Latest 2 Cases: Washington v. Batson (Constitutional Law), In re Dependency of A.L.K., L.R.C.K.-S., D.B.C.K.-S. (Family Law)

The Twenty-Sixth Amendment and the Real Rigging of Georgia’s Election

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar explains why Georgia’s law allowing persons 75 years and older to get absentee ballots for all elections in an election cycle with a single request, while requiring younger voters to request absentee ballots separately for each election, is a clear violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Dean Amar acknowledges that timing may prevent this age discrimination from being redressed in 2020, but he calls upon legislatures and courts to understand the meaning of this amendment and prevent such invidious disparate treatment of voters in future years.

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COVID Comes to Federal Death Row—It Is Time to Stop the Madness

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—explains the enhanced risk of COVID-19 infection in the federal death row in Terre Haute, not only among inmates but among those necessary to carry out executions. Professor Sarat calls upon the Trump administration and other officials to focus on saving, rather than taking, lives inside and outside prison.

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Washington v. Batson

Docket: 97617-1

Opinion Date: December 24, 2020

Judge: Yu

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the state legislature could impose a duty to register as a sex offender in Washington where an individual would be required to register in the state of conviction. In 1984, respondent Benjamin Batson pleaded guilty in an Arizona court to two counts of sexual conduct with a minor. As a result of his conviction, Arizona law required Batson to register as a sex offender for life. At some point prior to April 6, 2009, Batson moved to Washington. At that time, the State required individuals to register as sex offenders only if their out-ofstate offense would have been classified as a sex offense in Washington. Since Batson’s Arizona conviction arose from sexual contact with a 16-year-old, his offense would not have been a crime in Washington. But in June 2010, the state legislature amended the sex registry statute to require registration for “[a]ny federal or out-of-state conviction for: [a]n offense for which the person would be required to register as a sex offender while residing in the state of conviction.” The Court of Appeals held that RCW 9A.44.128(10)(h) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed: "the legislature permissibly identified circumstances under which Washington sex offender registration requirements become operative as to individuals with out-of-state convictions."

In re Dependency of A.L.K., L.R.C.K.-S., D.B.C.K.-S.

Docket: 98487-5

Opinion Date: December 24, 2020

Judge: G. Helen Whitener

Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law

Two of L.K.’s three children were Indian children for the purposes of federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). L.K. claimed the State Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Department) removed her children without making "active efforts" to keep the family together as was required under the two laws. The Court of Appeals did not address this issue but, instead, sua sponte found that under the invited error doctrine, L.K. was precluded from raising this issue on appeal, holding that because L.K. repeatedly contended she did not need services, she could not now claim on appeal that the Department did not provide her sufficient services under ICWA and WICWA. It did not reach the issue of whether the Department provided active efforts. The Washington Supreme Court reversed appellate court's holding regarding "invited error." With respect to "active efforts," the Supreme Court found the Department did not engage in the statutorily required active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family. Accordingly, the dispositional order continuing L.R.C.K.-S. and D.B.C.K.-S.’s foster care placement was vacated. The matter was remanded for immediate return of these two children to their mother, unless the trial court finds returning the children put them in “substantial and immediate danger or threat of such danger.” The finding of dependency was unaffected.