The Unacknowledged Clash Between the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Religion Clauses and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, ALAN E. BROWNSTEIN

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and UC Davis law professor emeritus Alan Brownstein comment on a largely unacknowledged clash between religious accommodations and exemptions on the one hand, and core free speech principles which the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, on the other. Amar and Brownstein describe this apparent conflict and suggest that the Court begin to resolve the conflict when it decides two cases later this term presenting the question of the scope of the “ministerial exception.”

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Dow v. Billing

Citation: 2020 ME 10

Opinion Date: January 23, 2020

Judge: Donald G. Alexander

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of divorce in this case, holding that there was no merit in Husband's arguments concerning a premarital agreement and a 401(k) plan Husband created during the marriage and that any error in the district court's consideration of the value of Husband's non marital property in its property distribution was harmless. On appeal, Husband argued that the district court (1) erred by interpreting the parties' premarital agreement as not applicable to the 401(k) plan and by failing to consider his testimony that the 401(k) plan was funded in part with nonmarital property, and (2) abused its discretion by making contradictory findings regarding its consideration of his nonmarital real estate and the debt associated with that property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in concluding that the 401(k) plan was marital property; and (2) any error in the manner of the court's consideration of the value of Husband's nonmarital real property was harmless.

State v. P.S.

Citation: 2020 ME 9

Opinion Date: January 23, 2020

Judge: Andrew M. Mead

Areas of Law: Juvenile Law

The Court of Appeals vacated the disposition imposed by the district court in three juvenile matters, holding that the language in State v. J.R., 191 A.3d 1157 (Me. 2018), could be read to suggest that a court imposing an indeterminate commitment of a juvenile to a Department of Corrections facility must specify a commitment no shorter in duration than up to the juvenile's eighteenth birthday, and the trial court here may have proceeded under such a belief. In this consolidated appeal, P.S. argued that the district court abused its discretion in ordering that he be committed to Long Creek Youth Development Center for an indeterminate period up to age eighteen. The Court of Appeals noted that, once the district court decided to commit P.S. to Long Creek, it may have felt compelled to order him committed up to his eighteenth birthday. The Court then acknowledged that its language in J.R. may have contributed to such a belief and clarified that the language of J.R. does not constrain a juvenile court's discretion to impose a shorter period of indeterminate commitment than up to a juvenile's eighteenth birthday so long as that commitment is for at least one year. Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the matter.