| SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae |
| Docket: 139A18 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Contracts |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Osae and Scott Bader with respect to SciGrip's trade secrets claim, unfair and deceptive trade practices claim, and request for punitive damages and deciding the parties' motions with regard to SciGrip's breach of contract claims, holding that the trial court did not err. As to SciGrip's breach of contract claims, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of SciGrip with respect to its breach of contract claim against Osae for violating a consent judgment while he was employed by Bader and refused to grant summary judgment in favor of SciGrip or Osae with respect to sciGrip's claim for breach of contract against Osae for violating the consent judgment during his period of employment with another entity. Further, the court denied Osae's motion to preclude the admission of certain expert testimony proffered by SciGrip on mootness grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed after careful consideration of the parties' challenges to the court's order in light of the evidence in the record, holding that the trial court did not err. |
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| Beem USA Limited-Liability Limited Partnership v. Grax Consulting LLC |
| Docket: 360A18 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Davis Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law |
| In this business case, the Supreme Court reversed the orders of the business court denying Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment based on its finding that Plaintiffs had failed to satisfy their burden of proving that the court possessed personal jurisdiction over Defendant, a nonresident company, holding that Defendant's contacts with North Carolina were sufficient to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it in North Carolina state courts. In the complaint, Plaintiffs sought an injunction, in part, directing Defendant to turn over certain documents and information necessary for Plaintiffs to wind up the affairs of a limited-liability limited partnership. A default was entered against Defendant, but the business court denied Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with this state such that a North Carolina court could constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over it. |
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| Vizant Techs., LLC v. YRC Worldwide, Inc |
| Docket: 160A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Bledsoe Areas of Law: Business Law, Contracts |
| In this action arising out of an alleged breach of a professional services agreement (PSA) between Vizant Technologies, LLC and YRC Worldwide Inc. the Supreme Court concluded that YRC's motion for summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in part, holding that partial summary judgment should be granted in YRC's favor on the issue of certain damages involving automated clearing house (ACH) batch payments. Vizant sought declaratory and injunctive relief against YRC as well as damages for breach of the PSA, claiming that it was owed outstanding fees for savings that YRC allegedly realized through successful efforts to pay using ACH rather than credit cards. Vizant argued that the PSA required YRC to pay a fee to Vizant because YRC realized savings as a result of the strategies identified by Vizant. YRC, however, argued that it did not owe Vizant a fee because Vizant's suggestions did not actually cause YRC to change business practices and realize savings. The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part YRC's motion for summary judgment, holding (1) Vizant failed to produce evidence to support its claimed ACH damages; and (2) YRC's summary judgment motion is denied with regard to Vizant's breach of contract claim. |
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| Cardiorentis AG v. Iqvia Ltd. |
| Docket: 168A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Conrad Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Drugs & Biotech |
| In this action asserting claims for breach of contract and fraud the Supreme Court granted Defendants' motion to stay proceedings under N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-75.12 on forum non conveniens grounds and denied as moot all other requested relief, holding that the balance of all relevant factors showed it would be more convenient for the parties to litigate these claims in England. Plaintiff, a Swiss biopharmaceutical company, sued an English contract research organization and its North Carolina-based parent, asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and fraud. Defendants filed, among other pre-answer motions, a motion seeking to stay the proceedings under section 1-72.12. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' motion to stay and denied as moot all other requested relief, holding that, after considering the convenience of witnesses, ease of access to sources of proof, applicable law, and local interest factors, this case should be stayed on forum non conveniens grounds because Defendants showed that a substantial injustice would result if this case were to proceed in North Carolina and that England was a convenient, reasonable, and fair place of trial. |
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| State v. Reed |
| Docket: 365A16-2 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the superior court's judgment following Defendant's plea of guilty to trafficking in cocaine, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to an unlawful traffic stop. In his appeal, Defendant argued that his initial investigatory detention was not properly tailored to address a speeding violation and contended that the officer seized him without consent or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Therefore, Defendant argued, the officer unlawfully seized items from the vehicle during the ensuing search of the car and that those objects were the fruit of the poisonous tree. The court of appeals reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle after the traffic stop had been completed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was obtained as a result of the officer's unlawful detainment of Defendant without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity after the lawful duration of the traffic stop had concluded. |
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| State v. Simpkins |
| Docket: 188A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court failed to satisfy the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1242 before allowing Defendant to proceed pro se, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that Defendant did not forfeit his right to counsel and that the trial court was therefore required to ensure that his waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Defendant was charged with offenses related to his failure to maintain a valid driver's license. Defendant was first tried in the district court, where he was convicted. Defendant appealed to the superior court, where he was tried without counsel and convicted by a jury. On appeal, a majority of the court of appeals determined that Defendant did not engage in such serious misconduct as to warrant forfeiture of the right to counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court violated his right to counsel under the federal and state Constitutions. |
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| State v. Nobles |
| Docket: 34PA14-2 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Native American Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions and rejecting Defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that he was an Indian for purposes of the federal Indian Major Crimes Act (IMCA) such that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of North Carolina's courts. Defendant was charged in Jackson County with first-degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that he was an Indian, and therefore, he could only be tried in federal court pursuant to the IMCA. After a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, determining that Defendant was not an Indian within the meaning of the IMCA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss; and (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's request for a special jury verdict. |
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| State v. Alonzo |
| Docket: 288PA18 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's convictions but modified the court of appeals' decision because the trial court did not err by not instructing the jury on the definition of "sexual act" under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-27.1(4). A jury found Defendant guilty of taking indecent liberties with a child, guilty of felony child abuse by sexual act, and not guilty of first-degree statutory sexual offense. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error in defining "sexual act" and did not accurately define the phrase in the context of felony child abuse under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-318.4(a2). The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury according to the definition of "sexual act" contained in section 14-27.1(4) but that the trial court's error did not amount to plain error. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the court of appeals' decision, holding that the trial court did not err by not instructing the jury on the meaning of "sexual act" according to the definition found in section 14-27.1(4). |
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| State v. Carey |
| Docket: 293A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing in part the trial court's judgments and holding that the trial court had erred by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction charge for insufficiency of the evidence, holding that a "flash bang" grenade is a weapon of mass death and destruction as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-288.8(a). Defendant was convicted of, among other things, possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction, which stemmed from his possession of "flash bang" grenades. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the flash bang grenades found in Defendant's car were not devices or weapons or grenades capable of causing mass death and destruction when constructing section 14-288.8(c)(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State presented substantial evidence tending to show that Defendant possessed an "explosive or incendiary" grenade in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-288.8(a). |
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| State v. Hoyle |
| Docket: 239A18 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Paul M. Newby Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals vacating a judgment entered by the superior court convicting Defendant of indecent exposure and remanding for a new trial, holding that there was no error in Defendant's conviction. The court of appeals ordered a new trial in this case, concluding that the trial court should have instructed the jury that to find that Defendant's exposure was in the "presence" of someone under the age of sixteen as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-190.9 the State must show that the victim could have seen the exposure had she looked and that the failure to give the instruction was reversible error. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the requirement that the exposure be "in the presence of" the victim does not require a jury to find that the victim could have seen the exposed private parts had she looked; and (2) the evidence established that the proximity of the exposure to the victim was sufficiently close that a jury could find it was in the child's presence. |
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| State v. Mercer |
| Docket: 257PA18 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to instruct the jury on justification as a defense for the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, holding that the failure to give such an instruction was prejudicial, and Defendant was entitled to a new trial. The court of appeals vacated Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, concluding that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's requested jury instruction on justification as a defense to possession of a firearm by a felon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err by recognizing the availability of a common law justification defense for a possession of a firearm by a felon charge and by prescribing the factors set forth in United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000), as the framework within which to determine whether the trial court erred by failing to present the defense to the jury; and (2) there was sufficient evidence of each Deleveaux factor to require a justification instruction be given to the jury, and the failure to give that instruction was prejudicial. |
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| In re J.M. |
| Docket: 220A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her five minor children, holding that the trial court's findings supported its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights to the children pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(3). The trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights based on neglect, failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to the children's removal from her care, failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the children's care while they were in the custody of the Department of Social Services (DSS), and dependency. The court further concluded that terminating Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the trial court's conclusion that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights for failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the children's care while they were in DSS custody. |
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| In re D.W.P |
| Docket: 140A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Cheri Beasley Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that the trial court made and relied upon findings of fact that were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in analyzing Mother's reasonable progress to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of her children. On appeal, Mother argued that the trial court made and relied upon finding of fact that were unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in assessing her reasonable progress to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of her children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings supported its conclusion that Mother had not made reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to the children's removal and that the children were likely to suffer neglect in the future. |
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| In re S.E. |
| Docket: 197A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her four children, holding that the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights based upon her willful failure to pay a reasonable amount of the cost of care for the children during their placement in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(3). The court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights on the bases of neglect, willfully leaving the children in foster care for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal, and willfully failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the children during their placement in the custody of the Department of Social Services. The court also concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the findings fully supported the trial court's conclusion that one ground existed to terminate parental rights, and therefore, this Court need not address Mother's arguments challenging the remaining grounds. |
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| North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Graybar Electric Co. |
| Docket: 153A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Bledsoe Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law |
| In this tax dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the final decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) entering summary judgment in favor of Graybar Electric Company, Inc., holding that dividends deducted on a corporation's federal corporate income tax return under the dividends-received deduction (DRD) of section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code do constitute "income not taxable" for purposes of calculating the corporation's net economic loss (NEL) deduction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 105-130.8(a) for North Carolina corporate income tax purposes. The Department found that the dividends received constituted "income not taxable" and that, therefore, Graybar was required to reduce its NEL deductions by the amount of the dividends apportioned to North Carolina. On appeal, (OAH) entered summary judgment for Graybar, holding that the dividends were taxable as a matter of law and were not "income not taxable." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the dividends deducted pursuant too I.R.C. 243(a)(3) were "income not taxable" under section 105-130.8(a)(3); and (2) therefore, Graybar failed to bring itself within the statutory provisions authorizing the NEL deduction calculation it sought. |
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| Accardi v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. |
| Docket: 42A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Cheri Beasley Areas of Law: Insurance Law |
| In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the business court finding that the policy was unambiguous and dismissing Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract, holding that the term actual cash value (ACV) is not susceptible to more than one meaning and unambiguously includes the depreciation of labor. The policy at issue in this case failed explicitly to provide that labor depreciation will be deducted when calculating the ACV of the damaged property. Plaintiff's home was insured by Defendant when the home was damaged by a storm. Defendant calculated the ACV by reducing the estimated cost of repair by depreciation of property and labor. Plaintiff brought this action seeking to represent a class of all North Carolina residents to whom Defendant paid ACV payments where the cost of labor was depreciated. The business court dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the insurance policy unambiguously allowed for depreciation of the costs of labor and materials. |
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| Rouse v. Forsyth County Department of Social Services |
| Docket: 1PA19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals invalidating a decision by an administrative law judge (ALJ) to award back pay and attorneys' fees to a local government employee protected under the North Carolina Human Resources Act who prevailed in a wrongful termination proceeding before the Office of Administrative Hearings, holding that N.C. Gen. Stat. 126-34.02 explicitly provides that an ALJ has the authority to award back pay and attorneys' fees to any protected state and local government employee. Petitioner was dismissed from her employment with Forsyth County Department of Social Services on the grounds of grossly inefficient job performance and unacceptable personal conduct. An ALJ reversed the Department's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment on the grounds that the Department had violated Petitioner's procedural rights and lacked just cause to dismiss Petitioner from its employment. The ALJ then ordered the Department to reinstate Petitioner to her former position, with all applicable back pay and benefits, and to pay Petitioners' attorneys' fees. The court of appeals vacated the ALJ's decision in part, concluding that the ALJ lacked the authority to award back pay and attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALJ had sufficient express statutory authority to award back pay and attorneys' fees to Petitioner. |
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| In re Stone |
| Docket: 242A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics |
| The Supreme Court ordered that Respondent Michael A. Stone, a judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division 16A, be censured for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, and 2B of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. Laws 7A-376, holding that the Judicial Standards Commission's findings were adequately supported by clear and convincing evidence and supported the Commission's conclusions of law. The Commission filed a statement of charges against Respondent alleging that he had engaged in conduct inappropriate to his judicial office by, among other things, demonstrating a lack of respect for the office and by making a number of misleading and grossly negligent assertions regarding his representation of a former client. Based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Commission recommended that the Supreme Court censure Respondent. After weighing the severity of Respondent's misconduct against his candor and cooperation, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission's recommended censure was appropriate. |
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