Latest 16 Cases This Week: Brownback v. King (U.S.), Molina-Diaz v. Rosen (1st Cir.), Oliveira v. Wilkinson (1st Cir.)

Death Penalty Opponents Should Rethink Their Support for Life Without Parole Sentences

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—argues that life sentences without the possibility of parole (LWOP) are as problematic and damaging as the death penalty. For this reason, Professor Sarat calls upon death penalty opponents to reconsider their support for LWOP sentences.

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Brownback v. King

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 19-546

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: Clarence Thomas

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) allows a plaintiff to bring certain state-law tort claims against the United States for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment if the plaintiff alleges six statutory elements of an actionable claim, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) bars “any action by the claimant” involving the same subject matter against the federal employee whose act gave rise to the claim. King sued the government under the FTCA after a violent encounter with federal task force members and sued the officers individually under “Bivens.” The district court dismissed his FTCA claims, holding that the government was immune because the officers were entitled to qualified immunity under Michigan law, then dismissed King’s Bivens claims. The Sixth Circuit found that the dismissal of King’s FTCA claims did not trigger the judgment bar to block his Bivens claims. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The dismissal was a judgment on the merits of the FTCA claims that can trigger the judgment bar, similar to common-law claim preclusion. Whether the undisputed facts established all the elements of King’s FTCA claims is a quintessential merits decision. The court also determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because, in the unique context of the FTCA, all elements of a meritorious claim are also jurisdictional. Generally, a court may not issue a ruling on the merits when it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, but when pleading a claim and pleading jurisdiction entirely overlap, a ruling that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits.

Molina-Diaz v. Rosen

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 15-2321

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the order of the immigration judge (IJ) denying Petitioner's application for withholding of removal, holding that the IJ and BIA made legal errors. Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, twice entered the United States without authorization. After the government ordered Petitioner removed to Honduras, Petitioner filed an application for withholding of removal. The IJ denied the motion. The BIA affirmed and denied Petitioner's motion to reopen and remand. The First Circuit vacated the removal order and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings, holding (1) the BIA erred in dismissing Petitioner's appeal based on her failure to corroborate; and (2) the BIA erred in finding that Petitioner did not adequately apply for relief under the Convention Against Torture.

Oliveira v. Wilkinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1258

Opinion Date: February 22, 2021

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the determination of an immigration judge (IJ) that Petitioners, a husband and wife who were natives and citizens of Brazil, were not eligible for an adjustment of status pursuant to the "grandfathering" provisions of section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), holding that the BIA and IJ did not appropriately focus their inquiry. On appeal, Petitioners argued that the BIA applied incorrect standards in determining that a labor certification application (LCA) filed on behalf of the petitioner husband was not "approvable when filed" and erred in denying their motion to remand. The First Circuit held (1) determining whether an LCA is approvable when filed requires a holistic inquiry that is not a license to deny grandfathering based on any perceived shortcoming in an LCA; and (2) the IJ and BIA did not keep their focus on that inquiry in the course of their evaluation of the petitioner's LCA.

Victim Rights Law Center v. Foundation for Individual Rights in Education

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 20-1748

Opinion Date: February 18, 2021

Judge: LaPlante

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' motion to intervene in the underlying suit involving a challenge to the U.S. Department of Education's recent promulgation of a challenged regulation, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to intervene. The regulation at issue sets the standard for actionable sexual harassment for administrative enforcement of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and provides additional procedural protections to students who have been accused of sexual harassment. Appellants - the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Independent Women's Law Center, and Speech First, Inc. - moved to intervene. The district court denied the motion, finding that Appellants had failed to show that the government would not adequately protect their rights. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying intervention.

Transportation Division of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers v. Federal Railroad Administration

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Dockets: 19-71787, 19-71802, 19-71916, 19-71918

Opinion Date: February 23, 2021

Judge: Consuelo Maria Callahan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law

In 2016, the FRA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposing a national minimum requirement of two crew members for trains. In 2019, the FRA issued an order purporting to adopt a nationwide maximum one-person crew rule and to preempt "any state laws concerning that subject matter." Two Unions and three states petitioned for review of the Order under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). As a preliminary matter, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Unions' petition because venue was not proper under 28 U.S.C. 2343. The panel explained that the Unions' principal officers were not in the Ninth Circuit. The panel concluded that it had jurisdiction over the States' petitions because they were sufficiently aggrieved to invoke jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2344. On the merits, the panel held that the FRA's Order does not implicitly preempt state safety rules, that the FRA failed to comply with the APA's notice-and-comment provisions in issuing the Order, and that the order is arbitrary and capricious. The panel explained that the Order's basis for its action did not withstand scrutiny, and the FRA's contemporaneous explanation was lacking. In this case, the States met their burden of showing that the issuance of the Order violated the APA. Accordingly, the panel dismissed the petition for review but granted the States' petitions, vacating the Order.

United States v. State Water Resources Control Board

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-15145

Opinion Date: February 24, 2021

Judge: Milan D. Smith

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting a partial stay under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), of three state law claims, in an action brought by the United States alleging that the California State Water Resources Board violated various provisions of the California Environmental Quality Control Act. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in granting a partial Colorado River stay. The panel explained that partial stays pursuant to Colorado River are permissible only in very limited circumstances, namely when there is strong evidence of forum shopping. In this case, there is little evidence of forum shopping. The panel also concluded that it could not affirm the district court on the basis of Pullman abstention where the Board, which did not cross-appeal, cannot ask the court to affirm on Pullman grounds. The panel reasoned that it would necessarily have to stay the intergovernmental immunity claim, which the district court allowed to proceed. On remand, the panel instructed the district court to allow the United States' claims to proceed, subject to regular issues of justiciability.

International Transmission Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-1190

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Cornelia Thayer Livingston Pillard

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

The DC Circuit denied a petition for review brought by three electrical transmission companies (Transcos), subsidiaries of the same parent company, challenging FERC's decision to reduce the enhanced return on equity FERC had previously authorized them to collect from ratepayers due to their status as standalone transmission companies. The court rejected ITC's contention that FERC arbitrarily and capriciously departed from precedent establishing a particular methodology to assess Transco independence. The court explained that FERC, consistent with its stated intent in Order No. 679, never established any definitive methodology, let alone the one ITC claims it did. In this case, FERC has consistently applied a case-by-case approach to determining Transco independence, considering ownership and business structure as part of that inquiry since it first granted a Transco adder in 2003. When the adder was codified in 2006, Order No. 679 built on prior practice by identifying certain criteria that ITC now mistakenly claims constitute "a new corporate-structure test." The court also rejected ITC's contention that FERC exceeded its statutory authority by reducing ITC's Transco adders without first finding the adders to be unjust and unreasonable. Rather, the court concluded that there was substantial evidence to support FERC’s finding that the merger had reduced ITC's independence, thereby rendering the existing adders unjust and unreasonable.

Bitmanagement Software GMBH v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 20-1139

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: O'Malley

Areas of Law: Copyright, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts, Intellectual Property

In 2013, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command installed copyrighted graphics-rendering software created by German company Bitmanagement onto all computers in the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet. No express contract or license agreement authorized the Navy’s actions. In 2016, Bitmanagement filed suit, alleging copyright infringement, 28 U.S.C. 1498(b). The Claims Court found that, while Bitmanagement had established a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the Navy was not liable because it was authorized to make copies by an implied license, arising from the Navy’s purchase of individual licenses to test the software and various agreements between the Navy and the vendor. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for the calculation of damages. The Claims Court ended its analysis prematurely by failing to consider whether the Navy complied with the terms of the implied license, which can readily be understood from the parties’ entire course of dealings. The implied license was conditioned on the Navy using a license-tracking software, Flexera, to “FlexWrap” the program and monitor the number of simultaneous users. The Navy failed to effectively FlexWrap the copies it made; Flexera tracking did not occur as contemplated by the implied license. That failure to comply creates liability for infringement.

Moore v. Tyson

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190547

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Chris and Suzanne Moore, as parents and next friends of Sydney Moore, a minor, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Pamela Tyson and Jennifer Douthit, two employees of the Huntsville City Board of Education ("the Board"), with regard to negligence and wantonness claims asserted against Tyson and Douthit by the Moores arising from injuries suffered by Sydney at her elementary school. Tyson was employed by the Board as a teacher at Goldsmith-Schiffman Elementary School. Douthit was employed as the principal of the school. Sydney was enrolled at the school as a third-grade student in Tyson's class. Tyson left the students unsupervised in the classroom while she went to the restroom. During that time, Sydney and another student in the class left their seats, and, according to Sydney, the other student caused her to fall and hit her head and face on a counter in the classroom. Sydney suffered injuries from her fall, including fractures of her left orbital bone, her eye socket, and her nose and entrapment of her eye. Sydney was admitted for treatment at a hospital and underwent surgery as a result of the injuries. THe Alabama Supreme Court determined the Moores did not demonstrate the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Tyson and Douthit based on immunity. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Gerwig v. Gordon

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D076921(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The issue this case presented was one of first impression for the Court of Appeal: whether a licensee can rebut an Evidence Code presumption that chemical blood tests were properly conducted, and the results are thus reliable. Plaintiff William Lee Gerwig crashed into the back of another vehicle at an intersection. He was thrown from his motorcycle and landed on the asphalt. California Highway Patrol Officer Jacob Rebelo responded to the scene and spoke with Gerwig while he was receiving medical attention. Based on his lethargic responses, the smell of alcohol, and his inability to recall the collision details, Rebelo suspected Gerwig was intoxicated. Rebelo arrested Gerwig for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), and watched while state-certified phlebotomist Francisco Moreno collected two vials of blood using a nonalcoholic swab to clean the site. Rebelo took the vials himself and entered them into evidence. Test results from Gerwig’s blood draw showed a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of .25 percent. At the Department of Motor Vehicle hearing, Gerwig’s counsel called an employee of Specimen Specialists of America, Inc. (SSI), the company that dispatched phlebotomist Moreno to draw Gerwig’s blood. Through the employee’s testimony, counsel demonstrated that certain SSI procedures were out of compliance with state regulations that govern blood test procedures. In particular, Moreno was functionally unsupervised and the manual that SSI provided for phlebotomists had not been approved by a physician and surgeon. After eliciting testimony to demonstrate these procedural failings, counsel argued that the test results could not be relied on due to SSI’s regulatory violations. The Court of Appeal concluded that licensees rebut the Evidence Code presumption only when they cast doubt on the integrity of the test. "It is not enough to show a violation of governing regulations that has only a tenuous connection to the accuracy of the results. Here, because plaintiff proved a regulatory violation with only an indirect and speculative relationship to the manner in which the blood test was conducted, and thus the reliability of the test results," the Court affirmed the order denying mandamus relief.

Sweeney v. California Regional Water Quality Control Board

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A153583(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Siggins

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Sweeney bought the 39-acre Point Buckler Site, located in Suisun Marsh in the San Francisco Bay's Grizzly Bay, which apparently was previously operated as a managed wetland for duck hunting. Sweeney undertook unpermitted construction and development, including restoring an exterior levee and opening a private recreational area for kiteboarding. The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) inspected the Site, noting the unauthorized work and multiple violations; the levee construction work had removed tidal flow to the Site’s interior and dried out tidal marsh areas. BCDC concluded the Site never functioned as a managed wetland and had long reverted to a tidal marsh. Sweeney was directed to stop work and informed that a marsh development permit was required to develop the Site; BCDC indicated that any work that could not be retroactively approved would need to be removed. The Regional Water Quality Control Board commenced separate proceedings, citing violations of the federal Clean Water Act and the California Water Code. BCDC staff observed that additional work had been performed since the earlier inspection. The Board issued a cleanup and abatement order (CAO), imposed administrative civil liabilities and required payment of approximately $2.8 million in penalties. The superior court set aside those orders. The court of appeal reversed. In issuing the CAO, the Board did not violate the requirements of Water Code section 13627; the CAO satisfied the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act criteria for enforcement actions and did not conflict with the Suisun Marsh Preservation Act. The court rejected arguments that the definition of waste cannot include earthen material, that the activities did not constitute “discharges,” and that any discharges were not into “waters of the state.”

Emerson v. Hillsborough County

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Dockets: SC19-1250, SC19-1343

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: Charles T. Canady

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court struck in its entirety an amendment to the Hillsborough County Charter adopted in an initiative election that approved a transportation surtax and directives for allocating the tax proceeds, holding that the spending directives were unconstitutional. The charter amendment at issue enacted a one percent transportation sales surtax and included various provisions governing the use and distribution of the tax's proceeds. Here, the Supreme Court reviewed the circuit court's judgment validating the Hillsborough County Commission's authorization of the issuance of bonds to be funded by a portion of the proceeds of the surtax. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court to the extent that it upheld the validity of any portion of the amendment, holding that core provisions of the amendment were inconsistent with the surtax statute and because the invalid provisions and the remaining provisions of the amendment form an interlocking plan, the amendment was unconstitutional in its entirety.

Wittkopf v. Stewart's Firefighter Food Catering, Inc.

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46860

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

This case arose from an Idaho Industrial Commission determination denying an application for unemployment benefits. William Wittkopf appealed pro se the Commission’s determination that he was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he voluntarily quit his job without good cause and he willfully made a false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact in his unemployment application. On appeal, Wittkopf challenged the factual findings made by the Commission and argued it violated his right to due process by taking into consideration the fact that he voluntarily terminated his employment approximately two and a half years prior to applying for unemployment benefits. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded: (1) Wittkopf failed to provide a cogent argument on appeal regarding whether his right to due process was violated; (2) the Commission’s determination that Wittkopf voluntarily terminated his employment at Stewart’s Firefighter without good cause and without exhausting all reasonable alternatives was supported by substantial and competent evidence; and (3) the Commission’s determination that Wittkopf willfully made a false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact in order to obtain benefits was supported by substantial and competent evidence. Accordingly, the Commission’s decision and order denying Wittkopf’s application for unemployment benefits was affirmed.

Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Kane County Commission

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 UT 7

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: Matthew B. Durrant

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing this complaint brought by the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) alleging that the Kane and Garfield County Commissions violated Utah's Open and Public Meetings Act (the Act), Utah Code 52-4-101 to 52-4-305, holding that the district court erred. The dispute leading to this litigation was whether the Commissions violated the Act when they failed to provide public notice or allow attendance at certain Commission members had with the United States Secretary of the Interior. The district court dismissed SUWA's complaint for lack of standing and concluded that the Act did not apply to the meetings at issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) SUWA had standing to bring these claims; and (2) the court erred in concluding that the Act did not apply because, even under the district court's interpretation of the Act, the allegations in SUWA's complaint were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Southern Utah Wilderness v. San Juan County Commission

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 UT 6

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: Matthew B. Durrant

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's dismissal of this complaint brought by the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) alleging that the San Juan County Commission violated SUWA's rights under Utah's Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code 52-4-101 to 52-4-305, holding that SUWA's complaint was sufficient to survive dismissal. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that SUWA failed to allege that the participants in the disputed meetings had discussed a matter over which the Commission had jurisdiction or advisory power. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) SUWA had standing to bring a challenge under the Act; and (2) the district court erred in dismissing SUWA's claims because the pleadings in SUWA's complaint were sufficient even if this Court were to adopt a proposed interpretation of the Act proffered by the Commission.

Smith v. Chestnut Ridge Storage, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 19-1076

Opinion Date: February 24, 2021

Judge: Armstead

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioners' motion for summary judgment, holding that Petitioners were immune from Respondent's lawsuit pursuant to the litigation privilege and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Petitioners executed an oil and gas lease to a company that assigned 2,300 acres of Petitioners' tract to Respondent for a storage project. Respondent then applied to FERC for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct and operate a storage field. Petitioners intervened in the FERC proceeding. FERC eventually granted Respondent's request. When Respondent did not complete construction of the storage facility within the required amount of time it sought a three-year extension. Petitioners opposed the extension, and FERC denied Respondent's request to extend the timeframe. Thereafter, Petitioners filed suit against Respondent alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory judgment. Respondent filed a counterclaim alleging, inter alia, breach of contract. Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were immune from suit pursuant to the litigation privilege and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the litigation privilege and Noerr-Pennington doctrine provided Petitioners with immunity from all of Respondent's counterclaims.