| In re Austin J. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B299564(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Frances Rothschild Areas of Law: Family Law, Native American Law |
| The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning seven of Mother's children. Leslie is the presumed father of the four older children and Edward is the presumed father of the three younger children. The court held that the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). In this case, California was the children's home state for purposes of the UCCJEA, and thus California courts have jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination. The court also held that the duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 were not met with respect to Edward's side of the family, but were met with respect to Mother's and Leslie's side of the family. |
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| Marriage of Mohler |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E071314(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 13, 2020 Judge: Raphael Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The sole issue in this appeal was how to allocate the value of a Rancho Cucamonga residential property lived in by plaintiff-respondent Jodie Mohler and defendant-appellant Greg Mohler during their marriage. Greg entered the marriage owning a home that the parties lived in as spouses for over 12 years. The parties agreed that application of the "Moore/Marsden" rule through the date of their separation resulted in the community beneficially owning 33.66 percent of the property. However, by the time of their dissolution trial, the husband had lived in the property for more than six years post-separation, paying the mortgage with his separate income. At the wife’s request, the trial court found that the community’s interest in the property continued to increase throughout those years, just as if community funds had been used to pay the mortgage during that time, resulting in the community obtaining a 64.9 percent interest in the property. The Court of Appeal concluded that was error: the Moore/Marsden rule applied only insofar as community funds were used to build equity in an asset, a situation which often terminates, as it did here, upon separation. "Watts" charges equitably compensate the community for one spouse’s use of a community-owned home. Therefore, as a matter of first impression, the Court held Watts charges could be levied against a spouse for his or her post-separation occupation of a property where the property is not entirely community property, but rather was treated as partially community property due to the Moore/Marsden rule. The trial court's judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for the proper application of Moore/Marsden and calculation of any Watts charges. |
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| DJ v. CJ |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-17-0000027 Opinion Date: April 13, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the intermediate court of appeals' (ICA) amended judgment remanding this custody case to the family court for further proceedings, holding that the ICA did not err by holding that the family court abused its discretion in denying Father's request for a continuance to seek the assistance of an attorney. Mother filed a motion for post-decree relief requesting sole physician and joint legal custody of the parties' two minor children so that she could relocate to North Carolina. Both parties proceeded to trial without attorneys. Father, who had a Tagalog interpreter available at trial, experienced difficulty cross-examining witnesses and orally requested a continuance so that he could obtain the assistance of an attorney. The family court denied as untimely Father's motion. The court then ruled that it was in the children's best interests to relocate with Mother. The ICA vacated the family court's ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court abused its discretion in denying Father's motion for a continuance. |
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| DHW v. Jane Doe |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 47230 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Stegner Areas of Law: Family Law |
| Jane Doe (Mother) executed a voluntary consent to terminate her parental rights to Son. Mother shortly thereafter filed a motion to rescind her consent. The magistrate court denied the motion. Termination proceedings were then conducted without Mother, her counsel, or a guardian ad litem for Mother being present. Following the hearing, Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the magistrate court erred in failing to appoint a replacement guardian ad litem for Mother. "At the time Mother executed the waiver, there was still an outstanding question, recognized but not addressed by the magistrate court, as to Mother’s need for a guardian ad litem. This outstanding question hinged upon the results of Mother’s psychological evaluations, but was never answered despite the availability of these results. It is clear that Mother suffered from significant mental illness. ...However, having identified the earlier need for a guardian ad litem and the continuing need to have a guardian ad litem absent receiving evidence to the contrary, a replacement guardian was never appointed. There is substantial and competent evidence strongly indicating Mother’s ongoing need for a guardian ad litem." The termination was vacated and the matter remanded to the magistrate court for further proceedings. |
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| DHW v. John Doe |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 47534 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Stegner Areas of Law: Family Law |
| John Doe I (Child) was removed from the care of his paternal grandmother (Grandmother) and his father, John Doe (Father) after a referral was made to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department). The Department ultimately petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father failed to attend scheduled hearings, ceased communicating with the Department, and only sporadically contacted his attorney. Father’s counsel sought several continuances, but eventually the termination trial proceeded. Following trial, the magistrate court found that Father had failed to comply with the case plan and was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities. The magistrate court found it was in Child’s best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father’s principal argument on appeal was that the magistrate court abused its discretion in allowing the Department to amend its petition to terminate by adding a separate, alternate basis for termination, and by granting only a two-week continuance to Father to respond to this alternate theory. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| In re Estate of Kendall W. Hatch Jr. |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 46 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Joseph Jabar Areas of Law: Family Law, Real Estate & Property Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the probate court interpreting a divorce judgment and ruling that certain real property once held in joint tenancy by Karen Hatch and Kendall Hatch, was an assets of Kendall's estate, holding that the probate court's decision represented a reasonable interpretation of the underlying divorce judgment. Karen appealed the probate court's judgment, arguing that the court erred in holding that the joint tenancy was severed and that Kendell was the sole owner of the property at issue at the time of his death. Rather, Karen contended, the property was still held in joint tenancy at the time of Kendall's death and that she became sole owner by right of survivorship when he died. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the probate court did not err in interpreting the divorce judgment and subsequent orders of the district court in concluding that title to the property vested in Kendall before his death and that the joint tenancy was severed. |
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| Mathiesen v. Michaud |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 47 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Ellen A. Gorman Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the divorce between Todd Mathiesen and Karie Ann Michaud entered by the district court, holding that the court did not err in denying Mathiesen's motion for recusal. The trial court issued a divorce judgment that, among other things, awarded primary physical residence of the parties' child to Michaud. On appeal, Mathiesen's sole argument was that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for recusal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the judge's decision not to recuse himself was proper. |
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| In re A.L.P. |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 87 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Beth Baker Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to his child, A.L.P., holding that the district court erred when it based its finding that Father's treatment plan was unsuccessful solely on Father's incarceration, but the error was harmless. In terminating Father's parental rights, the district court found that Father had not successfully completed his treatment plan. The court further found clear and convincing evidence to conclude that the child was adjudicated as a youth in need of care, that Father had not successfully completed his treatment plan, that his conduct or condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court erred in finding that Father failed successfully to complete his treatment plan resulting solely from his incarceration, but the error was harmless in light of the fact that the district court made express findings that rendered a treatment plan unnecessary; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that it was in the child's best interests to terminate Father's parental rights. |
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| Reynolds v. Tufenkjian |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 19 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Silver Areas of Law: Contracts, Family Law, Real Estate & Property Law |
| In this case involving the extent to which a judgment debtor's rights of action are subject to execution to satisfy a judgment the Supreme Court held that a judgment debtor's claims that are unassignable cannot be purchased at an execution sale. Respondents filed a motion to substitute themselves in place of Appellants and to voluntarily dismiss this appeal because they purchased Appellants' rights and interests in the underlying action at a judgment execution sale. The Supreme Court denied the motion in part and granted the motion in part, holding (1) because Appellants' claims for fraud and elder exploitation were personal in nature, they were not assignable and not subject to execution at a sheriff's sale, and therefore, Respondents did not purchase the rights to these claims at the execution sale; and (2) Appellants' claims of negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract were assignable and subject to execution, and therefore, this appeal is dismissed as to these claims. |
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| In re N.M.P. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1458 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Donnelly Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court placing Mother's child in the permanent custody of the Portage County Department of Job and Family Services (the agency), holding that because the child was in the temporary custody of the agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the agency was entitled to seek permanent custody. After the was found to be a dependent child the agency was given temporary custody. Later, the agency filed a motion for permanent custody of the child. After a hearing, court placed the child in the permanent custody of the agency. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue was whether, under section 2151.414(B)(1)(d), an agency may seek permanent custody of a child only if the child has been in the temporary custody of the agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that permanent custody may be granted to an agency if the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month permanent and permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. |
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| Metcalf v. Metcalf |
| Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court Citation: 2020 OK 20 Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Yvonne Kauger Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to address a question of first impression: whether the presumption that the intent of an interspousal transfer of real property constitutes a gift may be rebutted when the admitted purpose of the transfer was to illegally allude any creditor's attempts to collect on a judgment. After petitioner-appellee, Lewis Metcalf transferred some of his separate, real property into the name of his wife, respondent-appellant Bonnie Watson Metcalf, he filed for divorce. When it came time to divide their property, the husband claimed this particular real property as his separate property, even though it was now held only in his wife's name. His explanation for placing the property into his wife's name was that he was trying to avoid creditors potentially collecting on a judgment in a lawsuit to which he was a party. The trial court determined that the property in question was his separate property, and divided the couple's remaining marital property, and denied support alimony. The wife appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held: (1) the presumption of an interspousal gift may not be overcome with evidence that the sole purpose for the transfer was to defraud creditors; (2) the trial court did not err in denying the wife support alimony; and (3) each party was responsible for their own appeal related attorney fees and costs. |
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| Randall v. Hooper |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 32 Opinion Date: April 10, 2020 Judge: Paul L. Reiber Areas of Law: Family Law |
| MiHae (Hooper) Randall (mother) filed a motion with the family division requesting Timothy Randall (father) pay a portion of her attorney’s fees relating to proceedings modifying the parties' parental rights and responsibilities. The court denied mother’s motion. Mother filed a motion to amend or alter the judgment, which the court also denied. Mother appealed. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s request for attorney’s fees and therefore affirmed. |
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| Pulkkila v. Pulkkila |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2018AP000712-FT Opinion Date: April 14, 2020 Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley Areas of Law: Family Law, Insurance Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals applying a constructive trust to proceeds Lynnea Landsee-Pulkkila collected from a life insurance policy maintained by her late husband, James Pulkkila, holding that the court of appeals erred in imposing a constructive trust absent findings of fact that would support such an imposition. In 2009, James and Joan Pulkkila divorced. In their marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was incorporated into the judgment of divorce James and Joan were required to maintain life insurance with their children as beneficiaries. In 2013, James and Lynnea were married. The following year, James submitted a beneficiary name change asking that Lynnea be made the sole beneficiary of the life insurance policy. After Lynnea was paid the proceeds of the policy, Joan asserted that James breached the MSA agreement and that a constructive trust should be placed on the proceeds. The circuit court denied Joan's motion for a constructive trust. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that equity required the imposition of a constructive trust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously exercised its discretion because it determined that a constructive trust was appropriate in the absence of an evidentiary hearing and resulting relevant factual findings. |
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| Clark v. State, Department of Family Services |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 50 Opinion Date: April 15, 2020 Judge: Kate M. Fox Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to two of his children, holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence relating to the children's mother and half siblings and that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Father's parental rights could be terminated under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-2-309. A jury concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of Father's parental rights on the grounds that the children had been abused or neglected by Father and the Department of Family Services' reasonable efforts had been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family and that the children had been in the State's custody for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and that Father was unfit to have custody and control of the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) evidence concerning Father's relationship with the children's mother and half siblings was relevant to the question of whether Father was currently fit to parent the children and thus was admissible; and (2) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find clear and convincing evidence that Father was unfit at the time of the termination hearings. |
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