Dead Letter Office: What’s Left of the Impeachment Power After Trump’s Acquittal

DEAN FALVY

Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, discusses what happens now, after Senate Republicans voted to acquit President Trump. Falvy predicts that (1) President Trump will be emboldened to commit further abuses of power, (2) future presidents will be less constrained by fear of impeachment, and (3) impeachment may become more routine as political practice and significantly less effective as a constitutional remedy.

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Friends of Animals v. Romero

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 18-2481

Opinion Date: February 3, 2020

Judge: Gerard E. Lynch

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

FOA filed suit against NPS, alleging that the agency violated the National Environmental Policy Act in approving the Whitetailed Deer Management Plan for the Fire Island National Seashore. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of FOA's motion for summary judgment and grant of NPS's cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that NPS's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. In this case, NPS was not required to obtain the information about deer movement because it was not essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives; NPS took a hard look at the environmental consequences of the Plan; NPS has presented a rational basis for its decision to employ a Seashore-wide target deer density; and NPS considered all reasonable alternatives.

Robbins v. Cleburne County Commission

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1180106

Opinion Date: January 31, 2020

Judge: Mitchell

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

Shannon Robbins, the former county engineer of Cleburne County, Alabama, sued the Cleburne County Commission ("the Commission") alleging breach of contract after the Commission denied the validity of a renewal option in his employment agreement. To decide his appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court had to determine whether the Commission was authorized by the legislature to enter into that employment agreement. Because the Supreme Court determined Robbins could not prevail regardless of which potentially applicable statute gave the Commission authority to contract for the employment of a county engineer, it affirmed the trial court's dismissal of his case.

Steve's Auto Center of Conway, Inc. v. Arkansas State Police

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 58

Opinion Date: February 6, 2020

Judge: Wynne

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the Arkansas State Police (ASP) based on sovereign immunity and dismissing Appellants' suit for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the ASP policy prohibiting individuals with felony convictions from placement on the ASP Towing Rotation List is illegal, holding that sovereign immunity barred Appellants' suit. On appeal, Appellants argued that sovereign immunity did not bar their suit because ASP, an agency of the state, was acting illegally. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Appellants failed to show that ASP was acting illegally, and therefore they could not overcome sovereign immunity.

Graham v. Friedlander

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20243

Opinion Date: February 4, 2020

Judge: D’Auria

Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying certain defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint, holding that Defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs, the parents of four school-age children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, brought this action seeking judgment from the City of Norwalk's Board of Education and three of its members. Plaintiffs alleged that the negligent hiring and supervision of Stacy Lore, who was hired to provide autism related services to children in the school district, proximately caused them to suffer permanent and ongoing injuries and losses. The Board filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and, in the alternative, claiming that the doctrine of sovereign immunity mandated dismissal of the claims. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding (1) the trial court improperly dismissed this action on the ground that Plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies; and (2) the Board and its members were not entitled to sovereign immunity because they were acting under the control of, and as an agent of, the municipality rather than the state.

Quel v. Board of Trustees, Employees’ Retirement System of Hawai'i

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-16-0000355

Opinion Date: February 6, 2020

Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the decision of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System of Hawai'i (ERS Board) denying Plaintiff's application for service-connected disability retirement benefits, holding that the ERS Board clearly erred in finding that Plaintiff's permanent capacity resulted from an "occupational hazard." Specifically, the ERS Board found that Plaintiff's permanent incapacity did not result from "a danger or risk which is inherent in, and concomitant to," her "particular occupation or particular job," which was "not a risk common to employment in general." The circuit court and ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' decisions and remanded the case to the ERS Board for further proceedings, holding that the ERS Board added a requirement to the definition of "occupational hazard" that does not exist in the law.

Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2019-27)

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47415

Opinion Date: February 4, 2020

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

In an expedited appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, a magistrate court terminated Jane Doe’s (“Mother”) parental rights after finding clear and convincing evidence that Mother neglected her children, K.M. and R.M., and that termination was in the best interests of the children. Mother did not appeal the magistrate’s finding that she neglected her children. She only appealed the magistrate court’s finding that termination was in the best interests of the children. The magistrate court found Mother’s testimony lacked credibility and relied on other witnesses to find that Mother had neglected her children under Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(b) because Mother had failed to reunify with her children and had failed to comply with her case plan. According to Mother, termination was not in the best interests of her children because Mother had a close bond with her children, K.M. was not responding well to foster care, there was no evidence of violence between Mother and her children, and Mother tried to the best of her ability to comply with her case plan. The Supreme Court found substantial evidence supported the magistrate court's finding that termination was in the children's best interests, and affirmed.

Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2019-32)

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47466

Opinion Date: January 31, 2020

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

Mother Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court’s s decree terminating her parental rights. Both Mother and her child (Child) tested positive for methamphetamine when he was born. Law enforcement declared that Child was in imminent danger, and the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW or Department) assumed temporary custody. A case plan for reunification was adopted, focusing on Mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues, and on obtaining safe and stable housing. Mother made no progress on her case plan, and was subsequently incarcerated. IDHW petitioned to terminate Mother’s paternal rights. After a termination hearing in September 2019, where Mother argued that her recent sobriety and improved lifestyle justified the denial of the Department’s petition, the magistrate court entered a decree terminating Mother’s parental rights based on Mother’s neglect and the best interests of the child. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion, and affirmed the magistrate court’s decree.

Texas Brine Co., LLC v. Naquin

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Dockets: 2019-OC-01503, NO. 2019-OC-1508

Opinion Date: January 31, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics

In consolidated actions, the common issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a writ of mandamus should issue to the clerk of an appellate court for the purpose of directing the clerk to comply with certain rules for the random assignment of panels and cases at that court. In a three-page per curiam, the First Circuit explained its allotment procedures were changed in 2019 after the 2018 amendment to La. R.S. 13:319. The First Circuit stated it adopted rules requiring a procedure for random allotment by the Clerk’s office of both appeals (Internal Rule 2.3(d)(l)(c)) and writ applications (Internal Rules 3.9(a)),4 with consideration for recusals and emergencies. In a supplemental per curiam, the First Circuit discussed composition of judicial panels, each regular panel comprising of one member randomly chosen through mechanical means from the four members of each of the Court's three election districts. The random composition of the initial three-judge panels was adopted pursuant to a five-year plan of rotation of members among the panels. To further ensure random composition of the panels, panel members of particular panels did not sit as an intact panel in the following year. The four randomly drawn regular panels also sat on writ duty throughout the Court's six appeal cycles. Petitioner Texas Brine’s petition alleged the First Circuit’s composition of judicial panels “dramatically limits the number of unique panels that can hear writs, appeals, and contested motions before the First Circuit from 220 unique combinations to 64 unique combinations - a reduction of approximately 70.9%.” It concluded this policy was an “affront to the requirement of randomness.” The Solomon plaintiffs’ mandamus petition was premised on the First Circuit’s practice, used between 2006-2018, of assigning subsequent appeals or applications for writs to a panel which included a judge who sat on the original panel and may have taken the lead or authored the first opinion/ruling in the case. The Supreme Court determined the First Circuit’s assignment system was reasonably designed “to select judges for panels in a random fashion which does not permit intentional manipulation by either the judges or the litigants.” The Court therefore denied Texas Brine’s mandamus petition, and dismissed the Solomon plaintiffs’ application as moot.

Citrix Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12741

Opinion Date: February 5, 2020

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Tax Board (the Board) upholding sales tax assessments for fees charged for subscriptions to use online software products, holding that the subscription fees were subject to sales tax. Appellant sold subscriptions for three online software products. The Commissioner of Revenue determined that Appellant's subscription fees constituted sales of software subject to sales tax and assessed sales tax against Appellant for the taxable periods April 2007 through June 2009 and October 2009 through December 2011. The Board upheld the sales tax assessments. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that receipts from sales of subscriptions for the online software products were subject to Massachusetts sales tax.

Bergman v. Caulk

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A18-1784

Opinion Date: February 5, 2020

Judge: Chutich

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that James Bergman was not disqualified from receiving a permit to carry a firearm, holding that the sealing of judicial records under a court's inherent authority does not satisfy the federal requirement of expungement. In 2007, a Minnesota district court issued an expungement order under its inherent authority sealing the judicial records of Bergman's prior conviction of domestic assault. Thereafter, Bergman applied for a permit to carry a firearm. Bergman was granted the permit. In 2017, the Isanti County Sheriff denied Bergman's permit-to-carry application because of his prior domestic assault conviction. The district court denied Bergman's petition for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the sealing of judicial records under a district court's inherent authority is not sufficient under federal law to expunge a previous conviction and thereby reinstate an applicant's right to carry a firearm in Minnesota.

G4, LLC v. Pearl River County Board of Supervisors

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2018-CA-01227-SCT

Opinion Date: February 6, 2020

Judge: James W. Kitchens

Areas of Law: Business Law, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law

G4, LLC, entered into a lease in 2009 with the City of Picayune, Mississippi, for land on the grounds of the Picayune Municipal Airport. After the Pearl River County Board of Supervisors assessed ad valorem taxes on the leased land, G4 paid the taxes under protest and petitioned the Board for a refund and for a refund of taxes it had paid on lots in the Tin Hill subdivision. The Board denied G4’s petition, and G4 appealed to the Circuit Court of Pearl River County, which affirmed. G4 appealed, asserting that, according to the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Rankin County Board of Supervisors v. Lakeland Income Properties, LLC, 241 So. 3d 1279 (Miss. 2018), it was automatically exempt from paying ad valorem taxes on the airport property. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded the circuit court’s decision that affirmed the Board’s refusal to refund the airport property taxes. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision that G4 was not entitled to a refund of taxes paid on the Tin Hill subdivision lots.

Mark v. City of Hattiesburg

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2016-CT-01638-SCT

Opinion Date: February 6, 2020

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

An investigation into the Hattiesburg municipal court system led to several local news stories. One online story posted a copy of the police department’s internal-affairs investigative report of the court system, which the media outlet obtained from a city councilman. Attached to this report was a copy of municipal court clerk Sharon Mark’s medical-leave form. The form indicated Mark had asked for leave to undergo breast-cancer surgery. Aggrieved by public disclosure of her medical condition, Mark sued the mayor and five city council members for invasion of privacy. To get around the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Mark asserted that the mayor and city council members were individually liable because they had acted with malice. But at trial, the evidence showed the disclosure of her medical- leave form was at most negligence. Because Mark failed to support her claim that the mayor and council members maliciously invaded her privacy, the Mississippi Supreme Court held the trial court did not err by granting these individual defendants a directed verdict.

Pearl River County Board of Supervisors v. Mississippi State Board of Education

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2018-CA-00937-SCT

Opinion Date: February 6, 2020

Judge: Josiah D. Coleman

Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

Poplarville School District and Pearl River County sought to undo the July 1, 2018 consolidation of the Lumberton Public School District and the Lamar County School District. In 2016, the Mississippi Legislature adopted Senate Bill 2500, which, after being signed into law, was codified as Mississippi Code Section 37-7-104.5, the purpose of which was to administratively dissolve, consolidate, and split the Lumberton Public School District at the Lamar and Pearl River County line. The statute created the Commission on the Administrative Consolidation of the Lumberton Public Schools to work in conjunction with the Mississippi State Board of Education to accomplish the consolidation goal. However, Poplarville School District contended that instead of following the directive of Section 37-7-104.5, the Commission dissolved the Lumberton School District and consolidated all of it, to include the students who reside in Pearl River County, into the Lamar County School District. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the Pearl River County Board of Supervisors was a “person aggrieved” for purposes of Section 37-7-115, publication was not necessary pursuant to Section 37-7-115, and Section 37-7-115 was an exclusive remedy. Furthermore, the Court held the chancery court did not err by finding that the appeal was untimely filed pursuant to Section 37-7-115, and affirmed the chancery court's decision.

Appeal of Elizabeth Doody

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0115

Opinion Date: January 31, 2020

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Claimant Elizabeth Doody worked for the Laconia School District as an elementary school speech assistant for over a decade. Her job required her to accompany students from their location to a special services room as well as to supervise a locked side entrance door at the beginning of the school day when students arrive and at the end of the school day when they depart. Of the school’s 300 students, approximately 125 students typically used the side entrance, which consisted of an outside concrete area, an exterior door that accessed a small atrium with a floor mat, and an interior door that accessed the corridor. In winter weather, the outside concrete area was treated with sand and ice melt product. On April 18, 2017, Claimant fell twice while walking down the corridor toward the side entrance, once at approximately 8:30 a.m. and again at approximately 3:00 p.m. Both falls occurred in the same location. The morning fall did not injure Claimant, but the afternoon fall fractured her right arm, which had to be repaired surgically. Claimant was taken out of work by one of her doctors the day after the injury and was released to part-time work with modifications. Because the District was unable to accommodate the restrictions, Claimant remained out of work until school resumed in the fall. Despite the surgery and a subsequent course of physical therapy, Claimant remained unable to lift her right hand over her head and continued to experience pain. Claimant appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision to deny her claim for indemnity benefits and payment of medical bills. The parties disputed whether Claimant’s injury arose out of her employment. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the CAB misapplied the applicable law with respect to on-the-job injuries, and because applying that test required further fact-finding, it vacated the CAB’s decision and remanded for further factual findings and for the correct application of the “increased-risk test” to those facts.

Town of Dunbarton v. Guiney

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2018-0591

Opinion Date: February 5, 2020

Judge: Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Appellant Michael Guiney challenged a superior court declaratory judgment ruling the road between Guiney’s house and barn became a public highway by prescription. Guiney also appealed the trial court’s decision on his cross-claim against appellees David Nault, Joshua Nault, and Leigh Nault (the Naults), which upheld boundary lines and a 50-foot wide right-of-way (50-foot ROW) that appeared in a 1988 boundary line agreement (BLA) under the doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and estoppel by recitals in instruments. The relevant properties and Kelsea Road were located in Dunbarton. Guiney acquired his property (Lot 5) by deed dated March 30, 1999. David Nault purchased three lots (Lots 7, 8, and 9) to the west and north of Lot 5 between 1990 and 1998, and had a home on Lot 7. When Guiney purchased Lot 5, the deed described the boundaries of the property using the language that appeared in the BLA, including the 50-foot ROW in favor of Lot 7. In 2015, Guiney recorded a plan which illustrated the boundary lines of his property as they were described in the BLA. Nault was also aware of the BLA prior to purchasing Lot 7 and understood it to be binding upon him and all future owners of the affected pieces of property. Although he observed very little traffic near his house, Guiney observed plow trucks for the Town of Dunbarton (Town) plowing the disputed area during the winter and using space next to his barn to turn around and go back down Kelsea Road. Although Town trucks never graded the disputed area between Guiney’s house and barn, they used the space next to the barn to turn their trucks around when grading Kelsea Road. The present action was set in motion in 2006, when Guiney filed a petition against Nault to quiet title to a “driveway” Nault had constructed over Lot 5, and outside of the disputed area, to access Lots 8 and 9. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the evidence presented to the trial court supported a finding of public use, but not adverse public use, therefore, insufficient to support a finding of a public highway by prescription. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s finding that Kelsea Road spurred west between Guiney’s house and barn; affirmed the trial court’s finding that the boundaries between Lot 5 and Lot 7 were established by acquiescence; and affirmed the trial court’s finding that Guiney was judicially estopped from denying the existence of the 50-foot ROW outlined in the BLA.

Estate of Mary Van Riper v. Director, Division of Taxation

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: a-51-18

Opinion Date: February 5, 2020

Judge: Solomon

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law, Trusts & Estates

Walter and Mary Van Riper transferred ownership of their marital home to a single irrevocable trust. Walter passed away shortly after transfer of the property to the trust. Six years later, after Mary passed away, the trustee distributed the property to the couple’s niece. In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether the New Jersey Division of Taxation (Division) properly taxed the full value of the home at the time of Mary’s death. Walter and Mary directed that, if sold, all proceeds from the sale of their residence would be held in trust for their benefit and would be utilized to provide housing and shelter during their lives. Walter died nineteen days after the creation of the Trust. Mary died six years later, still living in the marital residence. Mary’s inheritance tax return reported one-half of the date-of-death value of the marital residence as taxable. However, the Division conducted an audit and imposed a transfer inheritance tax assessment based upon the entire value of the residence at the time of Mary’s death. Mary’s estate paid the tax assessed but filed an administrative protest challenging the transfer inheritance tax assessment. The Division issued its final determination that the full fair market value of the marital residence held by the Trust should be included in Mary’s taxable estate for transfer inheritance tax purposes. The Appellate Division affirmed the Tax Court’s conclusion, rejecting the estate’s argument that transfer inheritance tax should only be assessed on Mary’s undivided one-half interest in the residence. The Supreme Court agreed with both the Tax Court and the Appellate Division that the Division properly taxed the entirety of the residence when both life interests were extinguished, and the remainder was transferred to Marita. The property’s transfer, in its entirety, took place “at or after” Mary’s death, and was appropriately taxed at its full value at that time. “In light of the estate-planning mechanism used here, any other holding would introduce an intolerable measure of speculation and uncertainty in an area of law in which clarity, simplicity, and ease of implementation are paramount.”

Columbus City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-353

Opinion Date: February 6, 2020

Judge: Donnelly

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the board of tax appeals (BTA) of the 2015 tax year value of an apartment complex located in Franklin County, holding that the BTA's decision was reasonable and lawful. At issue was whether the BTA erred in deciding that the sale price paid for the transfer of ownership of a corporate entity, Palmer House Borrower, LLC (Palmer) should be presumed to constitute the value of the real estate owned by that entity. Palmer further asserted that the BTA improperly admitted and relied upon the submitted evidence of the transfer and sale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA reasonably considered the sale and conveyance documentation; (2) the BTA reasonably determined that the transaction was, in substance, a sale of the real estate; (3) the appraisal offered by Palmer was not the only evidence of value; and (4) Palmer did not show that the BTA's decision violated Ohio Const. art. XII, 2.

Willacy v. Cleveland Board of Income Tax Review

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-314

Opinion Date: February 4, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the board of tax appeals (BTA), holding that Cleveland's taxation of Appellant's employment compensation in 2014 and 2015 was required under municipal law and did not violate Appellant's due process rights, despite the fact that Appellant did not work or live in the city of Cleveland during the tax years at issue. Appellant was employed by the Sherwin-Williams Company from 1980 until she retired in 2009 and moved to Florida. Sherwin-Williams compensated Appellant, in part, with stock options during her employment. Appellant exercised some of those options in 2014 and 2015, and Cleveland collected income tax on their value. Appellant sought refunds from the city based on the fact that she resided in Florida during the tax years at issue. Cleveland Board of Income Tax Review denied the refunds, and the BTA affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's arguments challenging the taxation failed.

In re: Initiative Petition 420, State Question No. 804

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 OK 9

Opinion Date: February 4, 2020

Judge: Douglas L. Combs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Respondents-Proponents Andrew Moore, Janet Ann Largent, and Lynda Johnson filed Initiative Petition No. 420, State Question No. 804 (IP 420), with the Secretary of State of Oklahoma. The initiative measure proposed to submit to the voters the creation of a new constitutional article, Article V-A, which would create the Citizens' Independent Redistricting Commission (Commission). IP 420 would vest the power to redistrict the State's House of Representatives and Senatorial districts, as well as Federal Congressional Districts, in this newly created Commission. IP 420 would also repeal current constitutional provisions concerning state legislative apportionment. Notice of the filing was published on October 31, 2019; within 10 business days, Petitioners Rogers Gaddis and Eldon Merklin petitioned the Oklahoma Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction to challenge the legal sufficiency of IP 420. They alleged the proposed amendment by article suffered from two fatal constitutional defects: (1) the single subject rule, and (2) the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In case number 118405, the Supreme Court determined IP was legally sufficient for submission to the people of Oklahoma. In case number 118406, however, the Court determined the gist statement of IP 420 did not fairly describe the proposed amendment, and ordered it struck from the ballot.

K&W Automotive, LLC v. Town of Barrington

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-250

Opinion Date: January 31, 2020

Judge: William P. Robinson, III

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting Plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief and ruling that the Town of Barrington lacked authority under its Home Rule Charter to enact an ordinance banning the sale of flavored tobacco products and prohibiting the providing of any tobacco products to persons under the age of twenty-one (the Tobacco Ordinance), holding that the Town lacked the authority to enact the Tobacco Ordinance. Specifically, the Court held that, while the Tobacco Ordinance was enacted to protect public health and safety, the ordinance constituted legislation concerning a matter of statewide concern, and therefore, it fringed upon the power of the state. Further, because the Town lacked the authority under its Home Rule Charter to enact the ordinance, the hearing justice did not err in declining to decide whether the ordinance was preempted by state law.