Latest 2 Cases: United States v. Lopez-Soto (Criminal Law), Thompson v. Barr (Government & Administrative Law)

Joint Employer Liability: Notes from Australia

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, NICHOLAS SAADY

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and Nicholas Saady, LLM, conduct a comparative analysis of the doctrine of joint employer liability, looking at the rules adopted by the U.S. Department of Labor and National Labor Relations Board as compared to the approach Australia has taken in an analogous context, “accessorial liability” doctrine.

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United States v. Lopez-Soto

Dockets: 17-1663, 17-1680, 17-1668, 17-1679

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Dyk

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for three Hobbs Act robberies, conspiring to commit a Racketeer Influenced an Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation, and other offenses but vacated the district court's sentence and remanded for the limited purpose of reducing Defendant's sentence for the Hobbs Act and RICO counts, holding that the district court exceeded the statutory maximum for these offenses. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the district court erred in providing a medical care instruction to the jury, but the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt; (2) as to Defendant's remaining challenges to his convictions, the district court did not plainly err or abuse its discretion; but (3) Defendant's 360-month sentence for the Hobbs Act and RICO counts exceeded the statutory maximum of 240 months for these offenses, and therefore, the case is remanded for resentencing for these counts.

Thompson v. Barr

Docket: 18-1823

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Torruella

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The First Circuit vacated the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's motion to reopen sua sponte his immigration proceedings, holding that the BIA departed from his settled course of adjudication and that remand was required consistent with this opinion. Petitioner argued that the BIA clearly erred when it determined that he was not entitled to relief from deportation under section 237(a)(2)(A)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (the Pardon Waiver Clause). In making its determination, the BIA concluded that a pardon issued by the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles is "not effective for purposes of establishing entitlement to" a waiver of deportation. The First Circuit held (1) this Court has jurisdiction to review colorable legal and constitutional challenges to denials of motions to reopen sua sponte; and (2) the BIA departed from its settled course of adjudication by deeming a pardon from Connecticut insufficient under the Pardon Waiver Clause.