Latest 2 Cases: Moore v. Hiram Township (Civil Procedure), Bristol Regional Women's Center v. Slatery (Civil Rights)

The Upside-Down Treatment of Religious Exceptions Cases in the Supreme Court

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last week to reject an emergency application from the State of Alabama to lift a stay on the execution of Willie B. Smith III. Professor Dorf observes the Court’s unusual alignment of votes in the decision and argues that, particularly as reflected by the recent COVID-19 decisions, the liberal and conservative Justices have essentially swapped places from the seminal 1990 case Employment Division v. Smith, which established that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right to exceptions from neutral laws of general applicability.

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Moore v. Hiram Township

Docket: 20-3259

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Moore family, individually or in trust, has owned and maintained the 108-acre Hiram, Ohio property since 1813. They have operated a small airport on the Property since 1948. Around 1951, the Township enacted a zoning resolution that zoned the Property as Rural-Residential and classified the airport as a nonconforming use, permitted to continue so long as the use is not abandoned for two years. The airport remained active in varying degrees but its use for ultralight aircraft and hang gliders started recently, and prompted nuisance complaints from neighbors. In 2016, Township officials told Moore that he needed a certificate of nonconforming use to continue the airport’s operations. The Board of Zoning Appeals voted to grant Moore a certificate but imposed several conditions. The Portage County Common Pleas Court modified the conditions. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. While his state court appeal was pending, Moore filed a federal suit, alleging violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights and his equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the suit was barred by principles of claim preclusion. There was a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; this action involves the same parties; this action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the Ohio action; and this suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the Ohio action.

Bristol Regional Women's Center v. Slatery

Docket: 20-6267

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Tennessee Code 39-15- 202(a)–(h) requires the woman be informed, orally and in-person by the attending physician or by the referring physician that she is pregnant; of the probable gestational age of the fetus; whether the fetus may be viable; of the “services ... available to assist her during her pregnancy and after the birth of her child, if she chooses not to have the abortion”; and of “[t]he normal and reasonably foreseeable medical benefits, risks, or both of undergoing an abortion or continuing the pregnancy to term.” The law establishes a 48-hour waiting period that begins when the woman receives the mandated information, which is reduced to 24 hours in the event of a court order. The effect of the waiting period is that a woman seeking an abortion in Tennessee must make at least two visits to the clinic, except in the case of a medical emergency that prevents compliance. The district court declared the waiting period unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement but declined to rule on the equal protection claim. The Sixth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal. The district court’s factual findings compel the conclusion that Tennessee’s waiting period unduly burdens women’s abortion rights, under any of the cited precedents. Defendants—who bear the burden of persuading the court that a stay is warranted—did not challenge those factual findings.