| State v. Bennett |
| Docket: 406PA18 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming superior court judgments denying Defendant's Batson motion, holding that Defendant presented a sufficient record to permit meaningful appellate review of Defendant's Batson challenge and that Defendant established the existence of a prima facie case of discrimination necessary to require the performance of a complete Batson analysis. The trial court allowed Defendant to make a Batson motion but subsequently denied the motion, finding that there was no prima facie showing justifying the Batson challenge. The court of appeals also rejected Defendant's Batson claim, stating that, "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that defendant's argument is properly before us, we find no error in the ruling of the trial court and affirm." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings in the superior court, holding (1) the record was sufficient to permit appellate review of the merits of Defendant's Batson claim; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to find the existence of a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. |
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| Chambers v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital |
| Docket: 147PA18 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Class Action |
| In this class action, the Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception to the doctrine of mootness when a named plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot before the plaintiff has had a fair opportunity to pursue class certification and has otherwise acted without undue delay regarding class certification. The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital Operating Corporation sued Christopher Chambers and his wife seeking collection of $14,358 plus interest allegedly owed for emergency room services. At the same time, Chambers filed a class action complaint against Moses Cone seeking a declaratory judgment that the contract he signed as an uninsured patient needing emergency medical treatment entitled Moses Cone to recover no more than the reasonable value of the services it provided. Prior to certification of the class in Chambers's declaratory judgment action, Moses Cone dismissed its claims against Chambers and his wife and ceased all other attempts to collect the debt. At issue on appeal was whether the class action was moot. The Supreme Court held that, under these circumstances, the named plaintiff's claim relates back to the filing of the complaint for mootness purposes, and even though his individual claim may have been satisfied, the named plaintiff retains the legal capacity to pursue class certification and class-wide relief. |
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| Chavez v. McFadden |
| Docket: 437PA18 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by failing to summarily deny the applications for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus submitted by Petitioners, Carlos Chavez and Luis Lopez, for its consideration in this case. A sheriff entered into an agreement with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement pursuant to section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1357, that certified deputies to perform specific immigration enforcement functions, including the detention of undocumented aliens. Petitioners, who were being held in pretrial detention pursuant to immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers, filed petitions seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court issued writs of habeas corpus. The court of appeals vacated the trial court orders, concluding that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus for alien petitions not in state custody and held under federal authority. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that state judicial officials acting in counties in which the sheriff has entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government do not have the authority to grant applications for the issuance of writs of habeas corpus for and to order the release of individuals held pursuant to immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers. |
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| State v. Burke |
| Docket: 181A93-4 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| For the reasons articulated in State v. Ramseur, N.C. Jun. 5, 2020, the Supreme Court vacated the orders of the trial court concluding that the claims in Defendant's second motion for appropriate relief (MAR) pursuant to the North Carolina Racial Justice Act (RJA) and amended RJA MAR were void due to the repeal of the RJA, holding that the evidentiary provisions contained in the original, unamended RJA applied to the adjudication of Defendant's RJA claims. In 1993, Defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. In 2010, Defendant filed his second RJA MAR arguing that he was entitled to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In 2012, the General Assembly amended the RJA. Thereafter, Defendant filed an amendment to his RJA MAR. In 2013, the General Assembly repealed the RJA. Defendant then filed a second amendment to his RJA MAR. The trial court denied as being without merit and as being procedurally barred all of Defendant's claims under the RJA. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's orders, holding (1) the RJA repeal and the 2012 amendments to the RJA cannot be constitutionally applied in Defendant's case; and (2) the trial court erred by denying Defendant's RJA claims without a hearing. |
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| State v. Capps |
| Docket: 206A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Paul M. Newby Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals that vacated Defendants' convictions for certain charges, holding that when the prosecutor moved to amend the arrest warrant to correctly state the name of the property owner and did so by filing a statement of charges form after arraignment, the superior court properly considered and allowed the change. At issue was whether the prosecutor lost the right to amend the criminal warrant in this case when the amendment was filed on a statement of charges form after Defendant's arraignment. The court of appeals held that because Defendant was tried under a statement of charges that was filed after arraignment and because the sufficiency of the original arrest warrant had not been contested, the statement of charges was untimely and the superior court had no jurisdiction to try the case under that charging document. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) regardless of the label, such a change is still an amendment and no statutory provision limits the filing of a statement of charges in this way; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not err in proceeding under the amended pleading. |
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| State v. Fields |
| Docket: 170A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that Defendant could not be separately convicted and punished for the offenses of both habitual misdemeanor assault and felony assault inflicting serious bodily injury stemming from the same act. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of habitual misdemeanor assault and felony assault. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment on the offense of habitual misdemeanor assault, holding that the trial court erred in entering judgment and sentencing Defendant for both habitual misdemeanor assault and felony assault given that both offenses arose from the same act. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that (1) Defendant could not be separately convicted and punished for both misdemeanor assault and felony assault based on the same conduct; but (2) Defendant's conviction for habitual misdemeanor assault should have been arrested rather than vacated. |
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| State v. Keller |
| Docket: 201A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Cheri Beasley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for solicitation by computer or electronic device of a person believed to be fifteen years of age or younger for the purpose of committing an unlawful sex act and appearing at the location where he was supposed to meet the person he believed was a child, holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. On appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on entrapment was not error because the evidence failed to support the instruction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant presented evidence which a reasonable juror could find credible to demonstrate that he did not have a willingness or predisposition to engage in sexual activity with a minor; (2) Defendant's arguments at trial were consistent with the defense of entrapment and should not bar the availability of the defense; and (3) the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on entrapment was prejudicial, and Defendant was entitled to a new trial. |
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| State v. Ramseur |
| Docket: 388A10 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Defendant's motion seeking relief pursuant to the newly enacted North Carolina Racial Justice Act (RJA) on the basis that the RJA had been repealed before the trial court ruled on Defendant's motion, holding that applying the repeal retroactively violates the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. In 2010, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently brought his RJA motion, claiming that race was a significant factor in the decision to seek or impose the death penalty. In 2012, the General Assembly amended the RJA. In 2013, the General Assembly repealed the RJA in its entirety. The trial court dismissed Defendant's RJA claims, concluding that this repeal rendered Defendant's pending motion void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the RJA repeal and the provisions of the amended RJA altering the evidentiary requirements for an RJA claim constitute impermissible ex post facto laws and cannot constitutionally be applied retroactively to Defendant's pending RJA claims. |
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| State v. Taylor |
| Docket: 32A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's determination that Defendant failed to demonstrate a fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied Defendant's motion. The court of appeals affirmed after considering and applying the factors identified by the Supreme Court in State v. Handy, 391 S.E.2d 159 (N.C. 1990). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea based upon the trial court's ruling that Defendant failed to show any fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea; and (2) this Court disavows the dicta contained in the court of appeals' decision regarding the subject of prejudice to the State after the court's stated conclusion that Defendant had not satisfied the Handy factors. |
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| In re A.J.T. |
| Docket: 230A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Respondents' rights to their minor child, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it would be in the child's best interests to terminate Respondents' parental rights. The Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition to terminate Respondents' parental rights on the grounds that Respondents neglected their child, willfully left the child in foster care or placement outside the home for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to his removal, and willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the child. The trial court entered an order finding all three grounds for termination and concluding that termination was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's conclusion that termination of Respondents' parental rights was in the child's best interests was neither arbitrary nor manifestly unsupported by reason. |
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| In re A.L.S. |
| Docket: 295A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Cheri Beasley Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court on adjudication and disposition that terminated Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's second motion to continue the termination hearing in order to obtain her son's testimony; and (2) did not err in adjudicating grounds for the termination of Mother's parental rights because the evidence and the court's findings of fact supported its conclusion that Mother willfully abandoned her child for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(7). |
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| In re C.R.B. |
| Docket: 292A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Paul M. Newby Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Respondents' parental rights, holding that the trial court's order was supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and based on proper legal grounds. Randolph County Department of Social Services filed motions to terminate Respondents' parental rights to their two children on the grounds of neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the children's removal from their home. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating Respondents' parental rights based on both grounds alleged in the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. |
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| In re C.V.D.C. |
| Docket: 314A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Paul M. Newby Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights in her two minor children, holding that the court's findings of fact were sufficient to comply with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1110(a) and to support the trial court's discretionary determination that the children's best interests would be served by the termination of Mother's parental rights. After a hearing, the trial court adjudicated grounds for terminating Mother's parental rights based on her neglect of the children and her willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal from her care. The court then concluded that it was in the best interests of both children that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in making its dispositional determination that terminating Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests. |
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| In re F.S.T.Y. |
| Docket: 129A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Cheri Beasley Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights, holding that the status exception to the requirement that a nonresident parent have minimum contacts with North Carolina in order to establish personal jurisdiction over him for purposes of termination of parental rights proceedings applies to termination of parental rights proceedings. After the children in this case were adjudicated as neglected the trial court acknowledged that Father was a resident of South Carolina. The trial court later terminated Father's parental rights. Father appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights because he lacked minimum contacts with the State of North Carolina. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that due process does not require a nonresident parent to have minimum contacts with the State to establish personal jurisdiction for purposes of termination of parental rights proceedings. |
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| In re I.N.C. |
| Docket: 281A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Parents' parental rights to their two minor children, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of Parents' parental rights would be in the children's best interests. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating Parents' parental rights on the grounds of neglect and failure to make reasonable progress. Further, the trial court concluded that termination of Parents' parental rights would be in the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court considered all of the relevant statutory criteria set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1110(a) and made a reasoned determination that termination of Parents' parental rights in the children would be in the children's best interests. |
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| In re J.M.J.-J |
| Docket: 300A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his minor child, holding that the trial court did not err in adjudicating neglect as a ground to terminate Father's parental rights to his minor child pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1). After a hearing, the trial court entered an order concluding that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights based on neglect and abandonment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1), (7). The trial court further concluded that termination of Father's parental rights was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's conclusion that a ground for termination existed pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(1) was sufficient in and of itself to support the termination of Father's parental rights. |
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| In re L.T. |
| Docket: 274A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Cheri Beasley Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his child, holding that Father did not meet his burden of showing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a petition alleging that the child was a neglected and dependent juvenile, that the mother lived in Ohio, and that the child lived with Father in Charlotte, North Carolina. Thereafter, Father's attorney informed the court that the child had not lived in North Carolina for six months before the petition was filed and that there appeared to be a valid custody order from Delaware that granted sole custody to Father. The trial court concluded that it had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and terminated Father's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)92). Father appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of the UCCJEA when it learned of the Delaware custody order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that North Carolina was the child's home state under the UCCJEA and the trial court had jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 50A-203 to modify the Delaware custody order and preside over the case. |
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| Routten v. Routten |
| Docket: 455A18 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Family Law |
| In this child custody dispute between two biological parents the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals to the extent that it vacated the trial court's order regarding custody, holding that a trial court may grant full custody to one parent and deny visitation to the other parent under certain circumstances. The trial court entered an amended permanent child custody order awarding sole physical custody of the parties' children to Father and denying visitation by Mother. The court of appeals vacated the order, concluding that the trial court erred in denying Mother's ability to have visitation with her children without a determination that she was unfit to have visitation with them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court may deny visitation to a non-custodial parent, so long as the court has entered a written finding of fact that such a custody award is in the best interests of the children, without the need to have determined that the parent who has been denied visitation is deemed unfit to spend time with the children. |
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| Winkler v. N.C. State Board of Plumbing, Heating & Fire Sprinkler Contractors |
| Docket: 319PA18 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Cheri Beasley Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law |
| The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's award of attorney fees to Defendant, holding that N.C. Gen. Stat. 6-19.1 does not preclude a trial court from awarding attorney's fees in disciplinary actions by a licensing board, but when there is substantial justification for the agency's claims, the award of attorney's fees is unjust. The North Carolina State Board of Plumbing, Heater, & Fire Sprinkler Contractors disciplined Dale Winkler for working on a pool heater without proper licensure. The trial court affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that the Board lacked jurisdiction to discipline Winkler for conducting the pool heater inspection and vacated the portion of the Board's order relating to Winkler's inspection of the pool heater. Winkler then filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs. The trial court awarded Winkler attorney's fees and costs. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees because section 6-19.1 excludes cases arising out of the defense of a disciplinary action by a licensing board. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that the trial court erred in awarding Winkler attorney's fees because there was substantial justification for the Board's claims. |
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| Draughon v. Evening Star Holiness Church of Dunn |
| Docket: 216A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Paul M. Newby Areas of Law: Personal Injury |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this negligence action, holding that because the alleged defect was open and obvious and thus should have been evident to Plaintiff and because Plaintiff did not take reasonable care, summary judgment was properly granted. Plaintiff visited Defendant's church property for a funeral and helped carry the casket. Plaintiff tripped near the top of the stairs and was injured. The top step was visibly higher than the other steps and made of noticeably different materials. The trial court found that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the condition of the top step was open and obvious, whether the top step caused Plaintiff's fall, and whether Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the top step was an open and obvious condition such that a reasonably prudent person would have recognized it and taken appropriate care to avoid injury while using it; and (2) Plaintiff did not take the care that an ordinary person would have taken while carrying the casket up the set of stairs and so was contributorily negligent. |
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