The Third-Party Doctrine vs. Katz v. Untied States

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb proposes revising the third-party doctrine in a way that reconciles two of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions that some critics view as conflicting. Colb suggests that, contrary to what most critics argue and what she herself has long assumed, the prior decision, Katz v. United States rather than the later one, United States v. White, is the anomaly.

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In re Office of Information Practices Opinion Letter No. F16-01

Docket: SCWC-16-0000568

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

In this appeal stemming from James Smith's "complaint to initiate special proceeding," the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the circuit court's final judgment dismissing Smith's complaint, holding that the circuit court should have construed Smith's complaint as an original action under Haw. Rev. Stat. 92-12(c) seeking declaratory relief. The circuit court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Office of Information Practices (OIP), concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Smith's appeal and that Smith's remedies lay in Haw. Rev. Stat. 92-12. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court held (1) although Smith, at times, referred to his complaint as a Haw. Rev. Stat. 92F-43 appeal, it contained numerous references to Haw. Rev. Stat. Ch. 92, the Sunshine Law at issue in the OIP opinion, and therefore, the circuit court should have construed the complaint as an original action seeking declaratory relief; (2) the ICA erred in ruling that Smith was not permitted to name OIP as a defendant; and (3) the "palpably erroneous" standard, rather than the "de novo" standard, applies to a review of OIP opinions pursuant to a seciton 92-12(c) lawsuit.

State v. Lora

Docket: SCWC-18-0000548

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the intermediate court of appeals' (ICA) judgment on appeal and the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court erred in admitting a portion of the complaining witness's testimony and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was indicted for one count of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of sexual assault in the third degree. The jury found Defendant guilty on both counts. The ICA affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that a portion of the complaining witness's (CW) testimony was not properly admitted for the purpose of bolstering the credibility of the CW's account of the incident. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the cited testimony was not relevant to the witness's credibility, and the erroneous admission of the testimony was highly prejudicial to the defense.