Rethinking Retroactivity in Light of the Supreme Court’s Jury Unanimity Requirement

MICHAEL C. DORF

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Monday in Ramos v. Louisiana, in which it held that the federal Constitution forbids states from convicting defendants except by a unanimous jury, Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the Court’s jurisprudence on retroactivity. Dorf highlights some costs and benefits of retroactivity and argues that the Court’s refusal to issue advisory opinions limits its ability to resolve retroactivity questions in a way that responds to all the relevant considerations.

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Suero-Algarin v. HIMA San Pablo Caguas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 17-1851

Opinion Date: April 20, 2020

Judge: Torruella

Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of HIMA San Pablo Caguas's motion for judgment as a matter of law as well as its remitted verdict after a jury found HIMA responsible for ten percent of Plaintiff's damages, holding that the jury had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find HIMA responsible for ten percent of Plaintiff's damages and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in remitting the verdict. Plaintiff's father died from complications relating to the removal of his dialysis catheter at a HIMA facility. Plaintiff sued HIMA and other defendants, alleging negligence. The jury found the co-defendants jointly liable for medical malpractice and awarded Plaintiff $1,000,000 in compensatory damages, finding HIMA responsible for ten percent of Plaintiff's damages. HIMA moved for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, for remittitur of the jury's damages award. The district court denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law but granted remittitur, reducing the damages award to $400,000. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying HIMA's motion for judgment of a matter of law and did not abue its discretion in applying the federal standard in its remittitur analysis and remitting the verdict.

Young v. Frist Cardiology, PLLC

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: M2019-00316-SC-R11-CV

Opinion Date: April 20, 2020

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Health Law, Medical Malpractice

The Supreme Court held a doctor who was permitted to practice medicine in Tennessee under a statutory licensure exemption but was not licensed to practice in Tennessee or a contiguous state during the year before the date of the alleged injury or wrongful conduct does not meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-115(b) to testify as an expert witness in a health care liability action. Plaintiff brought this action against Thomas Killian, M.D. and Frist Cardiology, PLLC (collectively, Defendants) alleging that Defendants' negligent conduct caused her husband's death. Plaintiff named Dr. Jason A. Rytlewski as the expert witness who would testify that Dr. Killian deviated from the applicable standard of care in his treatment of the decedent. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Dr. Rytlewski did not have a medical license in Tennessee or a contiguous state the year before the decedent's heart procedure, as required by section 29-26-115(b). In response, Plaintiff explained that Dr. Rytlewski had been granted an exemption allowing him to practice medicine without a medical license. The trial court allowed Dr. Rytlewski's testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Dr. Rytlewski was not qualified to testify as an expert as an expert witness in this health care liability case.