Latest 22 Cases This Week: Allen v. Cooper (U.S.), Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African-American Owned Media (U.S.), ...

Whence Cometh Evil? Making Sense of Human Suffering and COVID-19

CHARLES E. BINKLEY

Surgeon and bioethicist Charles E. Binkley, MD, offers a perspective on how we might make sense of suffering, particularly in light of the present COVID-19 pandemic. Binkley suggests that through suffering, we are paradoxically able to find good, and in this instance, that good might be the practice of social reciprocity.

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Allen v. Cooper

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 18-877

Opinion Date: March 23, 2020

Judge: Elena Kagan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Copyright, Government & Administrative Law, Intellectual Property

In 1996, Intersal, a marine salvage company, discovered the shipwreck of the Queen Anne’s Revenge off the North Carolina coast. North Carolina, the shipwreck’s legal owner, contracted with Intersal to conduct recovery. Intersal hired videographer Allen to document the efforts. Allen recorded the recovery for years. He registered copyrights in all of his works. When North Carolina published some of Allen’s videos and photos online, Allen sued for copyright infringement, arguing that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 (CRCA, 17 U.S.C. 511(a)) removed the states’ sovereign immunity in copyright infringement cases. The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit, ruling in favor of North Carolina. Congress lacked the authority to abrogate the states’ immunity from copyright infringement suits in the CRCA. A federal court may not hear a suit brought by any person against a nonconsenting state unless Congress has enacted “unequivocal statutory language” abrogating the states’ immunity from suit and some constitutional provision allows Congress to have thus encroached on the states’ sovereignty. Under existing precedent, neither the Intellectual Property Clause, Art. I, section 8, cl. 8, nor Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress to “enforce” the commands of the Due Process Clause, provides that authority.

Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African-American Owned Media

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 18-1171

Opinion Date: March 23, 2020

Judge: Neil M. Gorsuch

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

ESN, an African-American-owned television-network operator, sought to have cable television conglomerate Comcast carry its channels. Comcast refused, citing lack of demand, bandwidth constraints, and a preference for different programming. ESN alleged that Comcast violated 42 U.S.C. 1981, which guarantees “[a]ll persons . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, holding that ESN needed only to plead facts plausibly showing that race played “some role” in the decision-making process. The Supreme Court vacated. A section 1981 plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff’s race was a but-for cause of its injury; that burden remains constant over the life of the lawsuit. The statute’s text suggests but-for causation and does not suggest that the test should be different in the face of a motion to dismiss. When the “motivating factor” test was added to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress also amended section 1981 without mentioning “motivating factors.” The burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas provides no support for the reading ESN seeks. The court of appeals should determine how ESN’s amended complaint fares under the proper standard.

Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 18-776

Opinion Date: March 23, 2020

Judge: Stephen G. Breyer

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Immigration Law

Aliens who lived in the U.S. committed drug crimes and were ordered removed. Neither moved to reopen his removal proceedings within 90 days, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Each later unsuccessfully asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen their removal proceedings, arguing equitable tolling. Both had become eligible for discretionary relief based on judicial and Board decisions years after their removal. The Fifth Circuit denied their requests for review, holding that under the Limited Review Provision, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D), it could consider only only “constitutional claims or questions of law.” The Supreme Court vacated. The Provision’s phrase “questions of law” includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. The Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction to consider claims of due diligence for equitable tolling purposes. A strong presumption favors judicial review of administrative action and a contrary interpretation of “questions of law” would result in a barrier to meaningful judicial review. The Provision’s statutory context, history, and precedent contradict the government’s claim that “questions of law” excludes the application of the law to settled facts. Congress has consolidated virtually all review of removal orders in one proceeding in the courts of appeals; the statutory history suggests it sought an “adequate substitute” for habeas review. If “questions of law” in the Provision does not include the misapplication of a legal standard to undisputed facts, then review would not include an element that was traditionally reviewable in habeas proceedings.

Union of Concerned Scientists v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1383

Opinion Date: March 23, 2020

Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In this case arising from a directive issued by the EPA that prohibits EPA grant recipients from sitting on the EPA's twenty-two scientific advisory committees the First Circuit reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint for a lack of justiciability and failure to state a claim, holding that EPA's challenged directive was judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. In 2017, the EPA former director issued the directive. The complaint alleged that the new directive disqualified thousands of scientists affiliated with academic and not-for-profit institutions. Count I alleged that the directive violated the APA's reasoned decision-making standard. Count II alleged that the directive conflicted with directives issued by the General Services Administration and regulations of the Office of Governmental Ethics. Counts III and IV alleged violations of the Federal Advisory Committee Act's requirements for advisory committees. The district court dismissed all counts, concluding that they raised questions unreviewable under the APA and, alternatively, that the first and second counts failed to state a claim on the merits. The First Circuit reversed the district court's decision on Counts III and IV, holding that the challenged directive was judicially reviewable under the APA.

Bradley v. Ackal

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-31052

Opinion Date: March 23, 2020

Judge: James Earl Graves, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated the district court's order denying vacatur of sealing orders. The court held that the decision denying vacatur of the sealing orders is appealable under the collateral order doctrine, because the decision is conclusive; the decision addresses important and unsettled questions of law concerning the Louisiana Public Records Law and appellants' First Amendment and common law rights to access settlement agreement information contained in a sealed court recording and sealed minutes, particularly where a minor's privacy interests are involved; the subject of the decision is completely separable from the merits of the litigation; and the decision would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. On the merits, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellants' motion for vacatur by relying on erroneous conclusions of law and misapplying the law to the facts. In this case, the settlement agreement involves public officials or parties of a public nature and matters of legitimate public concern, and it does not appear that the district court weighed as a factor in favor of disclosure the presumption of the public's right of access.

National Immigrant Justice Center v. United States Department of Justice

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2088

Opinion Date: March 23, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law, Legal Ethics

The Center lodged a FOIA request with the Department of Justice (DOJ) for records of communications between the Attorney General, the Office of the Attorney General and any Office of Immigration Litigation or Office of the Solicitor General lawyers related to 11 certified cases decided in 2002-2009. DOJ produced about 1,000 pages but withheld 4,000 pages, citing FOIA Exemption 5, which allows the withholding of agency memoranda not subject to disclosure in the ordinary course of litigation, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5). Exemption 5 encompasses the attorney work product, attorney-client, and deliberative process privileges. DOJ submitted a Vaughn index describing each document withheld, identifying documents reflecting discussions between attorneys working within different offices of issues related to immigration cases under consideration or on certification for decision by the Attorney General. The Center unsuccessfully argued that the documents contained ex parte communications outside Exemption 5's scope because the DOJ attorneys’ eventual litigation role taints the advice they provide the Attorney General at the certification stage; removal proceedings end in federal court litigation where those same attorneys are opposite the immigrant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Office of Immigration Litigation and Solicitor General attorneys do not hold interests adverse to the noncitizen at the stage at which the Attorney General certifies a case for decision. “ To conclude otherwise would chill the deliberations that department and agency heads like the Attorney General undertake in confidence to execute the weighty responsibilities of their offices.”

Orr v. Shicker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Dockets: 19-1380, 19-1387, 19-1732

Opinion Date: March 23, 2020

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Class Action, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The plaintiffs, current and former inmates of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), have been diagnosed with hepatitis C. They filed suit against IDOC, Wexford (which provides inmate health services) and doctors more than 10 years ago after fruitless efforts to receive treatment for their disease while incarcerated. Their 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleges that the diagnostic and treatment protocols for IDOC inmates with hepatitis C violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of class certification and vacated a preliminary injunction. After discussing numerosity and commonality of facts and issues, the court noted that the district court failed to name a class representative or explain its omission, leaving no way to assess the adequacy of representation. On the assumption that the court would have accepted the proposed representatives, the record does not reveal whether they would be adequate. The lack of a named representative also makes it impossible to find typicality--that the “claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” The individual plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent the preliminary injunction, so it was error to grant injunctive relief.

Rexing Quality Eggs v. Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2146

Opinion Date: March 26, 2020

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Contracts

Rembrandt contracted to supply Rexing with 3,240,000 cage-free eggs every week for a year. Eight months later, Rexing claimed that Rembrandt failed to provide eggs that met the specified quality standards. Rexing sought a declaration that it was excused from accepting any more eggs, and incidental and consequential damages. Rembrandt counterclaimed, seeking damages. The trial court determined that Rexing had unilaterally terminated the contract and that the breach was not excused. Rembrandt was awarded $1,522,302.61 in damages. Rexing voluntarily dismissed its subsequent appeal and filed suit in state court, alleging conversion and deception. Rexing claimed that Rembrandt had refused to return reusable shipping materials, the “EggsCargoSystem,” Rexing had provided. In the first suit, Rexing had sought the value of the EggsCargoSystem as part of the start-up costs that it allegedly incurred in reliance on the agreement. Rembrandt removed the second suit to federal court and argued that the claims were barred by claim-preclusion in light of the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the first suit and that Rexing had improperly split its claims between the two cases. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the second suit. Rexing impermissibly split its claims. Both suits centered around the same controversy. Under Indiana’s doctrine prohibiting claim splitting, a plaintiff cannot bring a new lawsuit based upon the same transaction or occurrence that underlies claims brought in another lawsuit.

Lovely, et al. v Baker Hughes, Inc., et al.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-16967

Opinion Date: March 20, 2020

Judge: Peter J. Maassen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Construction Law, Contracts, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

A construction contractor’s employees were injured on the job and received workers’ compensation benefits from their employer. The workers later brought a negligence suit against three other corporations: the one that had entered into the construction contract with their employer, that corporation’s parent corporation, and an affiliated corporation that operated the facility under construction. The three corporations moved for summary judgment, arguing that all three were “project owners” potentially liable for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits and therefore were protected from liability under the exclusive liability provision of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act. The superior court granted the motion, rejecting the workers’ argument that status as a “project owner” was limited to a corporation that had a contractual relationship with their employer. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded a project owner, for purposes of the Act, "must be someone who actually contracts with a person to perform specific work and enjoys the beneficial use of that work." Furthermore, the Court found the workers raised issues of material fact about which of the three corporate defendants satisfied this definition. Judgment was therefore reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

McCormick v. Chippewa, Inc.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-16619

Opinion Date: March 20, 2020

Judge: Joel H. Bolger

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

In August 2007 Brent McCormick was injured while working aboard FV CHIPPEWA, owned by Chippewa,Inc. McCormick filed a lawsuit against Chippewa and Louis Olsen, the vessel's captain in August 2010. McCormick initiated settlement negotiations with the employer's insurance company for "policy limits." Under the insurance policy there was a per-occurrence coverage limit. During negotiations, counsel for McCormick and the insurance company discussed the terms of the settlement over a phone call; the parties provided inconsistent accounts of which issues were addressed on the call. McCormick's counsel’s affidavit asserted he raised the issue of the number of occurrences and the parties agreed to leave it unresolved. Shortly after this phone call, the parties reached a purported settlement agreement. McCormick filed suit to enforce the purported settlement agreement for policy limits based on three occurrences. The insurance company filed for summary judgment, asserting that the agreement was for policy limits of a single occurrence. The superior court granted summary judgment for the insurance company, concluding that its interpretation of the purported settlement agreement was correct. On appeal, McCormick argued the superior court abused its discretion on evidentiary and discovery issues and erred by granting the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion. But the Court did find an issue of fact barring summary judgment due to the contradictory accounts of the phone call. A reasonable person could have discerned a genuine factual dispute on a material issue because this phone call could have either: (1) provided extrinsic evidence of the meaning of the settlement agreement, or (2) indicated there was no meeting of the minds on an essential term, and thus no enforceable agreement was formed. Therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Native Village of Barrow v. Williams

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-16893

Opinion Date: March 20, 2020

Judge: Joel H. Bolger

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Family Law, Native American Law

At issue in consolidated appeals before the Alaska Supreme Court were the custody proceedings involving the same child before two courts of independent sovereignty: the State of Alaska and the Native Village of Barrow (NVB). A child custody case was initiated in the Utqiagvik superior court. Thereafter, NVB, through its tribal court, took custody of the child in a tribal child in need of aid (CINA) case. In 2016 the superior court ultimately denied the mother’s state court motion to modify custody. NVB sought to intervene in the state custody case, but the superior court denied its motion. The mother appealed the superior court’s denial of her motion to modify custody; NVB appealed the order denying its motion to intervene. The Alaska Supreme Court determined that under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a superior court receiving a tribal court order to determine whether the order was issued in an ICWA-defined child custody proceeding and, if it was, was mandated to follow ICWA section 1911(d)’s full faith and credit mandate. The superior court erred in ruling that the NVB tribal court lacked jurisdiction without following the procedures underlying the process for giving full faith and credit to a tribal court order.

Citizens for Responsible Caltrans Decision. v. Department of Transportation

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D074374(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 24, 2020

Judge: Patricia D. Benke

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2017, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) released a final environmental impact report (FEIR) for the construction of two freeway interchange ramps connecting Interstate 5 and State Route 56 (SR 56) (the Project). However, before the public comment period for the FEIR commenced and without issuing a notice of determination (NOD), Caltrans approved the Project a few days later and then filed a notice of exemption (NOE) two weeks later. The NOE stated that the Project was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to Streets and Highways Code section 103,1 which was enacted January 1, 2012. Citizens for a Responsible Caltrans Decision (CRCD) did not become aware of the NOE filing until after the 35-day statute of limitations period for challenging the NOE had run. CRCD filed a petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief alleging, inter alia, that Caltrans erroneously claimed the Project was exempt from CEQA under section 103 and that Caltrans is equitably estopped from relying on the 35-day statute of limitations for challenging notices of exemption. Caltrans demurred to the petition on the grounds that the causes of action were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that the Project was exempt from CEQA under section 103. CRCD opposed the demurrer. On appeal, CRCD contended the trial court erred by sustaining Caltrans's demurrer to the petition because: (1) section 103 did not exempt Caltrans from complying with CEQA in its approval of the Project; and (2) the petition alleged facts showing equitable estoppel applies to preclude Caltrans from raising the 35-day statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal agreed that the court erred by sustaining Caltrans's demurrer and therefore reversed the judgment of dismissal.

Fidelity National Home Warranty Company Cases

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D074161(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 20, 2020

Judge: Cynthia Aaron

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Class Action, Consumer Law

Plaintiffs Dan Kaplan, James Baker, Janice Fistolera, Fernando Palacios, and Hamid Aliabadi appealed two judgments dismissing two coordinated actions against defendant Fidelity National Home Warranty Company (Fidelity): Fistolera v. Fidelity National Home Warranty Company (Super. Ct. San Joaquin County, No. 39-2012-00286479-CU-BT-STK) (Fistolera Action) and Kaplan v. Fidelity National Home Warranty Company (Super. Ct. San Diego County, No. 37-2008-00087962-CU-BT-CTL) (Kaplan Action). The trial court dismissed the actions after determining the plaintiffs failed to timely prosecute each case. With respect to the Fistolera Action, a putative class action, the trial court concluded that the Fistolera Plaintiffs failed to bring the action to trial within the five-year mandatory period specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310. As to the Kaplan Action, a certified class action, the trial court concluded that the Kaplan Plaintiffs failed to bring the action to trial within three years of the issuance of the remittitur in a prior appeal in that action (Kaplan v. Fidelity National Home Warranty (December 17, 2013, D062531, D062747) [nonpub. opn.] (Kaplan I)), as required by section 583.320. On appeal, plaintiffs claimed the trial court erred in dismissing each action. On the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, the Court of Appeal concluded that, in calculating the five- year and three-year mandatory dismissal periods, the trial court erred in failing to exclude 135 days immediately following the assignment of a coordination motion judge to rule on a petition to coordinate the Fistolera Action and the Kaplan Action. Furthermore, the Court determined this error required reversal of the dismissal of the Fistolera Action because, after excluding these 135 days, the five-year period had not expired as of the time the trial court dismissed that action, and the matter was set for trial within the five-year period. However, the Court concluded that this error did not require reversal of the trial court's dismissal of the Kaplan Action. To the Kaplan Action, the Court determined that because, even after excluding 135 days related to the coordination proceedings, the three-year period that the Kaplan Plaintiffs had to bring that action to trial had expired as of the time the trial court dismissed that case. Further, the Court held none of the Kaplan Plaintiffs' arguments for additional tolling of the three-year period had merit.

In re D.S.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D076517(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 24, 2020

Judge: Guerrero

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law

M.J. (Mother) appeals the order entered following the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in the juvenile dependency case of her minor child, D.S. D.S. was living with his paternal aunt (Aunt), later determined to be his presumed mother. The Agency alleged D.S.'s father was deceased, Mother had previously caused the death of another minor, and Aunt was no longer able to care for D.S. As discussed in the detention report, Mother's parental rights were terminated after she was charged and convicted of killing D.S.'s brother. D.S. had been placed in the care of his father, who subsequently died suddenly in March 2018. Aunt assumed care for D.S., but reported to the Agency that she could not currently care for D.S. due to her own health issues. In a report prepared for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the Agency detailed its inquiry into whether the Indian Child Welfare Act applied to the proceedings. The Agency stated: (1) Mother denied having any Indian heritage; (2) D.S.'s great-grandmother stated that her great-grandmother (D.S.'s great-great-great-great-grandmother) was "affiliated with the Sioux and Blackfeet tribes;" (3) Aunt denied that she or [her grandmother] have ever lived on an Indian reservation, have a tribal enrollment number or identification card indicating membership/citizenship in an Indian tribe; and (4) Aunt denied she has any reason to believe D.S. was an Indian child. Mother contended the court erred by not complying with the inquiry provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that the juvenile court's finding that the Agency completed its further inquiry was supported by the evidence. Similarly, there is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's conclusion that "there is no reason to believe or know that [ICWA] applies."

Lopez v. Ledesma

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B284452(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 24, 2020

Judge: Elwood G.H. Lui

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

In the absence of any clear legislative statement on the issue, a physician assistant acts within the scope of his or her license for purposes of Civil Code section 3333.2, subdivision (c)(2) if he or she has a legally enforceable agency agreement with a supervising physician, regardless of the quality of actual supervision. After plaintiff prevailed in her negligence claims, the trial court awarded noneconomic damages, but reduced them under section 3333.2, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's reduction of the damages awarded, rejecting plaintiff's claim that the negligence of the physician assistants is included within the scope of the proviso excluding certain conduct from statutory damages because the physician assistants acted without the supervision of a physician in violation of the governing statutes and regulations.

Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D074755(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 20, 2020

Judge: Cynthia Aaron

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

The Project CBD defendants, ProjectCBD.com, website founder Martin Lee, and article author Aaron Cantu, appealed a trial court's order denying their special motion to strike the three causes of action asserted in the second amended complaint. The Project CBD defendants contended the trial court erred in denying their motion because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on their claims. This case arose from the publication of an article regarding the safety of a cannabidiol (CBD) product, Real Scientific Hemp Oil (RSHO), sold by plaintiffs Medical Marijuana, Inc. (MMI) and HempMeds PX, LLC (HempMeds) (jointly the plaintiffs). The plaintiffs contended the article contained false information about RSHO and that the named defendants who were involved in the publication of the article, should be held liable for libel, false light, and unfair competition due to their publication of the article. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in determining that the plaintiffs demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits of their claims. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's order and remanded the matter with directions to enter an order granting the Project CBD defendants' anti-SLAPP motion.

In RE: Asbestos Litigation

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 86, 2019

Opinion Date: March 24, 2020

Judge: Seitz

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

In this appeal, the issue presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review was whether the Superior Court abused its discretion when it accepted the Special Master’s report denying the plaintiffs a second extension to move the trial date. To warrant the extension, the plaintiffs had to show good cause. According to the court, the plaintiffs failed to show good cause because they were not diligent in meeting Texas law requirements for asbestos exposure claims, the time pressures faced by counsel were foreseeable, counsel should not have missed deadlines, and, under the circumstances, refusing to grant another trial date extension was not unfair. On appeal, the plaintiffs tried to switch to a new standard to evaluate the Superior Court’s decision. The Delaware Supreme Court, however, declined to do so. "The Superior Court applied the law correctly and based its findings on the record and reason. There was no abuse of discretion, and we affirm."

Brown v. Brown

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46926

Opinion Date: March 26, 2020

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates

This case stemmed from Carol McCoy Brown’s petition for an elective share of her decedent husband’s augmented estate. When Michael Orion Brown (the decedent) died intestate, she discovered that he had set aside multiple payable on death (POD) accounts for his children and grandchildren from a prior marriage. Carol filed a petition to recover a portion of the POD funds as part of the decedent’s augmented estate. The decedent’s children, Dorraine Pool and Michael J. Brown (the Heirs), challenged the petition. The magistrate court denied Carol's petition, concluding that she had not met her burden of demonstrating that the POD funds were quasi-community property as required by the elective share statutes. Carol appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court’s denial of the petition, and granted the Heirs attorney fees. Still aggrieved, Carol sought certiorari review by the Idaho Supreme Court. But finding no reversible error in either of the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Richardson v. Z&H Construction, LLC

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46587

Opinion Date: March 20, 2020

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Michael Richardson was injured while working, and attempted to recover personal injury damages outside of the worker’s compensation system. Hayden Homes subcontracted with Z&H Construction, LLC, Plumbing Unlimited, LLC, and Alignment Construction, LLC for various aspects of a new construction project. Richardson was employed by Alignment, and worked on Hayden’s construction project. He was injured when he fell through a crawl space cover at the construction site. He received a worker’s compensation award from the worker’s compensation insurer for his direct employer, Alignment. After Richardson received his worker’s compensation award, he sued Z&H, Hernandez Framing, LLC (a subcontractor of Z&H), and Plumbing Unlimited (collectively, “Respondent LLCs”), alleging negligence in the construction of the crawl space cover. The district court granted the Respondent LLCs’ motion for summary judgment, determining that the Respondent LLCs were Richardson’s statutory co-employees and immune from suit pursuant to Idaho Code section 72- 209(3). Finding no reversible error in that reasoning, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment.

North Star Mutual Insurance v. Ackerman, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 73

Opinion Date: March 25, 2020

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law

North Star Mutual Insurance appealed a declaratory judgment holding that a commercial general liability policy it issued to Jayme Ackerman, doing business as Ackerman Homes, provided coverage for Ackerman’s potential liability arising from an accident involving Kyle Lantz, and that North Star has a duty to defend Ackerman. North Star argued the district court erred in finding coverage because the policy excluded accidents arising out of the use of an automobile. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

State ex rel. Davies v. Schroeder

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1045

Opinion Date: March 24, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for writs of mandamus and procedendo against Ashtabula County Court Judge David A. Schroeder, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Appellant filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Schroeder to grant his motion to vacate a trial court's judgment denying his motion for the return of his fine and court costs and seeking a writ of procedendo compelling Judge Schroeder to provide the clerk of courts with proper certification of the total amount of money to be returned to Appellant. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law Appellant's request for extraordinary relief in mandamus and procedendo was barred.

Fireside Bank v. Askins

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 96853-5

Opinion Date: March 26, 2020

Judge: Yu

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Contracts

In August 2004, the Askinses purchased a used car by entering into a retail installment contract with East Sprague Motors & R.V.'s, Inc. for $13,713.44 at an interest rate of 18.95% per year. The contract was contemporaneously assigned to Fireside Bank (formerly known as Fireside Thrift Co.). The Askinses made two years of regular payments, then returned the car to Fireside in an attempt to satisfy the loan. However, the loan was never satisfied. Fireside sold the car for less than the remaining balance owed, leaving the Askinses with an ongoing obligation. Fireside then sued the Askinses for the remaining balance of the loan. The Askinses did not appear, and the court entered a default judgment against them, which included prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees. Fireside assigned the debt to Cavalry Investments, LLC, in 2012. For the next 8 years, the Askinses were subjected to 14 writs of garnishment and several unsuccessful attempts at garnishment by Fireside and Cavalry. Approximately $10,849.16 was collected over the course of the garnishment proceedings. Fireside and Cavalry did not file any satisfactions of the garnishment judgments or partial satisfactions of the underlying judgment. Cavalry’s final writ of garnishment, obtained on August 3, 2015, stated that the Askinses still owed $11,158.94. This case presented an opportunity for the Washington Supreme Court to discuss the limits of CR60, in cases where a creditor uses the garnishment process to enforce a default judgment against a debtor. The Court held CR 60 may not be used to prosecute an independent cause of action separate and apart from the underlying cause of action in which the original order or judgment was filed. The Court held the trial court properly considered argument and evidence relevant to the questions of what was still owed on the underlying existing judgment and whether that judgment had been satisfied. The trial court correctly ruled that the judgment had been satisfied and ordered that the Askinses were entitled to prospective relief.