Latest 2 Cases: Ramirez v. Tegels (Civil Rights), United States v. Sutton (Criminal Law)

Trump’s Upcoming Refusal to Leave Office: The Good News

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

In this two-part series of columns, UF Levin College of Law professor Neil H. Buchanan discusses some new reasons for guarded optimism that Americans are beginning to recognize—and thus might be able to mitigate—the danger Donald Trump represents to American democracy. In this first part, Buchanan grounds his guarded optimism in Joe Biden’s expressly voicing concern that Trump will not leave the White House if he loses the election.

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How the President and Attorney General Could Have Avoided the Geoffrey Berman Debacle

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on the recent dispute over the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York and explains what President Trump and Attorney General Barr could have done to avoid the problem altogether. Amar describes a process that, if followed, could have allowed the administration to appoint their first-choice candidate without causing the controversy in which it now finds itself.

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Ramirez v. Tegels

Docket: 19-3120

Opinion Date: June 23, 2020

Judge: Joel Martin Flaum

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

During Ramirez’s 2001 Wisconsin state court trial, the prevailing interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause was that a defendant had no confrontation right to cross-examine an unavailable declarant if the declarant’s statements were adequately reliable, which could be established where the statements fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Applying hearsay exceptions, the court admitted several out-of-court statements accusing Ramirez of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter. The jury convicted Ramirez of multiple counts relating to the sexual assaults. In 2004, while Ramirez’s conviction was pending on direct review, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to cross-examine a declarant if the declarant’s statements were “testimonial”—e.g., were statements that the declarant “would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.” Ramirez urged his lawyer, Hackbarth, to raise a confrontation claim under Crawford. Hackbarth instead raised other claims, each of which Wisconsin state courts rejected. Ramirez filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that Hackbarth’s representation was ineffective based on her omission of the confrontation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court in granting relief. An attorney exercising reasonable professional judgment would have recognized that the confrontation claim was clearly stronger than the claims Hackbarth raised. Raising a confrontation claim while Ramirez’s conviction was pending on direct review would have given him a reasonable chance of prevailing.

United States v. Sutton

Docket: 19-2009

Opinion Date: June 23, 2020

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2008, Sutton pled guilty to distributing cocaine base and carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime. The district court sentenced Sutton to the then statutory minimum 15 years’ imprisonment. In announcing the sentence, the court emphasized that it had no authority to reduce the sentence further or amend it later, except on the government’s motion, and that the court’s authority had been so limited since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The First Step Act of 2018 subsequently permitted a defendant sentenced for a covered offense (which includes Sutton’s crack cocaine charge) to move for the district court to impose a reduced sentence. The district court denied Sutton’s motion. On Sutton’s pro se appeal, the Seventh Circuit recruited counsel for supplemental briefing on the narrow question of the proper vehicle for a First Step Act motion--how the First Step Act interacts with the Sentencing Reform Act. The Seventh Circuit then affirmed the denial of relief. The First Step Act is its own procedural vehicle; the only limits on the district court’s authority under the First Step Act come from the interpretation of the First Step Act itself, which gives the court broad discretion. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion.