Rethinking Retroactivity in Light of the Supreme Court’s Jury Unanimity Requirement

MICHAEL C. DORF

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Monday in Ramos v. Louisiana, in which it held that the federal Constitution forbids states from convicting defendants except by a unanimous jury, Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the Court’s jurisprudence on retroactivity. Dorf highlights some costs and benefits of retroactivity and argues that the Court’s refusal to issue advisory opinions limits its ability to resolve retroactivity questions in a way that responds to all the relevant considerations.

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In re Marriage of Elder & Mahlum

Citation: 2020 MT 91

Opinion Date: April 21, 2020

Judge: Sandefur

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dissolving Sam Mahlum's marriage to Terri Elder and equitably apportioning the parties' marital estate, holding that the district court erroneously characterized and divided Sam's early disability retirement benefit as a divisible marital estate asset rather than the equivalent of post-dissolution employment income. Before the district court, the only significant matter in dispute was the status of Sam's disability retirement benefits from the Montana Sheriff's Retirement System (SRS) and whether the benefits were a divisible marital asset or the indivisible equivalent of future earnings. The district court concluded that Sam's SRS disability benefits were a divisible marital asset. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in characterizing Sam's post-dissolution SRS disability retirement benefits as a marital estate under Mont. Code Ann. 40-3-202(1).

In re Marriage of Ruis

Citation: 2020 MT 90

Opinion Date: April 21, 2020

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the post-judgment order of the district court requiring David Ruis to pay his ex-wife, Twila Ruis, a cash equalization payment plus interest in accordance with the court's earlier dissolution decree, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in awarding Twila the cash equalization payment originally determined in the decree, together with judgment interest. David appealed, arguing that the eventual sale of the parties' marital home rendered the cash equalization payment inequitable, which made the award of post-judgment interest on that payment amount an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not act arbitrarily or exceed the bounds of reason when it awarded Twila the cash equalization payment originally contemplated in the decree even though David did not refinance and retain the property; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding Twila judgment interest or err in its calculation of judgment interest.