Lange. The Supreme Court denied the writ and motion to strike, holding (1) White failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the three disputed petition signatures were genuine or that the Board abused its discretion in rejecting them; and (2) White was not entitled to a motion to strike.

In Re: Nomination Papers of Sherrie Cohen

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 31 and 32 EAP 2019

Opinion Date: February 19, 2020

Judge: Mundy

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

In October 2019, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a Commonwealth Court order and directed that the name of Sherrie Cohen be placed on the November 5, 2019 ballot as an independent candidate for Philadelphia City Council-at-Large. Because the Board of Elections only had until the close of business on October 4, 2019 to add Cohen’s name to the ballot, the Supreme Court issued its order noting that an opinion would follow. By this opinion, the Supreme Court forth its reasons for concluding that Cohen’s withdrawal as a candidate in the Democratic primary election for City Council-at-Large did not preclude her from running in the general election as an independent candidate. On August 16, 2019, the trial court issued an order granting the petitions to set aside Cohen’s nomination papers. In an opinion in support of the order, the court looked to Packrall v. Quail, 192 A.2d 704 (Pa. 1963), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when a candidate withdraws his nomination petitions for a primary ballot “within the permitted period,” his subsequently filed nomination papers may be accepted. The trial court distinguished Cohen’s case from Packrall because “Cohen required Court intervention to leave the primary ballot.” The court determined this to be the decisive factor in concluding that she was “subject to the 'sore loser’ provision.” Cohen filed a timely appeal to the Commonwealth Court. In a single-judge memorandum and order, the trial court was affirmed, holding “[w]hen a person withdraws of his or her own volition within the time for filing, it 'undoes,’ ab initio, the filing because a person gets to choose whether he or she wants to go through the primary process to seek an office.” Cohen asserted on appeal of the Commonwealth Court’s order that that court erred by failing to consider withdrawal by court order under Election Code Section 978.4 to have the same effect as voluntary withdrawal pursuant to Section 914. The Supreme Court agreed with Cohen that “[t]he Commonwealth Court failed to acknowledge that the important dividing line in this area of the law is between voluntary withdraw[als] and candidates getting stricken from the ballot. … Because there is no principled reason to distinguish between the voluntariness of a withdrawal under Section 914 or Section 978.4, Cohen is entitled to relief from this Court.”

Preservation Society v. SCDHEC

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 27949

Opinion Date: February 19, 2020

Judge: James

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Petitioners, consisting of several citizens groups and neighborhood associations, sought a contested case hearing in the administrative law court (ALC) to challenge the propriety of state environmental authorizations issued by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) for a project relocating and expanding the passenger cruise facility at the Union Pier Terminal (the Terminal) in downtown Charleston. Petitioners contended they had standing to seek this hearing as "affected persons" under section 44-1- 60(G) of the South Carolina Code (2018). The ALC concluded Petitioners did not have standing and granted summary judgment to Respondents. The ALC terminated discovery and also sanctioned Petitioners for requesting a remand to the DHEC Board. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, concluded Petitioners did have standing, and thus reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter to the ALC for a contested case hearing.

Frazier v. S.P.

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 18-0785

Opinion Date: February 18, 2020

Judge: Jenkins

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court reversed the final order of the circuit court reversing the order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) revoking Respondent's driver's license for driving under the influence (DUI), holding that the OAH's findings were not clearly wrong and that the circuit court abused its discretion in substituting its judgment for that of the fact finder. After unsuccessfully challenging the revocation of her license with the OAH Respondent appealed to the circuit court. The court found that that OAH clearly erred in weighing the facts and in applying the law and legal standards and that OAH's final order was an abuse of discretion and was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for reinstatement of the administrative order revoking Respondent's driver's license, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion when it substituted its own view of the evidence for that of the OAH.

Eisele v. Town of Pine Bluffs

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 22

Opinion Date: February 19, 2020

Judge: Michael K. Davis

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court reversing the decision of the State Board of Equalization affirming the ruling of the County Board of Equalization against the Town of Pine Bluffs in its appeal from the Laramie County Assessor's denial of a request for exemption from taxation for a daycare facility operated by the Town, holding that the County Board's order was in accordance with law, was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, and was supported by substantial evidence in the record. In 201y, the Town filed requests for exemption from the assessment of its daycare facility. The County Assessor denied the requests, and the County Board and State Board affirmed. The district court ruled in favor of the Town and reversed the decision of the State Board. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the order of the County Board, holding that the County Board's decision did not constitute reversible error.