The Oprah Interview as a Truth Commission

LESLEY WEXLER

Illinois Law professor Lesley Wexler explains how Oprah’s interview with Prince Harry and Meghan Markle might illuminate how a formal truth commission to deal with legacies of racism and colonialism might function in the British empire. Professor Wexler describes the purpose and function of state-operated truth commissions and notes the similarities and differences between those and the interview.

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Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-31162

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Priscilla R. Owen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury

The Fifth Circuit granted panel rehearing; denied rehearing en banc; withdrew its prior opinion; and substituted the following opinion. Frank Williams, Jr. filed suit in Louisiana state court against his former employer, Lockheed Martin, seeking to recover damages for asbestos-related injuries. After Williams passed away, his children were substituted as plaintiffs. Lockheed Martin removed the case under federal officer removal jurisdiction and the district court granted summary judgment for Lockheed Martin, issuing sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel for improper ex parte communications. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court properly considered the full state-court record as it existed at the time of removal and Lockheed Martin has met the requirements for federal officer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(2)(1). In this case, Lockheed Martin alleged the requisite nexus and has stated sufficient facts to make out a colorable Boyle defense. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to any of the challenged discovery orders. The court applied Louisiana law and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Lockheed Martin on plaintiffs' survival and wrongful death claims. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err by imposing sanctions on plaintiffs' attorney and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $10,000 in attorney's fees.

P.W. v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1142

Opinion Date: March 5, 2021

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Health Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Woodson received prenatal treatment from Dr. Ramsey at NorthShore Health Centers. Ramsey informed Woodson that she would likely need to deliver her baby by C-section. Ramsey delivered P.W. vaginally at Anonymous Hospital. Woodson noticed immediately that something was wrong with P.W.’s left arm. P.W.’s arm did not improve. NorthShore is a Federally-qualified health center (FQHC) that receives federal money (42 U.S.C. 1396d(l)(2)(B)); its employees are deemed Public Health Service employees, covered against malpractice claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 42 U.S.C. 233(g). NorthShore appears in the federal government's online public database of federal funding recipients whose employees may be deemed Public Health Service employees. Woodson’s attorney, Sandoval, failed to recognize NorthShore’s status as an FQHC. Sandoval reviewed the Indiana Department of Insurance (IDOI) and Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund online databases and learned that Ramsey and Anonymous Hospital were “qualified” providers under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. The IDOI forwarded Woodson’s complaint to Ramsey and his insurance carrier. Those claims remain pending. On December 16, 2015, NorthShore informed Sandoval that NorthShore was a federally funded health center. Woodson filed administrative tort claims, which were denied. Nearly three years after P.W.’s birth, Woodson filed suit against the government and Anonymous Hospital. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the claims accrued on December 7, 2013, the day P.W. was born, and were untimely under the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. Woodson had enough information shortly after P.W.'s birth to prompt her to inquire whether the manner of delivery caused P.W.’s injury. The FTCA savings provision does not apply because the IDOI never dismissed the claims. Neither Ramsey nor NorthShore had a duty to inform Woodson of their federal status.

Scott v. Key Energy Services, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-3196

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Products Liability

After plaintiff sustained injuries in an on-the-job accident, he filed suit against his former employer, Key Energy, and the company that manufactured the equipment that caused his injuries, Hydra-Walk, alleging products liability and negligence claims. Plaintiff suffered injuries when the Hydra-Walk system he was operating became unstable and overturned, crushing him. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, concluding that Hydra-Walk is not a third-party tortfeasor for purposes of determining whether plaintiff may pursue a remedy. The court explained that plaintiff's arguments to the contrary ignored that a merger occurred between Key Energy and Hydra-Walk, with Key Energy emerging as the only surviving entity and Hydra-Walk, ceasing to exist. Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court has never allowed an employee to successfully recover against an employer where the employee was injured by equipment manufactured by another company prior to the company's merger with the employer and the injury occurred post-merger. Without further indication that the North Dakota Supreme Court would be receptive to the application of the exception, the court was unwilling to apply it, for the first time, to plaintiff's claims. Finally, the court concluded that the North Dakota Supreme Court would not apply the dual capacity doctrine to the exclusive remedy rule to plaintiff's claims.

Vette v. Sanders

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 20-1118

Opinion Date: March 5, 2021

Judge: Carolyn Baldwin McHugh

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Personal Injury

Defendant-appellant Keith Sanders, a sergeant with the Montrose County Sheriff’s Office, appealed the denial of his summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. Plaintiff-appellee Eric Vette filed a verified complaint alleging, among other things, that Sergeant Sanders subjected him to excessive force during the course of his arrest by committing the following acts after Vette had already been apprehended: punching Vette, hitting him in the face with a dog chain, and letting a police dog attack him. Sergeant Sanders moved to dismiss the complaint, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court converted Sergeant Sanders’s motion to one for summary judgment and denied it. Sergeant Sanders appealed, invoking the collateral order doctrine as the purported basis for appellate jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit determined, however, that it lacked jurisdiction over Sergeant Sanders’ appeal to the extent his arguments depended on facts that differed from those the district court assumed in denying his summary judgment motion. Exercising jurisdiction over the abstract issues of law advanced by Sergeant Sanders, the Court held the district court did not err.

Shepherd v. Costco Wholesale Corp.

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CV-19-0144-PR

Opinion Date: March 8, 2021

Judge: Montgomery

Areas of Law: Health Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff does not have to allege bad faith or rebut the good faith presumption in his complaint asserting a claim of negligent disclosure of medical information in order to withstand a motion to dismiss based on the immunity provided by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2296. Plaintiff sued Costco, alleging several claims of action based on Costco's public disclosure of an embarrassing medication that Plaintiff twice rejected. Costco filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2296 provided immunity and that Plaintiff's claims were preempted by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff was not required to anticipate in his complaint Costco's affirmative defense of qualified immunity under section 12-2296 or to rebut the good faith presumption; and (2) Plaintiff permissibly referenced HIPAA to inform the standard of care for his negligence claim.

Calhoun v. Area Agency on Aging of Southeast Arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 Ark. 56

Opinion Date: March 11, 2021

Judge: Hudson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that Appellant was not entitled to a wage-loss award in addition to his impairment rating because Area Agency on Aging of Southeast Arkansas (AAA) extended to him a bona fide offer of employment, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's decision. Appellant was driving an AAA van that overturned, injuring Appellant. An ALJ determined that Appellant was entitled to a sixty percent wage-loss award and that Appellees made no bona fide job offer of employment because the position and wages were not clear. The Commission reversed, concluding that any wage-loss award was precluded because AAA made a bona fide and reasonable obtainable job offer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that AAA did not meet its burden to prove that Appellant was offered employment at wages equal to or greater than his average weekly wage at the time of the accident.

Wermerskirchen v. Canadian National Railroad

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 18-2039

Opinion Date: March 5, 2021

Judge: Edward M. Mansfield

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Defendants in this personal injury case, holding that the Federal Railroad Safety Act preempted Plaintiff's excessive speed claims and that summary judgment was properly granted on his lookout and braking claims. The driver of a road grader was seriously injured when a train struck the grader while it crossed the railroad tracks. The driver sued the railroad and the train crew alleging failure to break, excessive speed, failure to keep a proper lookout, and failure to properly sound the horn. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all but the horn claims. After a trial, a jury returned verdicts for Defendants on the horn claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the driver's excessive speed claims were preempted by federal law; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted on the lookout and braking claims based on lack of causation.

Hyundai Motor America, et al. v. Applewhite, et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2015-CA-01886-SCT

Opinion Date: March 11, 2021

Judge: Michael K. Randolph

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury

This case arose from a two-car accident in Mississippi in which a Hyundai Excel was traveling southbound at a closing speed of 68 to 78 mph and, for reasons unknown, crossed the center line into the oncoming lane of traffic, striking a Lincoln Continental passenger car traveling northbound. None of the three Excel occupants survived the collision. This case made it to the Mississippi Supreme Court after an earlier appeal and remand for a new trial. During the remand proceedings, multiple discovery disputes ensued before the trial court ultimately held two 606(b) hearings on October 30, 2018, and January 23, 2019 (nearly four years after the trial court’s original denial of relief). The trial court expressly found that one of Applewhite’s counsel, Dennis Sweet, III, misrepresented his relationship with a witness, Carey Sparks, during the April 2015 hearing. It was not until a January 25, 2018 hearing, that Sweet admitted that he had paid Sparks to perform services during the Applewhite trial. This admission was made only after documents evidencing multiple payments to Sparks by Sweet surfaced in the discovery ordered by the Supreme Court. During discovery, multiple witnesses, including six attorneys, testified that Sparks stated that he had knowledge of discussions of the jurors during the trial. Following the 606(b) hearings, the trial court issued a one-paragraph order, finding that the posttrial testimony of the jurors offered no evidence supporting Defendants’ allegations. Reviewing the trial court proceedings, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded "a fair and impartial trial was not had." The Court found "overwhelming evidence of actual impropriety, which destroys any confidence in the jury verdict. The facts developed in this record threaten the public’s confidence in our system of justice. We find that this case is permeated by actual deception upon the trial court, which led to Plaintiffs’ obtaining a favorable ruling. Such improper acts of misconduct leave a indelible stain on these proceedings. We are loathe to overturn jury verdicts, yet justice dictates a reversal and a retrial, unencumbered by extraneous assaults on our justice system. We considered the ultimate sanction of dismissal of this case with prejudice. We decline to impose such a severe sanction, for no evidence suggests that any Plaintiff employed Sparks or had knowledge of Sparks’s actions. But the judgment must be reversed." This case was remanded for a new trial.

Holmes v. Holmes

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC98673

Opinion Date: March 8, 2021

Judge: George W. Draper, III

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's wrongful death lawsuit against Union Pacific Railroad Company under the Federal Employes' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, et seq. (FELA), holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her petition out of time. Plaintiff brought this action in her purported capacity as the personal representative of the estate of her husband (Decedent). In its motion to dismiss, Union Pacific argued that, prior to filing suit, Plaintiff was not appointed the personal representative of Decedent's estate, as required under 45 U.S.C 51. The circuit court granted Plaintiff thirty days to obtain the appointment and amend her petition. Plaintiff, however, was not appointed the personal representative of Decedent's estate until after the deadline. The circuit court dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to further extend the deadline for Plaintiff to file an amended petition out of time.

Rodriguez v. Lasting Hope Recovery Center

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 308 Neb. 538

Opinion Date: March 5, 2021

Judge: Michael G. Heavican

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants in this wrongful death action, holding that the district court properly found that Defendants owed no legal duty under the circumstances. Mikael Loyd was a patient for six days at Lasting Hope Recovery Center, a mental health facility, where he was treated by a psychiatrist employed by the University of Nebraska Medical Center Physicians (UNMC Physicians). The day he was released Loyd killed his ex-girlfriend, Melissa Rodriguez. As special administrator's for Melissa's estate, her parents brought this action against Lasting Hope and UNMC Physicians for failing to warn and protect Melissa from Loyd. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, concluding that they owed no legal duty to Melissa. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Melissa's death was not legally attributable to the breach of duty by Defendants because Loyd never communicated to them that he intended to harm Melissa.

Smith v. Zilverberg

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 137 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 7

Opinion Date: March 4, 2021

Judge: Cadish

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court held that the district court properly determined that the allegedly defamatory statements made by Respondents Kay Zilverberg and Victoria Eagan fell within the protections of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes and that Appellant Jason Smith did not demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claims. Appellant was a professional thrifter, and Respondents were thrifters. When Respondents criticized Appellant for bullying behavior Appellant filed a complaint alleging that Respondents' statements were false and defamatory. Respondents filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and awarded Respondents attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly granted the anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss; and (2) Appellant failed to show with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claims.

Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 137 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 6

Opinion Date: March 4, 2021

Judge: James W. Hardesty

Areas of Law: Drugs & Biotech, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a petition for a writ of mandamus stemming from lawsuits brought against generic drug manufacturers for selling vials of propofol to ambulatory surgical centers despite an allegedly foreseeable risk that they would be used on multiple patients, holding that some of the claims were preempted. Plaintiffs alleged that Petitioners knew or should have known that selling 50 mL vials of propofol, as opposed to 20 mL vials, to ambulatory surgical centers with high patient turnover was unsafe due to the risk of contamination from multi-dosing. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Plaintiff's claims conflicted with federal law. The district courts summarily denied the motions to dismiss. Petitioners then filed the instant writ petition. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs' negligence cause of action and request for punitive damages survived; but (2) the remainder of Plaintiffs' causes of action were preempted.

Arredondo v. SNH SE Ashley River Tenant, LLC

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28011

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: James

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

This appeal concerned the enforceability of an arbitration agreement executed between Ashley River Plantation, an assisted-living facility, and Thayer Arredondo, the attorney-in-fact under two powers of attorney executed by Hubert Whaley, a facility resident. When Whaley was admitted into the facility, Arredondo held two valid powers of attorney, a General Durable Power of Attorney (GDPOA) and a Health Care Power of Attorney (HCPOA). Arredondo met with a facility representative and signed various documents in connection with Whaley's admission. During that meeting, the facility representative did not mention or present an arbitration agreement to Arredondo. Later that day, after Whaley was admitted, Arredondo met with a different facility representative who, according to Arredondo, told her she "needed to sign additional documents related to [her] father's admission to the facility." Included among those documents was the arbitration agreement, which Arredondo signed. The arbitration agreement contained a mutual waiver of the right to a trial by judge or jury, and required arbitration of all claims involving potential damages exceeding $25,000. The agreement barred either party from appealing the arbitrators' decision, prohibited an award of punitive damages, limited discovery, and provided Respondents the unilateral right to amend the agreement. Two years into his stay at the facility, Whaley was admitted to the hospital, where he died six years later. Arredondo, as Personal Representative of Whaley's estate, brought this action alleging claims for wrongful death and survival against Respondents. The complaint alleged that during his residency at the facility, Whaley suffered serious physical injuries and died as a result of Respondents' negligence and recklessness. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals held the arbitration agreement was enforceable. The South Carolina Supreme Court held neither power of attorney gave Arredondo the authority to sign the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the court of appeals was reversed.

Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Walls

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28012

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Kaye Gorenflo Hearn

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company ("Nationwide") relied on flight-from-law enforcement and felony step-down provisions in an automobile liability insurance policy to limit its coverage to the statutory mandatory minimum. Following a bench trial and after issuance of the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Williams v. Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO), 409 S.C. 586 (2014), the circuit court held the step-down provisions were void pursuant to Section 38-77-142(C) of the South Carolina Code (2015). The court of appeals reversed. Three individuals, Sharmin Walls, Randi Harper, and Christopher Timms, were passengers in a vehicle driven by Korey Mayfield that crashed in 2008 following a high-speed chase by law enforcement. Mayfield refused to pull over, and during the chase, the trooper's vehicle reached speeds of 109 miles per hour. All the passengers begged Mayfield to stop the car, but Mayfield refused. Eventually, the trooper received instructions to terminate the pursuit, which he did. Nevertheless, Mayfield continued speeding and lost control of the vehicle. Timms died in the single-car accident, and Walls, Harper, and Mayfield sustained serious injuries. After being charged with reckless homicide, Mayfield entered an Alford plea. At the time of the accident, Walls' automobile was insured through her Nationwide policy, which included bodily injury and property damage liability coverage with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. Walls also maintained uninsured motorist (UM) coverage for the same limits, but she did not have underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. In reliance on the aforementioned provisions, Nationwide paid only $50,000 in total to the injured passengers (the statutory minimum as provided by law) rather than the liability limits stated in the policy. Safe Auto, Mayfield's insurance company, also paid a total of $50,000 to the passengers. Nationwide brought this declaratory judgment action requesting the court declare that the passengers were not entitled to combined coverage of more than $50,000 for any claims arising from the accident. Walls answered, denying there was any evidence that the flight-from-law enforcement and felony provisions applied. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 38-77-142(C) rendered Nationwide's attempt to limit the contracted-for liability insurance to the mandatory minimum void.

Billman v. Clarke Machine, Inc.

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: INC., 2021 S.D. 18

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: David Gilbertson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Department of Labor and Regulation denying Steven Billman's application for permanent total disability benefits, holding that the Department's determination that Billman was not obviously unemployable was clearly erroneous. During his employment, Billman suffered a work-related injury that required the amputation of his left leg just below the knee. The Department denied Billman's application for benefits, finding that Billman was not obviously unemployable and that he failed to conduct a reasonable job search. The circuit court affirmed the Department's findings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Billman established that he was obviously unemployable, and therefore, he was entitled to odd-lot disability benefits.

In re Gilberto Gonzales

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 20-0506

Opinion Date: March 5, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court conditionally granted the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Gilberto Gonzales challenging a trial court order allowing Houston Distributing Company to designate an unknown person as a responsible third party, holding that Gonzales was entitled to relief. Gonzales sued Houston Distributing, alleging that it negligently caused an automobile accident. One hundred and thirty-five days after filing its answer, Houston Distributing filed a motion for leave to designate an unknown person as a responsible third party. The trial court granted the motion. Gonzales petitioned the Supreme Court for relief, challenging the order. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting Houston Distributing's motion to designate "John Doe" as an unknown responsible third party, holding that the trial court failed properly to apply Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 33.004 and abused its discretion by granting Houston Distributing's motion for leave to designate John Doe as an unknown responsible third party.