Local Control: Massachusetts Law Provides Stronger Protection Against Sexual Harassment than Federal Law

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on a recent decision by a federal district court applying Massachusetts law that demonstrates the power of tough state antidiscrimination laws. Grossman describes the facts of the case and the differences between Massachusetts and federal law and explains why robust state laws have the power to hold institutions liable when they delegate authority to those who abuse it.

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Physicians Healthsource Inc v. Cephalon Inc

Docket: 18-3609

Opinion Date: March 30, 2020

Judge: Greenaway

Areas of Law: Communications Law

Dr. Martinez, who worked for PHI, met with Cephalon representatives to discuss Cephalon drugs. Cephalon representatives asked Martinez if they could follow up with him and “send [him] things,” after which faxes were sometimes then sent. Martinez never told Cephalon or its representatives to stop sending faxes. One 2009 fax, addressed to Martinez, was an invitation to a dinner meeting program on a drug called AMRIX®; another was an invitation to a promotional product lunch on FENTORA®. Both are drugs that Martinez had discussed with Cephalon representatives previously. Neither fax included opt-out language. PHI provided its fax number to Cephalon via business cards. PHI filed a putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, seeking actual monetary losses or statutory damages, because Cephalon sent unsolicited faxes that failed to contain opt-out notices. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Cephalon. The faxes were solicited and the Act does not require solicited faxes to contain opt-out notices. The voluntary provision of a fax number constitutes express consent, invitation, and permission.

Riccio v. Sentry Credit Inc

Docket: 18-1463

Opinion Date: March 30, 2020

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Consumer Law

Riccio fell behind on payments to M-Shell. Sentry Credit bought the debt and sought to collect it, sending Riccio a letter containing a notification that described how to contact Sentry by phone, mail, or email. Riccio sued, alleging the letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(3) by providing a debtor with multiple options for contacting Sentry rather than explicitly requiring any dispute be in writing. Sentry agreed that it had to require Riccio to dispute the debt in writing but viewed its letter as complying with that requirement. The district court granted Sentry judgment on the pleadings. The Third Circuit affirmed, overruling its own precedent. Debt collection notices sent under section 1692g need not require that disputes be expressed in writing. Sentry’s notice perfectly tracked sect 1692g’s text.