Coen v. Aptean, Inc. et al. |
Docket: S18G1638 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Labor & Employment Law |
The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review centered on a claim of abusive litigation that Timothy Coen filed based on a previous contract lawsuit against his former employer that was resolved in his favor. In his abusive litigation case, Coen sought punitive damages. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling that punitive damages were not available for a statutory abusive litigation claim, relying on its prior decisions that in turn relied on dicta in footnote 3 of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Yost v. Torok, 344 SE2d 414 (1986), which was decided three years before the current abusive litigation statutes, OCGA sections 51-7-80 to 51-7-85, were enacted in 1989. The Supreme Court granted Coen’s petition for certiorari to decide whether that statute authorized the recovery of punitive damages. The Court concluded punitive damages generally may be recovered in an abusive litigation lawsuit (as long as the lawsuit is not solely to recover damages for injury to peace, happiness, or feelings), because the text of OCGA 51-7-83 (a) indicated that punitive damages were included, the statute did not change the common law generally allowing punitive damages in abusive litigation cases, and punitive damages in abusive litigation cases did not always constitute an impermissible double recovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. |
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Lee v. Smith, II |
Docket: S18G1549 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury |
In a personal injury case, the trial court excluded the testimony of an expert defense witness, reasoning that the expert had “not [been] properly identified within the parameters of the scheduling order.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted the defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari to answer whether: (1) a trial court could exclude an expert witness solely because the witness was identified after the deadline set in a scheduling, discovery, and/or case management order; and (2) If not, what factors should a trial court consider when exercising its discretion whether to exclude an expert witness who was identified after the deadline set in a scheduling, discovery, and/or case management order? The Court concluded the answer to (1) was “no,” and with respect to (2), the Court concluded that when a trial court exercises its discretion in a civil case to determine whether to exclude a late-identified witness, it should consider: (1) the explanation for the failure to disclose the witness; (2) the importance of the testimony; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party if the witness is allowed to testify; and (4) whether a less harsh remedy than the exclusion of the witness would be sufficient to ameliorate the prejudice and vindicate the trial court’s authority. Based on these answers, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded this case with direction that the Court of Appeals vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand to the trial court for reconsideration. |
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DeLoach v. Georgia |
Dockets: S19A1299, S19X1300 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Arheem DeLoach was convicted by jury on two counts of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the deaths of Rashad Biggins and Jamell Law. In Case No. S19A1299, DeLoach contended the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial with respect to the crimes committed against Law, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective in two ways: (1) counsel failed to move to sever the counts involving Law from those involving Biggins, and (2) counsel failed to object or to move for a mistrial when the trial judge mentioned the appellate process before giving the final jury charge. In Case No. S19X1300, the State cross-appealed, contending the trial court erred in granting DeLoach a new trial with respect to the crimes committed against Biggins. The State argued that the trial court’s basis for granting a new trial, that the prosecutor knowingly failed to correct material, false testimony from a key witness, was is unsupported by the record. The Georgia Supreme Court concurred with the reasons given below in Division 2, affirmed that portion of the trial court’s judgment. As set forth in Division 3, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the trial court’s judgment because the record did not support the trial court’s finding that the false testimony was material. |
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Georgia v. Bryant |
Docket: S19A1145 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
A grand jury indicted Archie Bryant and Jose Carrillo in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Shawn Rhinehart. The indictment charged Bryant with malice murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Bryant elected to proceed under reciprocal discovery. The State brought an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order to exclude certain evidence on the basis that the evidence was not produced until just over a month before trial, or had not been produced at all, in violation of the trial court’s pre-trial scheduling order. The trial court’s order could stand only if it properly found the State acted with bad faith and that defendant was prejudiced as a result. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court’s order was ambiguous both as to whether the court actually found bad faith on the part of the State at all and as to the basis for the trial court’s finding of prejudice to the defendant. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded for the trial court to clarify its ruling on the defendant’s motion to exclude the evidence. |
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Georgia v. Lane |
Docket: S19A1424 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Antiwan Lane was convicted by jury of malice murder and other charges for procuring the murder of Ivan Perez. The trial court granted Lane a new trial based on a host of grounds, including evidentiary errors and ineffective assistance of counsel. The State appealed, arguing that none of the claimed errors by counsel or the trial court resulted in sufficient prejudice or harm to require reversal. Given the large number of errors at issue, the Georgia Supreme Court first reconsidered and overruled its prior precedent that precluded full consideration of the cumulative effect of multiple errors at trial. The Court then concluded counsel was ineffective in at least two respects and the trial court made at least one key evidentiary error in overruling a defense objection. Lastly, given the combined prejudicial effect of multiple errors by counsel and the trial court, the Court affirmed the grant of a new trial. |
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Georgia v. Williams |
Docket: S19G0005 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
The Court of Appeals reversed Kenneth Williams’ conviction for aggravated sexual battery based on its conclusion that the trial court gave an erroneous charge to the jury concerning an underage victim’s capacity to consent. The State appealed, arguing the jury instruction did not constitute plain error to warrant reversal of the conviction. The Georgia Supreme Court concurred: the victim was young, the conduct was clearly sexual in nature, the adult was an authority figure in the child’s life, and the evidence was strong. The Court surmised it was unlikely that the trial court’s instruction affected the jury’s decision to return a verdict of guilty for the charge of aggravated sexual battery. “In other words, the jury instruction error did not constitute plain error here given the circumstances.” Accordingly, judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed as it pertained to Williams’ conviction for aggravated sexual battery. |
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Gittens v. Georgia |
Docket: S19A1044 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Joseph Gittens was convicted by jury of malice murder in connection with the death of fellow inmate Johnny Johnson. Gittens argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, that he was denied the right to communicate freely with counsel, and that newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. Finding no merit to these claims, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that each claim was without merit and affirmed. |
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Howell v. Georgia |
Docket: S19A1182 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Aaron Howell was convicted by jury of malice murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery in connection with the beating death of Paul Guerrant. Howell argued on appeal that the evidence presented at his trial was legally insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by admitting other-act evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b). After review, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Howell’s murder conviction, although it vacated his convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery to correct merger errors. |
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London v. Georgia |
Docket: S19A1637 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
LaParrish London was convicted by jury of the malice murder of Eric Terrell. On appeal, he argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial; (3) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay; and (4) his trial counsel was ineffective. Upon review, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed London’s conviction. |
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Mitchell v. Georgia |
Docket: S19A1330 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Tony Mitchell was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Randy Lewis. On appeal, Mitchell contended his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because she failed to competently execute her chosen strategy of discrediting the jailhouse informant who testified that Mitchell had confessed to having killed Lewis. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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Mitchell v. Georgia |
Docket: S19A1147 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Sandy Mitchell, Jr., was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Byron Brown. On appeal, Mitchell argued his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to certain trial testimony from a detective in this case on the grounds that it was improper expert opinion, and that other testimony offered by the same detective was admitted in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Mitchell also contended the trial court erred in permitting the detective to testify about the alleged Brady violation evidence and in admitting a particular autopsy photograph into evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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Naples v. Georgia |
Docket: S19A1571 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Michael Naples was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the death of 17-month-old Kaylee Johnson. Investigation revealed the child died from inoperable brain swelling from either having her head slammed against a hard object or having been thrown down a flight of stairs. Naples appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it admitted “other acts” evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”) and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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Richardson v. Georgia |
Docket: S20A0306 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Sylvester Richardson was convicted by jury of murder and other crimes relating to the fatal shooting of Christopher Wilson. He appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it denied a motion for a mistrial and when it admitted evidence that he was involved in a gang. Richardson also contended he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. |
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Taylor v. Georgia |
Docket: S19A1588 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Antonio Taylor was convicted by jury of murder and other crimes in connection with the stabbing death of Araminta Elly. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred when it admitted certain hearsay testimony and when it denied his motion for a mistrial based on the prosecution’s alleged use of his pre-arrest silence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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Thomas v. Georgia |
Docket: S19A1503 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Daniel Thomas was convicted by jury for malice murder in connection with the shooting death of Elliott Mizell. Thomas argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erred by admitting an involuntary custodial statement; and that trial counsel was ineffective in two ways. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, finding the evidence was sufficient to support Thomas’s convictions; the custodial statement was not involuntary; and Thomas failed to show that his trial counsel was deficient as to one ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and failed to show prejudice as to the other. |
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Walker v. Georgia |
Docket: S19A1520 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Otheron Walker was convicted by jury of malice murder in connection with the beating death of his ten-month-old daughter, Daijah White. On appeal, Walker contended the evidence was insufficient, that the jury was improperly charged, and that trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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White v. Georgia |
Docket: S19A1257 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Lazarus White was convicted by jury of malice murder and another crime in connection with the 2012 stabbing death of Terry Bell. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding Bell’s alleged act of violence against a third party and three instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys. |
Docket: S19A1203 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use |
City of Atlanta (“the City”) and the Atlanta Independent School System (“APS”) were involved in a dispute over the City’s annexing property in Fulton County, while it expressly prohibiting the co-expansion of APS’s territory. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the City’s application for interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss. The Court concluded this matter did not amount to an actual, justiciable controversy; consequently, it vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for this case to be dismissed by the trial court. “These parties have appeared before this Court numerous times, and the instant dispute is part of a larger, ongoing disagreement between the City and APS. … Mere disagreement about the 'abstract meaning or validity of a statute [or ordinance]’ does not constitute an actual controversy within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act. … APS has failed to establish the existence of an actual controversy, for purposes of declaratory relief, because it has failed to demonstrate that a ruling in its favor would have any immediate legal consequence.” |
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