“Might as Well Carry a Purse with That Mask, Joe”: COVID-19, Toxic Masculinity, and the Sad State of National Politics

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, LINDA C. MCCLAIN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and Boston University law professor Linda C. McClain comment on COVID-19, toxic masculinity, and the state of national politics today. Grossman and McClain contrast President Trump’s reckless bravado that endangers the lives of Americans with the empathy of Democratic presidential nominee former Vice President Joe Biden’s in asking people to be patriotic by doing their part by wearing masks to protect other Americans.

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Should Department of Justice Lawyers Defy William Barr?

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—comments on an open letter addressed to the 100,000 professionals working in the U.S. Department of Justice and published by Lawyers Defending Democracy. In the letter, more than 600 members of the bar from across the United States call on their DOJ colleagues to refrain from “participating in political misuse of the DOJ in the elction period ahead.” Sarat argues that the letter rightly recognizes that Attorney General Barr’s blatant partisanship endangers the integrity of the DOJ itself and its role in preserving the rule of law.

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Villeneuve v. Avon Products, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 20-1121

Opinion Date: October 7, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The First Circuit dismissed Appellant's appeal from the ruling of the district court granting in part and denying in part Avon Products, Inc.'s motion for the district court to tax costs, holding that the appeal was moot. In a previous appeal, the First Circuit affirmed judgment for Avon on three claims brought by Appellant. After the Court's mandate issued, Avon sought to recover some of its expenses by moving the district court to tax costs. After the district court granted the request in part, Appellant appealed. Thereafter, the parties settled the case for the purpose of avoiding litigation costs. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal and denied, without prejudice, the parties' request that the Court vacate the district court's costs order, holding that the appeal was moot, with the parties to be a their own appellate costs and fees, but that this decision was without prejudice to pursuit of vacatur relief in the district court.

Trump v. Vance

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-2766

Opinion Date: October 7, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

President Trump filed suit against the District Attorney of the County of New York, alleging that a grand jury subpoena issued on August 29, 2019 by the District Attorney to Mazars USA, LLP, the President's accounting firm, is overbroad and was issued in bad faith. The subpoena directed Mazars to produce financial documents—including tax returns—relating to the President, the Trump Organization, and affiliated entities, dating back to 2011. The district court granted the District Attorney's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint based on failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the claim of overbreadth is not plausibly alleged for two interrelated reasons. First, the court concluded that the President's bare assertion that the scope of the grand jury's investigation is limited only to certain payments made by Michael Cohen in 2016 amounts to nothing more than implausible speculation. Second, the court concluded that, without the benefit of this linchpin assumption, all other allegations of overbreadth—based on the types of documents sought, the types of entities covered, and the time period covered by the subpoena, as well as the subpoena's near identity to a prior Congressional subpoena—fall short of meeting the plausibility standard. Finally, the court concluded that the President's allegations of bad faith fail to raise a plausible inference that the subpoena was issued out of malice or intent to harass. The court considered the President's remaining contentions on appeal and found no basis for reversal. The court ordered an interim stay of enforcement of the subpoena under the terms agreed to by the parties.

Basic Capital Management, Inc., v. Dynex Capital, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-11272

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Carolyn Dineen King

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

After plaintiffs were unable to collect on a $55 million judgment against Dynex Commercial, Inc., plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Dynex Commercial, Inc. and Dynex Capital, Inc., alleging fraudulent-transfer and alter-ego claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' second amended complaint with prejudice based on the grounds that the fraudulent transfer claim is time-barred and the alter ego claim is barred by res judicata. In this case, plaintiffs knew of or reasonably could have discovered the transfers at least by February 2004, if not earlier, and plaintiffs reasonably could have discovered the allegedly fraudulent nature long before April 2016. Furthermore, plaintiffs' failure to raise an alter-ego claim against Dynex Capital during the state-court litigation does not mean that they can raise such a claim now. The court also stated that the district court appropriately used judicial notice of the Form 10-K and state court record.

Sayers Construction, LLC v. Timberline Construction, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-51099

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Andrew S. Oldham

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Construction Law

A federal district court in Texas does not have jurisdiction to vacate an arbitration award in Florida. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action based on lack of personal jurisdiction over the subcontractors. The court held that the subcontractors did not have the minimum contacts in Texas such that a Texas court could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over them. In this case, the place of contractual performance was Florida—not Texas, after plaintiff allegedly failed to pay its subcontractors' invoices, the parties met in Florida to discuss the dispute, then they arbitrated the dispute in Florida, and Florida's courts have determined that Florida is a proper venue for the subcontractors to seek enforcement of the arbitration awards. Therefore, the subcontractors did not purposefully avail themselves to being sued in Texas courts.

Valencia v. Allstate Texas Lloyd's

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-20193

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law

Plaintiff, a Texas resident, filed suit against Allstate Texas, a Texas entity, seeking damages for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Texas Insurance Code, the Texas Business and Commerce Code, and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Allstate Illinois, rather than Allstate Texas, answered the petition and removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) and 1441(b). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand to state court, and remanded with instructions for the district court to remand to state court. The court held that Allstate Illinois lacked the authority to remove the suit to federal court and the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case when it denied plaintiff's motion to remand because the only parties to the case at the time of removal was plaintiff and Allstate Texas, both Texas residents. In this case, Allstate Illinois was not a defendant as originally filed and did not become a defendant through proper means.

Vapor Technology Association v. United States Food and Drug Administration

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-5199

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) allows the FDA to regulate tobacco products. Tobacco products that were not on the market in February 2007 or that were modified after that date must obtain premarket authorization. The 2016 “Deeming Rule” subjected cigars, pipe tobacco, and electronic nicotine delivery systems to the TCA; about 25,000 existing products became subject to 21 U.S.C. 387j(a). The FDA planned to stagger compliance periods for deemed tobacco products. In 2018, public health organizations challenged FDA “guidance” issued under the TCA. The Maryland district court granted them summary judgment. Compliance deadlines had passed but the court concluded that it could impose a deadline because the case presented extraordinary circumstances. The court ordered the FDA to require that premarket applications be filed within 10 months (May 2020) but declined to require enforcement actions. The FDA issued new guidance in January 2020, stating that it intended to prioritize enforcement of the premarket-review requirements for e-cigarettes beginning in May 2020. Before the Fourth Circuit ruled, the district court amended its injunction, in light of the pandemic, to require that applications be submitted by September 2020. The FDA revised its guidance accordingly. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. An e-cigarette trade organization sought a declaration that FDA’s deadline was unlawful agency action under the APA in the Eastern District of Kentucky, arguing the FDA’s brief and an attached declaration motivated the Maryland court to impose that deadline, which significantly accelerated the original FDA deadline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The Maryland court’s injunction was independent of the FDA’s brief and declaration; the allegedly unauthorized court submissions do not form a plausible legal basis for an injunction against subsequent, independently-caused FDA enforcement proceedings.

Prairie Rivers Network v. Dynegy Midwest Generation, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 18-3644

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law

The Network filed suit under the Clean Water Act against Dynegy, the owner of an Illinois power station, claiming that Dynegy’s station was releasing contaminants into groundwater. The district court dismissed the suit concluding that the Act does not regulate groundwater. An appeal focused on whether and how the Act applies to the alleged groundwater contamination after the Supreme Court’s 2020 “County of Maui” decision. Three organizations sought permission to file amicus briefs in support of Dynegy’s position. The Network argued that each brief only parrots Dynegy’s arguments, wasting the court’s time. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state that a prospective amicus must explain why its brief is desirable and why the matters asserted are relevant. The Seventh Circuit Practitioner’s Handbook adds that the court looks at whether the submission will assist the judges by presenting ideas, arguments, theories, insights, facts, or data that are not found in the parties' briefs. The Seventh Circuit granted the motion, stating that amicus briefs should not serve only to count which interest groups are promoting which outcome. In this case: the Illinois Environmental Regulatory Group briefly presents the history of Illinois groundwater regulation from before the Clean Water Act, lending context to the cited cases; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce provides insight into how an alternative federal scheme would apply, absent Clean Water Act regulation; and the Washington Legal Foundation’s brief offers its own theory for how to best fit "Maui" into the existing federal scheme regulating the pollutants at issue.

National Urban League v. Ross

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-16868

Opinion Date: October 7, 2020

Judges: Susan Graber, William A. Fletcher, Marsha Siegel Berzon

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

After the Census Bureau instituted a revised schedule on April 13 (COVID-19 Plan) for the 2020 decennial census due to the global pandemic, the Secretary of Commerce announced a new schedule (the Replan) where the Bureau greatly compressed, as compared both to the original schedule and to the COVID-19 Plan, the time allocated to various stages for completing the census. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the Bureau from implementing its proposed Replan schedule for conducting the census. Addressing the government's emergency motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the government is unlikely to succeed on the merits of the appeal as to plaintiffs' Administrative Procedure Act claims. To the extent that the district court enjoined the Replan and the September 30, 2020, deadline for data collection, the panel concluded that the government has not met its burden in showing irreparable harm, and the irreparable harm to plaintiffs and the resulting balance of equities justify the denial of a stay. To the extent that the district court enjoined the government from attempting to meet the December 31, 2020, statutory deadline for completing tabulations by state, the panel concluded that the government has, at this juncture, met its burden in seeking a stay pending appeal. Accordingly, the court denied in part and granted in part the motion for a stay.

Dones v. Life Insurance Co. of North America

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A157662(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 7, 2020

Judge: Kline

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law

While employed by Alameda County and on a medical leave of absence, Johnson enrolled online in supplemental life insurance coverage under a LINA group insurance policy. She remained on leave on the policy’s effective date and died six months later, without returning to work. When her beneficiary claimed benefits, LINA denied coverage based on a policy provision stating the insurance would not become effective if the employee was not in “active service” on the effective date. Johnson’s beneficiary sued for breach of contract, arguing that LINA and the county waived or were estopped from asserting the active service precondition. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of Alameda County but reversed the dismissal of LINA. In determining the effect of preconditions to effective coverage, waiver and estoppel are questions of fact. There are factual questions as to what Johnson knew or should have known about the active service requirement and whether the conduct of LINA and the county supported a reasonable expectation that the supplemental insurance was in place and effective. It is not apparent that “active service” has a single unambiguous meaning such that Johnson necessarily must have known she was not in “active service” because she was on medical leave. If Johnson’s policy went into effect, LINA, not the county, is liable for improper denial of benefits.

Reales Investment, LLC v. Johnson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E072523(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Carol D. Codrington

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

Two months before trial, appellant Reales Investment, LLC’s attorney moved to withdraw from the case. Reales did not retain counsel until a few days before trial began, and it did not participate in any of the pretrial proceedings mandated by Riverside County Superior Court Local Rule 3401. On the morning of the first day of trial, Reales’ new attorney orally requested a continuance. The trial court denied the request, and also excluded all documents and witnesses Reales did not disclose in pretrial exchanges between the parties as required by Rule 3401. Because Reales did not disclose anything under Rule 3401, it was precluded from offering any evidence or testimony at trial, so the trial court granted a nonsuit for respondent Thomas Johnson. On appeal, Reales argued the trial court’s pretrial rulings were an abuse of discretion. After review, the Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment.

Skaff v. Rio Nido Roadhouse

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A152462(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Sanchez

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics, Real Estate & Property Law

Skaff sued the Roadhouse restaurant and grill, located in Sonoma County, alleging that the Roadhouse and parking lot were inaccessible to wheelchair users. Skaff cited Health and Safety Code section 19955 and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civ. Code section 51. Under section 19955, public accommodations must comply with California Building Code disability access standards if repairs and alterations were made to an existing facility, triggering accessibility mandates. No evidence was presented that the Roadhouse's owner had undertaken any triggering alterations. The owner nonetheless voluntarily remediated the identified barriers to access. The court entered judgment against Skaff on his Unruh Act claim but ruled in his favor on the section 19955 claim, reasoning that he was the prevailing party under a “catalyst theory” because his lawsuit was the catalyst that caused the renovations. Skaff was awarded $242,672 in attorney fees and costs. The court of appeal reversed the judgment and fee award. A plaintiff cannot prevail on a cause of action in which no violation of law was ever demonstrated or found. Nor is the catalyst theory available when a claim lacks legal merit. That a prelitigation demand may have spurred action that resulted in positive societal benefit is not reason alone to award attorney fees under the Civil Code.

Fulton County v. Ward-Poag

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S19G1619

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure

Summary judgment was awarded to Fulton County, Georgia on Sandra Ward-Poag’s civil whistleblower claims on the ground of judicial estoppel. Specifically, the superior court concluded judicial estoppel barred Ward-Poag’s claims because she took an inconsistent position regarding the nature of those claims when she failed to disclose her claims in her bankruptcy case, and then amended her bankruptcy petition to value her claims against the County as worth far less than alleged here. The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s decision, concluding that Ward-Poag’s amendment to her bankruptcy petition to list the claim in fact showed that she did not take an inconsistent position in the superior court. In making that determination, the Court of Appeals relied on its case law that created a bright-line rule that a party takes consistent positions, and thus lacks an intent to deceive the court system, when the party successfully amends a bankruptcy schedule to include a previously undisclosed asset. The Georgia Supreme Court disapproved the Court of Appeals’s analysis and its previous case law to the extent it created that bright-line rule, because "such rules have no place in the application of judicial estoppel." The Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the Court of Appeals’s ultimate conclusion that the superior court abused its discretion in applying the doctrine at this procedural stage because there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment to Fulton County.

Geer v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S19G1265

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

In 2017, Claude Wilson Geer IV filed a request with Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. under the Open Records Act seeking the release of minutes of its board meetings held between January 2008 and December 2017. The following day, Phoebe Putney denied the request, asserting that it was not subject to the Open Records Act and that its minutes and other documents and records were not “public records” within the meaning of the Act. Geer filed suit against Phoebe Putney in superior court seeking an injunction compelling the release of the records he had requested and other relief. Along with its answer, Phoebe Putney filed a counterclaim for attorney fees under OCGA 50-18-73(b). In response, Geer filed a motion to strike Phoebe Putney’s counterclaim for attorney fees under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, asserting that the counterclaim was nothing more than an effort to chill his rights to petition the government and to free speech. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Geer’s motion to strike, concluding that he had not made a prima facie showing that the anti-SLAPP statute applied to the counterclaim. The trial court did not consider the merits of Phoebe Putney’s claim for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals later affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to an Open Records Act defendant’s claim for attorney fees because the anti-SLAPP statute “does not preclude a party defending a lawsuit from preserving its right to seek attorney fees and expenses if the lawsuit later is determined to lack substantial justification.” After review, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment.

Smith v. Smith

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46832

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law

In 2005, Ballard Smith (Husband) and Charlie Smith (Wife) stipulated to a final divorce order that required the parties to sell real property located in Salt Lake City, Utah and allocate the net proceeds to both parties on an equal basis. In subsequent orders, Husband was tasked with marketing and selling the Salt Lake Property. Without Wife’s knowledge, Husband moved the Salt Lake Property in and out of various business entities and unilaterally sold a six-acre portion of the Salt Lake Property. After the majority of the Salt Lake Property remained unsold for nearly a decade, Wife petitioned the magistrate court to modify its prior order, requesting that the magistrate court: (1) direct that the Salt Lake Property be appraised and that Husband pay her one-half the appraised value; or (2) in the alternative, appoint a receiver to sell the Salt Lake Property and divide the net proceeds equally. Husband opposed the petition by arguing the magistrate court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property when it entered its original final divorce order. The magistrate court granted Wife’s petition to modify and appointed a receiver to handle all matters relating to the Salt Lake Property. Additionally, the magistrate court ordered Husband to pay Wife one-half of the net proceeds from the sale of the six-acre portion of the Salt Lake Property and awarded Wife attorney fees. Husband appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the magistrate court and awarded Wife attorney fees for her intermediate appeal. Husband then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Riddle v. Cress

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 20S-PL-573

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendants relief from a default judgment, holding that the trial court's assessments of the parties' credibility and demeanor were sufficient to establish at least "slight evidence" of excusable neglect. Plaintiff sued Defendants alleging that certain statements Defendants made constituted defamation and false reporting. Because Defendants did not enter appearances or respond to the complaint the trial court granted default judgment to Plaintiffs. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for relief from the default judgment, concluding that Defendants were sincerely confused about their obligation to respond. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court's fact-sensitive judgments showed that Defendants were entitled to relief.

Purcell v. Parker

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 OK 83

Opinion Date: October 6, 2020

Judge: Yvonne Kauger

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Petitioners and respondents owned real property in McClain County, Oklahoma, containing and abutting Colbert Lake (the Lake). Petitioners also owned real property containing Colbert Creek, which was the sole source of water that fed the Lake. Respondents sought a permit from the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), to sell water from the Lake to oil companies for use in fracking operations. The only notice that the OWRB provided to petitioners of the respondents' permit application was by publication in newspapers. The permits were issued, and petitioners subsequently filed suit at the district court, arguing that they were not given proper and sufficient notice of the permit proceedings. The district court dismissed the lawsuit in a certified interlocutory order, and petitioners appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper, constitutionally required notice to landowners in such proceedings. The Court held that the notice given was inadequate, therefore judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for for further proceedings.

Crouch Railway Consulting, LLC v. LS Energy Fabrication, LLC

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: M2017-02540-SC-R11-CV

Opinion Date: October 6, 2020

Judge: Bivins

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Contracts

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the chancery court dismissing this complaint against a Texas company for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction was constitutionally permissible. The Texas company contracted with a Tennessee civil engineering company for services related to the potential construction of a railcar repair facility in Texas. When the Texas company failed to pay in full, the Tennessee company filed a breach of contract action in Tennessee. The chancery court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the Texas company lacked the minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction and that requiring the Texas company to litigate in Tennessee would be unreasonable and unfair. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Tennessee company established a prima facie case for the valid exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Texas company; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction was fair and reasonable.