The “When” of Chevron: The Missed Opportunity of County of Maui

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, DANIEL FOLSOM

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and rising 3L Daniel Folsom comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, in which the Court interpreted a provision of the Clean Water. Estreicher and Folsom argue that the case presented an opportunity to clarify the murky question of when the Chevron doctrine applies, yet the Court avoided answering that question.

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The Unnecessary Protection of Qualified Immunity

JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, SETH STOUGHTON

UCLA law professor Joanna C. Schwartz and South Carolina law professor Seth W. Stoughton address some of the arguments commonly asserted to support qualified immunity, the doctrine that shields police officers from civil liability for constitutional violations. Schwartz and Stoughton argue that eliminating qualified immunity should not affect police decision-making and that existing Supreme Court doctrine gives police officers plenty of leeway to make mistakes without violating the Constitution. Because qualified immunity applies only to unreasonable actions by police officers, eliminating or substantially restricting it should not a chilling effect on police officers’ ability or willingness to respond to critical incidents.

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Owen v. State

Docket: SC18-810

Opinion Date: June 25, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to vacate his sentence of death under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that there was no constitutional infirmity in Defendant's sentence. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of Karen Slattery after his jury recommended this sentence by a vote of ten to two. Defendant's conviction and sentence of death for Slattery's murder was reversed and remanded for a new trial, which delayed the finality date of his conviction and sentence for that murder and made Defendant eligible for Hurst relief. Defendant was again convicted of the Slattery murder and given the same sentence. In a successive postconviction motion, Defendant sought relief from his death sentence pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant's jury found that he committed first-degree murder and jury findings established the existence of two statutory aggravators, Defendant was eligible for the death penalty under the law in effect at the time of his crime.

Santiago-Gonzalez v. State

Docket: SC18-806

Opinion Date: June 25, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below. Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder. After a penalty phase, Defendant was adjudicated guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Defendant competent to proceed; (2) the trial court did not err in failing to order a new competency evaluation before the penalty phase began; (3) Defendant's death sentence was a proportionate penalty; (4) the trial court's finding that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated without pretense of moral or legal justification was supported by competent, substantial evidence; (5) there was sufficient evidence to justify the trial court's finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; (6) the trial court's questioning and Defendant's responses were sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea; and (7) Defendant's remaining arguments on appeal were without merit.