He Said/She Said, Save Our Sons, and the Stories that Stick: Part Two of a Two-Part Series of Columns

SHERRY F. COLB

In this second in a series of columns on the U.S. Department of Education’s recent push toward a higher burden of proof in determinations of sexual harassment or assault under Title IX, Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb suggests that gendered narratives play a role in people’s willingness to regard an acquaintance rape case as “he said/she said.” Colb describes several examples in which people prefer a story that confirms a pre-existing bias over truth based on evidence.

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McDougald v. Kuhn

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4924

Opinion Date: October 20, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of procedendo against Judge Mark Kuhn of the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas, holding that the dismissal of Appellant's complaint was appropriate under the circumstances. Appellant, an inmate, filed a complaint for a writ of procedendo seeking an order compelling Judge Kuhn to journalize a final judgment of conviction. The Fourth District dismissed Appellant's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that the dismissal of Appellant's petition was appropriate because Appellant failed to show a clear legal right to relief in procedendo.

State v. Price

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4926

Opinion Date: October 20, 2020

Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for corrupting another with drugs and other offenses but remanding the matter to the trial court for resentencing because the trial court had erred in failing to merge the two convictions for corrupting another with drugs as allied offenses of similar import, holding that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the causation element of the offense of corrupting another with drugs. On appeal, Defendant argued that, when instructing a jury on the causation element of the offense of corrupting another with drugs, the trial court is required to inform the jury that it must find not only that the accused's conduct was the but-for cause of serious physical harm to the victim but also that it was an independently sufficient cause of that harm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant did not ask the trial court to give that instruction, the propriety of such an instruction was not before the Court in this case.