In (Trial) Courts (Especially) We Trust

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, JASON MAZZONE

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone describe the increasing importance of courts and lawyers in safeguarding and reinforcing the role of factual truths in our democracy. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone point out that lawyers and judges are steeped in factual investigation and factual determination, and they call upon legal educators (like themselves) to continue instilling in students the commitment to analytical reasoning based in factual evidence, and to absolutely reject the notion that factual truth is just in the mind of the beholder.

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The Rhetoric About a “Decline” in Religious Liberty Is Good News for Americans

MARCI A. HAMILTON

Marci A. Hamilton, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and one of the country’s leading church-state scholars, explains why the rhetoric about a “decline” in religious liberty actually signals a decline in religious triumphalism, and is a good thing. Professor Hamilton describes how religious actors wield the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) not as a shield, but as a sword to destroy the lives of fellow Americans.

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Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-20818

Opinion Date: November 24, 2020

Judge: Jerry Edwin Smith

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

Plaintiff filed suit against Wal-Mart after a store employee incorrectly identified plaintiff as a shoplifting suspect in a photo lineup. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of her defamation claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart on the defamation claim, holding that none of plaintiff's assertions raises a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Wal-Mart employee made her statement with actual malice. In this case, the employee could easily have been confident in her identification despite the absence of a facial piercing in the photo lineup; the record does not suggest a large discrepancy between the employee's description of the suspect and her identification of plaintiff, including the shade of her complexion; and the employee did not demonstrate malice by failing to review security footage. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's attacks on the employee's credibility.

Harris v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-11907

Opinion Date: November 20, 2020

Judge: Newsom

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Products Liability

In this "Engle progeny" case, where Florida-resident smokers sought recovery from tobacco companies for cigarette-related injuries, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for judgment in accordance with the verdict. Plaintiff brought an individual Phase III suit on behalf of her deceased husband, seeking the benefit of the Phase I jury's findings, arguing that her husband was a member of the original class based on two medical conditions. The court concluded that plaintiff's husband had no medical condition that both was caused by cigarette addiction and manifested on or before the class cut-off date. Therefore, plaintiff's husband was not an Engle class member, and nothing in the Florida Supreme Court's treatment of Angie Della Vecchia, one of the three representative plaintiffs, requires the court to conclude otherwise. Furthermore, because plaintiff's husband was not a class member, Florida courts would not give preclusive effect to the Engle Phase I findings in this case. Neither did the court under the Full Faith and Credit Act. Without the preclusive effect of the Phase I findings, plaintiff failed to prove essential elements of her claims. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the tobacco-company defendants acted tortiously, relying only on the Phase I findings.

Borden v. Malone

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190327

Opinion Date: November 25, 2020

Judge: Mendheim

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Health Law, Personal Injury

Dennis Borden, individually and as father and next friend of his son J.B. (minor), appealed the dismissal of his defamation, negligence, wantonness and wilfulness claims against Bobby Malone and Malone's counseling clinic, B.L. Malone and Associates, Inc. Borden and his then-wife, Kathy Smith, received marriage counseling from Malone at the clinic. Borden filed for divorce in 2010. The complaint here alleged that in the divorce proceedings Malone "served in the role of custody evaluator" and recommended to the court that Smith be given sole custody of J.B. Instead of following Malone's recommendation, the court awarded Borden and Smith joint custody. The divorce was finalized in 2012. In 2019, Smith petitioned for modification of custody, seeking sole custody of the child. Borden opposed the petition, alleging that "during the pendency of an adversarial custody dispute involving litigation," Malone began seeing J.B. for counseling at Smith's behest without Borden's consent. J.B. allegedly related to Malone in counseling sessions many deeply personal statements concerning the child's relationship with Borden. Borden's complaint alleged that Malone made numerous defamatory statements in a letter to Smith's custody attorney, that was eventually presented as evidence in the custody hearing (the letter was stricken from evidence because that court ruled the counselor-patient privilege applied). After review, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of defamation claims to the extent it precluded Borden from maintaining his claim that Malone and the clinic bore some culpability for the dissemination of the letter beyond those who had a direct or close relationship to the custody-modification proceeding. Furthermore, the trial court's dismissal of the count alleging negligence/wantonness/wilfulness was reversed to the extent that it precluded claims based on a breach of confidentiality on behalf of J.B., which were not foreclosed by the litigation privilege. The trial court's dismissal of the claims asserted in that count as to Borden was affirmed.

Garcia v. D/AQ Corp.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B305555(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 24, 2020

Judge: Elizabeth A. Grimes

Areas of Law: Landlord - Tenant, Personal Injury

Plaintiff, the lessee under a lease for commercial premises, filed suit against defendants, alleging causes of action for premises liability and negligence after he fell down a staircase after hitting his head on a beam in the doorway at the top of the staircase. Plaintiff alleged that his fall was caused by the inherently dangerous condition of the staircase due to numerous building code violations. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the exculpatory clause in the lease. In this case, plaintiff alleges ordinary, passive negligence -- the failure to discover a dangerous condition or to perform a duty imposed by law. The court held that the exculpatory clause shields the lessor from liability for ordinary negligence; its language is clear that the lesser shall not be liable for injury to the person of lessee; and these circumstances make this a case where, when the parties knowingly bargain for the protection at issue, the protection should be afforded.

Siercke v. Siercke

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47196

Opinion Date: November 20, 2020

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

This case arose from a domestic dispute between Analli Salla and Duane Siercke, and centered on whether any privilege from defamation claims applied to statements made to law enforcement. Salla appealed the district court’s entry of judgment and denial of her motion for a new trial. After misdemeanor domestic battery charges against him were dropped, Siercke filed a civil action against Salla alleging, among other things, defamation. Following a five-day trial, a jury awarded Siercke $25,000.00 on his defamation claim. Salla filed a motion for a new trial, contending the district court erred in instructing the jury on defamation per se because her statements to law enforcement were privileged and her statements did not allege that Siercke had committed a felony. The district court denied the motion and Salla appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the district court’s decision refusing to apply an absolute litigation privilege to the statements made by Salla to law enforcement officers; (2) could not address whether the district court erred in not giving a qualified privilege instruction because that issue was never raised below; and (3) the district court erred in delivering a defamation per se instruction; and (4) reversed the district court’s final judgment and order on Salla’s motion for a new trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Tyson Farms, Inc. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 5/20

Opinion Date: November 20, 2020

Judge: Shirley M. Watts

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

In this workers' compensation action, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Uninsured Employers' Fund's (UEF) motion for judgment, holding that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Tyson Farms, Inc. was Mauro Garcia's co-employer as a matter of law. Mauro Jimenez Garcia sustained an occupational disease of the lungs while working on a chicken farm. The chickens were raised for and owned by Tyson. The Uninsured Employers' Fund became involved in Garcia's workers' compensation claim, and Tyson was impleaded into the claim. The Commission issued an award of compensation, determination that Garcia was a covered employee that sustained an occupational disease arising of and in the course of his employment and that Tyson was Garcia's co-employer. On judicial review, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Tyson, finding that Tyson was not Garcia's co-employer. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Tyson was not a co-employer of Garcia.

Buckles v. BH Flowtest, Inc.

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 291

Opinion Date: November 24, 2020

Judge: Shea

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that Montana law applied to the wrongful death action brought by Nicole Buckles on behalf of the estate her deceased son, Zachary Scott Buckles, whose death occurred in the State of North Dakota, holding that the district court did not err. Zachary died of exposure to high levels of hydrocarbon vapors while working on Continental Resources, Inc.'s well site located near Alexander, North Dakota. Buckles, acting as personal representative of Zachary's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Continental and other entities in a Montana district court. Two defendants filed a motion for declaration of applicable law requesting that the district court apply North Dakota substantive law to Buckles' claims. The district court denied the motion, determining that Montana law applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that although the injury occurred outside of Montana, Montana had the most significant relationship to this litigation.

State ex rel. Manor Care, Inc. v. Bureau of Workers' Compensation

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-5373

Opinion Date: November 25, 2020

Judge: Judith L. French

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the request brought by Manor Care, Inc., a self-insured employer, for a writ of mandamus ordering the Bureau of Workers' Compensation to reimburse it for lump-sum permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation payments, holding that Manor Care did not establish a clear legal right to relief. Manor Care made lump-sum payments under protest to two injured workers in order to correct its long-term underpayment of their permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation. Manor Care then requested reimbursement from the Disabled Workers' Relief Fund, contending that Manor Care's underpayment of PTD compensation should be offset by the Bureau's corresponding overpayment of relief-fund benefits to the same employees, for which Manor Care had reimbursed the Bureau as part of its annual assessments. The Bureau denied the request. Manor Care then filed this action alleging that the Bureau abused its discretion by requiring Manor Care to, in effect, double-pay the purported PTD underpayment to the employees and refusing to reimburse Manor Care for the PTD underpayment amount. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Manor Care identified no authority granting a clear legal right to the relief it sought.

Shawreb v. SSM Health Care of Oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 OK 92

Opinion Date: November 24, 2020

Judge: James E. Edmondson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Health Law, Personal Injury

Plaintiffs filed a negligence action based upon the alleged acts of defendants when one of the plaintiffs was staying in a hospital after surgery and received a burn from spilled hot water. The district granted defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' witness list and defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals. After its review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the trial court erred in granting summary judgment striking the list of trial witnesses when plaintiffs were not provided time to respond to the motion to strike as granted by District Court Rule 4. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

AEP Texas Central Co. v. Arredondo

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 19-0045

Opinion Date: November 20, 2020

Judge: Debra Lehrmann

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this personal injury case, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing in part the trial court's summary judgments in favor of an electric utility and its independent contractor, holding that fact issues precluded summary judgment in favor of the contractor. Plaintiff sued the utility and its contractor (collectively, Defendants) for negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment as to the negligence claim against the independent contractor and as to all claims against the utility and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the contractor breached a duty of care; but (2) because the utility owed no duty with respect to the independent contractor's work, the court of appeals erred in reversing summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims against the utility.

Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Lee

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-0309

Opinion Date: November 20, 2020

Judge: Bland

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment notwithstanding the verdict but reversed its remand in the interest of justice, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that the evidence did not show that Employer believed that its actions were substantially certain to injure Plaintiff and that remand was not appropriate. Plaintiff was injured in a workplace accident. Plaintiff received workers' compensation medical and disability benefits for his injuries. Plaintiff then sued Employer for negligence and gross negligence, arguing that the common-law exception to the rule that the Texas Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for employees who sustain nonfatal work-related injuries requiring that the defendant have a specific intent to injure the plaintiff applied. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, and the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Employer. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment notwithstanding the verdict and reversed its remand in the interest of justice, holding that the evidence confirmed that the accident fell short of a "genuine intentional injury."

Spanton v. Bellah

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 19-0920

Opinion Date: November 20, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

In this negligence action, the Supreme Court vacated the default judgment entered by the trial court in favor of Plaintiff after Defendants failed timely to file an answer or otherwise appear, holding that the substitute service in this case did not strictly comply with the order permitting such service. More than thirty days after the trial court's default judgment entry, Defendants filed a restricted appeal asserting that Plaintiff had failed properly to serve them with process. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a discrepancy between the address at which the trial court authorized substitute service and the address where the process server actually sent substitute service did not invalidate service or the default judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the default judgment, holding that substitute service did not strictly comply with the trial court's order.

Sheehy v. Williams

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 190802

Opinion Date: November 25, 2020

Judge: Kelsey

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court remanded the judgment of the trial court in this civil case against Appellant based upon a finding that she had violated Va. Code 8.01-40.4 by unlawfully disseminating images of Appellee, holding that further factual findings were required on the issue of whether the voluntary-payment doctrine mooted Sheehy's appeals of the now fully satisfied judgment. Appellant filed two appeals after the trial court entered judgment. While the appeals were pending, the judgment was paid in full. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the voluntary-payment doctrine mooted Appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court temporarily remanded the case to the trial court for factual findings on the voluntary-payment issue, holding that it was necessary for the circuit court to make findings of fact for deciding the motion to dismiss the pending appeals.

Bell v. Nicholson Construction Co.

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Dockets: 18-1124, 18-1139, 18-1140

Opinion Date: November 19, 2020

Judge: Armstead

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction in part three consolidated appeals from the circuit court's orders relating to the same underlying civil action involving a workplace incident, holding that two of the orders appealed were not final orders. The orders at issue ruled on motions to dismiss filed by several of the parties in the underlying action. The circuit court dismissed claims for deliberate intent and loss of consortium asserted by the plaintiffs and denied several motions to dismiss. These appeals followed. The Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court's order dismissing the deliberate intent and loss of consortium claims was correct because the claims were time barred; and (2) the orders being appealed in the remaining two cases were not final and appealable.

Roof Service of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Trent

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 19-0200

Opinion Date: November 20, 2020

Judge: Margaret L. Workman

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial following a jury trial in a personal injury action brought by Respondents, holding that the circuit court did not err. This action arose from an incident where Respondent was severely injured when he was struck and run over by a truck owned and operated by an employee of Petitioner. The jury returned a verdict finding that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment and apportioning one hundred percent of the fault for the incident to the employee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Petitioner's motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial, or for remittitur.

West Virginia Regional Jail & Correctional Facility Authority v. Estate of Cody Lawrence Grove

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Dockets: 18-1076, 18-1083

Opinion Date: November 20, 2020

Judge: Jenkins

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the orders of the circuit court denying Petitioners' respective motions to dismiss the amended complaint filed by the Estate of Cody Lawrence Grove for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, holding that the circuit court erred in several respects. This appeal arose from the suicide of Groves during his incarceration at the Eastern Regional Jail, which was operated by the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility (WVRJCA). The Estate filed a complaint agains the WVRJCA and Joshua David Zombro (collectively, Petitioners), asserting seven causes of action. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by (1) incorrectly failing to apply the heightened pleading standard applicable to cases implicating qualified immunity; (2) failing to appropriately consider whether qualified immunity applied to shield Petitioners from suit; (3) failing to determine whether the WVRJCA is a state agency; and (4) failing to address punitive damages.

Wageman v. Harrell

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 143

Opinion Date: November 25, 2020

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court entered on the jury's verdict finding Defendant not negligent, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict. Following a car collision, Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence. During trial, Plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Defendant's negligence. The district court reserved its ruling on the motion and gave the case to the jury. The jury found Defendant not negligent, and the court entered judgment on the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court acted appropriately in sending the issue of Defendant's negligence to the jury; and (2) the jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that Defendant failed to meet his burden to establish that Defendant breached his duty of ordinary care under the circumstances.