Latest 2 Cases: Santa Maria Reservoir Co. v. Warner (Civil Procedure), Colorado v. Lujan (Constitutional Law)

Even During a Pandemic, Fear-Mongering About the Debt Has Predictably Reared Its Ignorant Head

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan explains why we should not be concerned about increasing the federal government’s debt, despite what some journalists are suggesting. Buchanan points out that sometimes—such as during a pandemic or other crisis—the federal government should borrow more to prevent a downward economic spiral.

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Santa Maria Reservoir Co. v. Warner

Citation: 2020 CO 27

Opinion Date: April 20, 2020

Judge: Samour

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Santa Maria Reservoir Company (“SMRC” or the “Company”) was a mutual reservoir company responsible for storing and releasing water to its shareholders, who owned the right to use that water. SMRC’s water was stored in its two reservoirs: the Santa Maria Reservoir and the Continental Reservoir. SMRC was contacted about leasing water from SMRC’s shareholders to replace depletions to the Rio Grande. In May 2013, the Division Engineer submitted a written report in which he recommended “that th[e] requested change of water right be granted” with one condition: “that such change . . . not expand the consumption of the water right beyond that which has been the historical practice for agricultural purposes.” SMRC met with various opposers to explore what terms and conditions might assuage their concerns. Based on their input, it drafted a proposed decree in which it agreed to replicate accretions (including return flows) to the Rio Grande to prevent injury to other water rights diverting from the Rio Grande. By April 2016, all opposers except appellant Jim Warner had stipulated to the entry of SMRC’s proposed decree. Warner’s opposition was premised on his concern that SMRC’s application, if granted, would interfere with his downstream surface and groundwater rights. Warner, a rancher, owned two parcels of land on which he grew hay for his livestock using flood irrigation. His properties were located in the Closed Basin, generally east and north of land that received the water SMRC delivered through the Rio Grande Canal. Because he flood irrigated, Warner needed the groundwater beneath his lands to stay at a level close enough to the surface to reduce ditch losses and allow water to carry further across his crop land. After review of the water rights at issue and proposed uses, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Warner was not injured by the water court’s approval of the change-of-use application submitted by SMRC with respect to the water it diverted from the Rio Grande into the Closed Basin. "Because that water is imported water, SMRC is entitled to fully consume all of it. The water would not be in the Closed Basin, much less available for use by Warner and other water users in the Closed Basin, without its importation by SMRC. Thus, rather than cause an injury to Warner, the approval of SMRC’s application simply revealed to him that his past use of return flows from SMRC’s imported water in the Closed Basin was a benefit to which he had no enforceable right; Warner just didn’t know what he had 'til it was gone."

Colorado v. Lujan

Citation: 2020 CO 26

Opinion Date: April 20, 2020

Judge: Brian D. Boatright

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Abel Lujan was charged with first-degree murder for the death of his girlfriend after she was found beaten and strangled behind a friend’s house. At trial, two women testified for the State about Lujan’s prior violent behavior towards them. Prior to admitting this evidence, the trial court read a limiting instruction, telling the jury that it could only consider the evidence for the purposes of establishing Lujan’s motive, intent, or common plan. A copy of this instruction was not given to the jury for deliberations; however, the jury did receive an instruction at the close of the evidence explaining that certain evidence could only be considered for the limited purposes for which it was admitted. While deliberating, the jury submitted a question seeking clarification about the limiting instruction. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court cleared the courtroom of the public and parties, leaving only the judge, bailiff, and court reporter; the judge then brought in the jury and reread the limiting instruction that it had previously read twice in open court. The jury ultimately found Lujan guilty of second-degree murder. Lujan appealed, arguing that the court’s actions when rereading the jury instruction constituted a courtroom closure that violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. A division of the court of appeals agreed and reversed Lujan’s conviction. The State argued on certiorari review that the Colorado Supreme Court adopt a triviality standard, under which a defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial was not violated when the closure at issue was trivial. In so doing, the State argued that the brief courtroom closure here was trivial and therefore did not violate Lujan’s public trial right. The Court concurred with the State, adopted the standard and reversed the appellate court's decision.